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ABSTRACT 
This thesis aims at examining the possibility of education as initiation into social 
practices as an alternative to liberal education. To this end, the main arguments run as 
follows. 
Firstly, I argue that liberal education, as both the pursuit of rationality and the 
promotion of personal autonomy, does not give a satisfactory explanation of educational 
phenomena because of several internal and external criticisms. Both versions of liberal 
education have limitations for different reasons: in dealing with human practices and 
practical matters which are raised by vocationalists and in meeting a variety of social or 
communal demands that are addressed by communitarians, respectively. 
Secondly, I analyse the notion of 'social practices' as a basis for understanding 
'education as initiation into social practices' by examining a conventional conception and 
some recent influential conceptions. A conventional usage of 'practice' as opposed to 
'theory' is inappropriate in terms both of the Greek notion of 'praxis' and of Ryle's 
'knowing how' and Wittgenstein's 'language-games', and is also inappropriate from an 
educational perspective. On the other hand, positively, I establish my conception of social 
practices as a modified Maclntyrean conception by analysing MacIntyre's conception of 
'a practice' in its various dimensions and discussing Miller's and Schatzki's crucial 
distinctions within social practices. 
Lastly, I draw the overall picture of 'education as initiation into social practices' 
by comparing MacIntyre's, Hirst's and Langford's views and by applying them to 
teaching as education writ small, and I examine its possibility as an alternative to liberal 
education. I suggest that 'education as initiation into social practices' should be 
understood in a 'substantial'(prescriptive) sense and, on the basis of this, I tackle 
curriculum issues and teaching process. 
I conclude that social practices-based education could be an alternative to liberal 
education by taking a middle way between liberal education as the pursuit of rationality 
and as the promotion of personal autonomy. 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
A. The Main Purpose and Tasks of the Thesis 
The main purpose of this thesis is to examine the possibility of social practices-
based education as an alternative to liberal education. Social practices-based education 
in school education can be best expressed in the phrase 'education as initiating pupils into 
social practices'. This view presupposes dissatisfaction with liberal education. Hence, my 
main query lies in exploring how 'education as initiation into social practices' can 
overcome deficiencies of liberal education. To this end, I attempt: 
1) to explore the claims of liberal education both as the pursuit of rationality and the 
promotion of personal autonomy. 
2) to examine the claims of liberal education both as the pursuit of rationality and the 
promotion of personal autonomy in terms of internal and external criticisms of it. 
3) to critically look at a conventional conception of 'practice' that is in opposition to 
'theory'. 
4) to analyse and elaborate the conception of 'social practices'. 
5) to draw an overall picture of 'education as initiation into social practices'. 
6) to show what 'education as initiation into social practices' in school education would 
be like with regard to the selection of the curriculum content and teaching process. 
7) to justify why 'education as initiation into social practices' can be an alternative, or 
at least a complement, to liberal education. 
B. An Overview of Arguments 
The overall argument of the thesis can be outlined as follows. 
In Part I(Chapter 2 and 3), I argue with reference to internal and external 
criticisms, that liberal education, as both the pursuit of rationality or knowledge and the 
promotion of personal autonomy, does not give a satisfactory explanation of educational 
phenomena. 
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In Chapter 2, I mainly examine the claims and internal criticisms of two versions 
of liberal education. Liberal education as the pursuit of rationality addresses the 
development of rational mind or rationality as its intrinsic aim through initiating pupils 
into several forms of knowledge. This is justified by the transcendental argument. 
However, neither the forms of knowledge that are specifications or contents of education 
for rationality, nor the transcendental argument that is the way of justification for the 
pursuit of knowledge for its own sake, stand on firm ground. On the other hand, liberal 
education as the promotion of personal autonomy, whether the rationalistic model or the 
desire-satisfaction model, emphasises one's autonomous choice or life. The former model 
which underlines 'rational autonomy' is often associated with liberal education as the 
pursuit of rationality and thus it may face similar limitations to those which liberal 
education as the pursuit of rationality faced. The desire-satisfaction model stresses the 
satisfaction of one's needs and desires in exercising one's autonomy, whether post-
reflective desire-satisfaction or informed desire. However, the relations between reason 
and desires, and between one's desires and others' desires, are not clear. 
In Chapter 3, I discuss the fundamental weaknesses of liberal education in the 
light of external challenges. Liberal education as the pursuit of rationality may not satisfy 
many practical demands which are not intrinsic but very important for human life or 
society. Liberal education as the promotion of personal autonomy may have some 
limitations in meeting a variety of social or communal demands, although some liberals 
assume social and political frameworks and they also recognise that the self is, to some 
extent, embedded in one's society. But, liberal education as the promotion of personal 
autonomy may be not enough in coping with stronger communitarian challenges which 
claim that education should be derived from social demands which are based on the 
public nature of education. 
In Part II(Chapter 4 and 5), I analyse the notion of 'social practices', which is a 
central concept in understanding 'education as initiation into social practices', in two 
ways: by examining a conventional but inadequate way, and by looking at influential 
conceptions. 
In Chapter 4, I try to show that a conventional usage of 'practice' which is often 
understood as 'everything that is not theory' is mistaken in terms both of the Greek 
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notion of 'praxis' and of Ryle's 'knowing how' and Wittgenstein's 'language-games', 
and from an educational perspective. The Greek notion ofpraxis(doing) makes sense in 
relation to 'poiesis'(making or producing), these being two modes of practical activity, 
rather than 'theoria'. For Ryle, 'knowing how' is logically prior to 'knowing that' and 
thus practice is not' a step-child of theory', but rather theory cannot be fully understood 
without participating in practices to which someone belongs. In an educational context, 
the strict dichotomy between theory and practice may not be plausible in that it tends to 
overlook the nature of educational practices and the role of practitioners who engage in 
them. 
In Chapter 5, I explore five criteria (coherent and complex forms of socially 
established co-operative human activities; achievement of internal goods; standards of 
excellence; rule-governed or rule-following activities; and their improvement by ongoing 
traditions) and three dimensions (human activity, society and tradition) of a (social) 
practice through analysing MacIntyre's account of it. I also try to establish my conception 
of social practices by discussing Miller's 'self-contained' and 'purposive' practices, and 
Schatzki's 'dispersed' and 'integrative' practices. Through this process, in the end, I take 
a modified MacIntyrean conception of social practices. That is, I basically take 
MacIntyre's criteria of a social practice, but I am inclined to understand social practices 
in a purposive and integrative sense. 
In Part III(Chapter 6, 7 and 8), I explore what 'education as initiation into social 
practices' means by comparing MacIntyre'S, Hirst's and Langford's views and by 
understanding it in the light of teaching as a specific educational context. 
In Chapter 6, I try to draw the overall picture of 'education as initiation into 
social practices' by analysis of the conception of 'initiation' and by comparing three 
writers' views. The phrase 'education as initiation into social practices' should be 
understood in a 'substantial'(prescriptive) sense- in that education not only should be 
derived from current social practices, but also should bring about concrete prescriptions, 
such as changes of an educational perspective, selecting the curriculum content and 
teaching process- which goes beyond a formal or descriptive sense that education is a 
(kind of) social practice. In this regard, MacIntyre, Hirst and Langford provide us with 
the central features of 'education as initiation into social practices'. MacIntyre's account 
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of social practices underlines the achievement of internal goods and their relation with 
the virtues. Hirst's view of education tends to understand it in a rationalistic way in that 
it can be achieved from engaging in socially constructed rational practices and, thus, the 
role of education lies mainly in developing practical judgements, so as to choose the most 
defensible practices and critically reflect on various social practices in the light of one's 
desires and the good life. Langford addresses the social nature of education and the 
degree to which education is often equated with socialisation in that to become persons 
is to be members of society who are to assimilate social values as their own values. My 
overall picture of social practices-based education is, in short, that through initiating 
students into current pervasive social practices it is developing educated publics who will 
bring about the flourishing of society as a whole. 
In Chapter 7, I try to show a clearer picture of 'education as initiation into social 
practices' by applying it to teaching as education writ small, that is, by considering 
conceptions of teaching, curriculum issues and teaching process in terms of social 
practices. With respect to the content of curriculum, whatever the content of curriculum, 
it should grow out of social practices to which one or a society belongs and a mere list 
of the spheres of human life is not enough for selecting the content of curriculum. Rather, 
it should be integrated into forms of life and aspects of experience. It is natural, therefore, 
that the content in a social practice-based curriculum will be selected by its significance 
for one's everyday life and a flourishing society in the light of ongoing traditions of social 
practices, and thus the contents are never taken for granted or have canonical status. The 
teaching process of social practices-based education, as I show by exemplifying 
citizenship education and environment education, can be portrayed in terms of the variety 
and flexibility of teaching methods. The most striking feature of a social practices-based 
teaching process may lie in not only starting with pervasive social practices, but also in 
resulting in flourishing social practices and society. 
In Chapter 8, as a concluding chapter, I discuss why social practices-based 
education is better than liberal education in terms of integration of the 
academic/vocational, the individual/society, and the theory/practice divides. Furthermore, 
I examine the possibility of social practices-based education as an alternative to liberal 
education. My argument for this, in the end, takes a middle way between liberal education 
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as the pursuit of rationality and as the promotion of personal autonomy in terms of the 
nature of each form of education, its justification and its underlying ground. The middle 
way involves i) a social picture of education rather than universal or individual pictures 
of education, ii) internal justification rather than intrinsic justification or autonomy for 
personal well-being iii) a grounding in real human practices rather than personal desires 
or transcendental logic. Lastly, I examine some possible objections to social practices-
based education and some reflections on my thesis as a text in relation to real social 
practices; these reflections include limitations on my thesis, contributions it can make and 
further tasks for research. 
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Part I. Liberal Education and Its Limitations 
When we examine a possibility of 'education as initiation into social practices' 
as an alternative to liberal education, the first task that we should tackle may be the 
question: what is wrong with liberal education? To do this, what exactly liberal education 
means should be answered, but it is not so easy to answer straightforwardly, because the 
liberal education tradition itself is 'complex and pluralistic in character'(Gray, 1995, p. 
21). 
There seem to be two (or three) different versions of liberal education: as the 
pursuit of rationality; as the promotion of autonomy; (and maybe also as the education 
appropriate to political liberalism)l. Liberal education as the pursuit of rationality in 
general and of knowledge in particular was, as represented by Peters and Hirst, a typical 
liberal education tradition for the 1960s and 1970s. For Peters and Hirst, roughly 
speaking, the heart of education in general and liberal education in particular is the 
development of rational mind or reasoning and thus addresses the pursuit of knowledge 
and understanding as the real core of developing rational mind. Liberal education as the 
development of rational autonomy is related to, and influenced by, the former tradition. 
This tradition can be found in various liberals on education, notably J. White, although 
recently his view of autonomy has slightly changed: from limited concern to wide 
concern. His recent view of autonomy, which emphasises desire satisfaction in deciding 
one's (autonomous) choice, tends to emphasise political contexts for autonomy, whilst 
his earlier view of autonomy, which addresses reason, is more or less detached from 
social and political contexts. For White, personal autonomy is a crucial value within a 
liberal democratic framework rather than for its own sake and this seems to be influenced 
by political liberalism. 
In this Part I, what I want to argue is why liberal education, as both the pursuit of 
rationality and the promotion of personal autonomy, does not, in view of internal and 
external criticisms of it, give a satisfactory explanation of educational phenomena. In 
lHowever, I am not directly concern with poiiticaiiiberalism, although it is partly involved in White's 
liberal education and the liberal-communitarian debate. 
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Chapter 2, I shall mainly deal with the claims and internal criticisms of the two versions 
of liberal education, i.e. liberal education as the pursuit of rationality and as the 
promotion of personal autonomy. In Chapter 3, I shall examine the two versions of liberal 
education in the light of the two challenges, i.e. vocational education and communitarian 
views on education, respectively. These internal and external criticisms against liberal 
education, in tum, lead us to search for an alternative to liberal education. 
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Chapter 2. Liberal Education: Internal Criticisms 
Attempts to clarifY and justifY conceptions of liberal education have been much 
debated throughout the history of western thought, particularly since the 1960s. The 
debates on liberal education can be divided into three: intrinsic versus extrinsic- whether 
liberal education is initiation into knowledge and understanding for its own sake or 
acquisition of useful knowledge for instrumental reasons; broad versus narrow- whether 
liberal education is general or specific; and individual versus social- whether liberal 
education is development of autonomous and critical thinking or initiation into a 
particular tradition of thought. To put it crudely, the first two debates are related to the 
Peters-Hirstian liberal education2, while the third debate, which is more complicated, is 
connected to the debates on liberalism-communitarianism. These debates also seem to 
be based on different conceptions of liberal education. The first two debates rely on the 
Peters-Hirstian conception of liberal education, whereas the third debate involves the 
White an liberal education and political liberal education. It is noteworthy that the 
Whitean liberal conception of education which emphasises autonomy seems to lie in a 
middle way between the Peters-Hirstian liberal education and political liberal education 
in that White addresses personal autonomy including intellectual and rational autonomy 
on the one hand and, on the other, he says that autonomy should be understood in the 
light of social and political frameworks. It is thus necessary to explore the two versions 
of liberal education in order to understand, and further to criticise, the claims of liberal 
education fully. 
To do this, I shall examine the Peters-Hirstian liberal education as the pursuit of 
2 The issue of whether Peters' and Hirst's conception of liberal education can be equated is arguable. 
Nevertheless, Peters' theory of liberal education is often equated with Hirst's. This kind of thinking is 
reinforced by their joint work, The Logic of Education (1970) and thus many people tend to think that 
Hirst's theory is an epistemological elaboration of Peters' theory. In this respect, henceforth, I call their 
theory the 'Peters-Hirstian liberal education'. We must admit, however, that there are some differences 
between them in terms of their starting points, the relationship between education and liberal education, 
and so on. For the details of this, see Appendix I. Dearden (1986) also points out their minor differences 
in terms of the relationship between education and the development of rational mind, between knowing 
forms of knowledge and the development of mind, and the nature of the forms of knowledge itself. In each 
case, Peters' position, in general, is more flexible than Hirst's(pp. 73-4). 
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rationality(in section A) and the Whitean liberal education as the promotion of personal 
autonomy(in section B). 
A. Liberal Education as the Pursuit of Rationality 
The Peters-Hirstian conception of liberal education is generally admitted, as 
O'Hear pointed out(1981, p.4), to be 'a standard view of education' in Western countries, 
as well as countries influenced by the West, at least, in the past two decades. Indeed, 
whether or not one agrees with their view of liberal education, it is obvious that they have 
refined the idea ofliberal education. Accordingly, it has been taken for granted that their 
theory is a typical view of liberal education. In this respect, their theory offers a good 
starting point for seeking on an understanding of liberal education. Hence, in this section, 
I shall look at the Peters-Hirstian liberal education and internal criticisms of it. 
1. The Peters-Hirstian Liberal Education 
Peters' and Hirst's liberal education is often identified, since they share some 
fundamental issues: education is linked with the good life; the good life is a rational life; 
for a rational life, the pursuit of rationality is necessary; therefore, the pursuit of 
knowledge and understanding is central in education; and the ground for the pursuit of 
rationality relies ultimately on Kantian transcendental deduction. We may also admit, as 
I explain in Appendix I, they have different views on the relation of education to liberal 
education, and different concerns: the focus of Hirst's liberal education is on 
epistemology and its application to curriculum, whereas Peters' concern lies in 
philosophy of mind and social/moral education. In this respect, Hirst's liberal education 
can be seen as an epistemological elaboration of Peters'. My concern here is not 
analysing the Peters-Hirstian liberal education as a whole, partly because it is well known 
and partly because I put it forward in Appendix I, but rather briefly sketching their liberal 
education in order to show its limitations. 
Peters' account runs as follows: education is linked with the pursuit of 
worthwhile activities. That worthwhile activities should be intrinsic to education is built 
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into the concept of education. The intrinsic aim( or value) of education is connected with 
knowledge, understanding and cognitive perspective. (Liberal education is the claim that 
any restrictions for realising the intrinsic aim of education should be removed). Hence, 
education should be the pursuit of knowledge, understanding and cognitive perspective. 
On the other hand, Hirst's logic for liberal education runs as follows: education is 
fundamentally associated with the good life. For the good life, the development of 
rational mind is central. Liberal education is fundamentally concerned with the 
development of rational mind and the achievement of knowledge, which are logically 
connected. It can be achieved only through initiating pupils into a number of distinctive 
forms of knowledge. Therefore, one of the most essential tasks of (liberal) education is 
initiating pupils into the various forms of knowledge. 
From this, the Peters-Hirstian liberal conception of education can roughly be 
summarised thus: liberal education is linked to the pursuit of worthwhile activities. For 
them, the worthwhile activities can be defined as the development of rational mind. The 
development of rational mind is possible through being initiated into various forms of 
knowledge. The strong emphasis on the forms of knowledge results, in the end, in a 
tendency to regard education as the pursuit of knowledge for its own sake. Accordingly, 
when we consider the Peters-Hirstian liberal education, regardless of their intention, we 
tend to equate liberal education with pursuit of theoretical activities, i.e. the acquisition 
of knowledge for its own sake. What is more, we are inclined to regard 'the pursuit of 
knowledge for its own sake' as the 'intrinsic aim of education'. In this sense, the Peters-
Hirstian liberal education might be called the 'rationalistic' approach to (liberal) 
education. 
2. Internal Criticisms 
However, the Peters-Hirstian rationalistic approach to (liberal) education has been 
criticised in various aspects and by various scholars. Perhaps they are a typical case 
among greater thinkers who have been criticised from both sides of the same points. For 
they have been portrayed as too conservative(Enslin, 1985), elitist(Ormell, 1988), 
narrow(Thiessen, 1987; Crittenden, 1993) and too theoretical. This criticism coexists 
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with a more common one, from the opposite extreme, that they are not completely 
theoretical in that forms of knowledge are at best forms of experience, not 
knowledge(Gribble, 1970; Watt, 1974; A. Q'Hear, 1981, pp.92ff; Cooper, 1993) and their 
way of justification, i.e. the transcendental argument, is not sufficient(1. White, 1973, 
chapter2; 1982, chapter2; Downie et. ai., 1974, chapter 3; Shin, 1989). Roughly speaking, 
the former are external criticisms in that they are trying to find their solution outside of 
the logic of liberal education, whereas the latter are internal criticisms for the reverse 
reason. 
External criticisms are intimately linked with the 'rationalistic character' of the 
Peters-Hirstian approach. The excessive emphasis on the pursuit of knowledge and of 
rationality is seen, sometimes, as necessarily 'conservative' in that it supports traditional 
education through emphasising traditional subjects, and it is, sometimes, regarded as 
'narrow' in that it overlooks emotional, moral and vocational aspects, etc.3 It is also 
shown to be theoretical rather than practical in that it emphasises the pursuit of theoretical 
knowledge. And for the same reason, it is often criticised as education for an elite and 
thus as promoting inequality in education. 
Regarding internal criticisms, it must be said that there are some criticisms in the 
rationalistic understanding of liberal education even within Peters-Hirstian circles. These 
3Being faced with this criticism, Bantock(1981) tried to overcome its shortcomings by reinterpreting the 
conception of liberal education in a broader sense. According to him, the modem conception of liberal 
education tends to be narrowly defined, with its wider meaning being lost. He writes: 'Yet in all these 
attempts to redefine liberal education in the changed circumstances of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries 
one crucial feature of traditional liberal education has been forgotten- the element of sprezzafura, of play ... 
It protests against both the excessive faith in knowledge and understanding as the modem world seeks 
these ... The solution is not an abandonment of what knowledge has brought with it but a balancing with 
other modes, so that both the strengths and the limitations of 'understanding' become apparent ... surely 
this sense of balance was one of the first virtues that a liberal education, in the dawn of its history, set out 
to promote'(pp.78-9). Bantock's prescription is, in tum, to suggest broadening the conception of liberal 
education by recovering an element of 'play' that once we had. Pieper's (1952) attempt to understand the 
conception of liberal education in terms of its origin, i.e. scola or leisure, can be understood in a similar 
context. According to him, education should be connected with 'homo capax universi', who is 'capable of 
grasping the totality of exist things' or reality(p. 36). Leisure is 'the prerequisite of the apprehension of 
reality', that is, a contemplative attitude for the grasping ofthe whole world(p. 41). Pieper's conception of 
liberal education, eventually, is similar to Bantock's in the sense that their solutions rest on the origin of 
it. Unlike Bantock, Pieper's conception of liberal education is much wider in that it encompasses not only 
aspects of the whole person- intellect, emotions, will, etc.-, but also understandings of the whole world 
including the metaphysical world. We can surely admit that both views certainly see liberal education as 
wide. It must be said, however, that their views may not be enough for defending external challenges, such 
as vocational preparation, although Bantock's and Pieper's modified views ofliberal education can avoid 
a too narrow intellectualism. For the external criticisms, I shall deal with them more fully in Chapter 3. My 
concern here is to discuss internal criticisms of the rationalistic liberal education. 
18 
criticisms are largely twofold: the pursuit of knowledge, particularly forms of knowledge; 
and its way of justification, i.e. the transcendental argument. Let us examine these more 
fully in tum. 
First of all, the criticisms regarding the pursuit of knowledge fall into two 
categories: the relation of mind to knowledge; and forms of knowledge themselves. With 
regard to the relationship between mind and knowledge, Hirst's claim that there is a 
logical connection between the concept of mind and that of knowledge is less tenable 
than he maintained it to be, since we can hardly say that 'the development of mind can 
solely be defined in terms of the growth of knowledge' and, further, the methodological 
argument that the pursuit of knowledge is a means to the development of mind is also 
dubious. Rather, it is more exact to say that rationality or knowledge itself cannot 
comprise the human mind, although it is a part of the human mind. Hence, it is an 
exaggeration to say that the development of mind is identified with the acquisition of 
rationality(Shin, 1989, p.136). 
With regard to the forms of knowledge, the debates seem to be focusing on 
whether the criteria and seven or eight forms of knowledge suggested by Hirst are 
plausible. Indeed, there is a double paradox here. If his criteria are correct, and if we 
apply them to his forms of knowledge in a strict sense, the forms of knowledge he 
suggested would be questionable. On the contrary, if we accept his forms of knowledge 
as sound, his criteria for them would be less convincing. Gribble(1970), Watt(1974), 
O'Hear(1981) and Cooper(1993) belong to the former group, whereas Phillips(1971) and 
Simons(1975) belong to the latter group. 
Gribble as regards 'morals' and 'literary criticism' and Watt as regards 'religion', 
'morality' and 'aesthetics' within Hirst's forms of knowledge are sceptical whether these 
are forms ofknowledge4. What is more, O'Hear and Cooper seem to strongly suggest that 
Hirst's criteria should be applied more strictly in order to avoid the criticism that his 
forms of knowledge are no more than 'forms of experience'. For them, forms of 
4In contrast, some would argue that religious and moral languages can fit the criteria of the forms of 
knowledge. See B. Crittenden(l993). These arguments are, it seems to me, more or less arbitrary. A more 
fundamental solution to this, I suggest, is that 'forms of knowledge' in the narrow sense should be replaced 
by 'forms oflife' in a broader sense or 'social practices' for the present purpose, since forms of knowledge, 
regardless of whether these include religious and moral domains or not, necessarily lead into a narrow 
intellectualistic education. For me, it should be noted that education, of course, essentially includes the 
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knowledge should be confined to the logically distinctive knowledge, not a broad sense 
of beliefs5. 
On the other hand, Phillips' and Simons' criticisms are more radical in that they 
attack the foundations for the forms ofknowledge6. It is surprising, however, that Phillips 
and Simons raise questions about the unclarity of the criteria, instead of directly attacking 
the foundation for the criteria. Phillips raises the question that there is a possibility of 
different forms of knowledge within a form of knowledge. It is hardly appropriate to say 
that science, for instance, has only one structure. What is more, for Simons, besides seven 
or eight forms of knowledge, there might be some other forms of knowledge such as 
astrology, etc? Simons' assertion, in the end, requests other additional criteria for 
opening up the possibility of the other forms of knowledge. Phillips' and Simons' 
assertion, as contrasted with the former group, is, in short, that the criteria should be more 
flexible since there is no strict logical distinction between forms of knowledge. These 
criticisms in the end lead to the negation of forms of knowledge. 
What I have examined so far is the plausibility of the Peters-Hirstian assertion 
that there is a logical relationship between mind and knowledge and, therefore, liberal 
education should be initiating pupils into seven or eight forms of knowledge. The upshot 
is that their assertion is less obvious than they seem to think. 
Let me move on now to the second point, i.e. the transcendental argument that 
is the ground for justifying the pursuit of rationality in general and of knowledge for its 
own sake in particular. Given the criticism of the relationship between mind and 
knowledge and, further, of the forms of knowledge, is the transcendental argument that 
is the way of justification for them still sound? If the transcendental argument is not 
pursuit of knowledge as a part; however, education goes far beyond the pursuit of knowledge. 
5Following O'Hear and Cooper, for instance, religious beliefs such as 'God created the heavens and the 
earth', unlike scientific knowledge such as 'light travels in a straight line', might be not included in Hirst's 
forms of knowledge, because they may regard religious beliefs as 'forms of experience' rather than 'forms 
of knowledge'. They both do not dissent from Hirst's assertion in that the contents for the promotion of 
rational mind are in the end constituted by forms of knowledge and forms of knowledge can be 
distinguished by some logical criteria. 
6The reason is: if Hirst's criteria that constitute the underpinning of the forms of knowledge are dubious, 
his forms of knowledge thesis and, further, his theory ofliberal education as a whole would be seriously 
threatened, since his forms of knowledge are a central thesis within his liberal theory of education. 
?With relation to this, Hirst seems to recognise this point in saying that 'music' might be a discipline within 
literature and the fine arts. Hirst(l974), p. 97. 
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independent of the Peters-Hirstian view of liberal education, it is unlikely to be so 8. To 
evaluate it more fully, first of all, let us see the Peters-Hirstian account of the 
'transcendental argument': 
To ask the question 'why do this rather than that?' seriously is therefore, however 
embryonically, to be committed to those inquiries which are defined by their serious 
concern with those aspects of the reality which give context to the question which he is 
asking. In brief the justification of such activities is not purely instrumental because they 
are involved in asking the question 'why do this rather than that?', as well as in 
answering it(Peters, 1966, p.164). 
To ask for the justification of any form of activity is significant only if one is in fact 
committed already to seeking rational knowledge. To ask for a justification ofthe pursuit 
of rational knowledge itselftherefore presupposes some form of commitment to what one 
is seeking to justify(Hirst, 1965, p.126). 
The transcendental argument, as what Peters may call the 'argument by 
presupposition'(1966, p.114), is a way of justification by revealing the logical 
presupposition of the question itself. For them, the questioning itself depends on 
accepting the very ground that is finally being called into question. In justifying the 
development of rationality in general and the pursuit of knowledge and understanding in 
particular, they follow this argument. That is, the importance of the pursuit of knowledge 
and understanding is presupposed in the question 'why do we pursue (forms of) 
knowledge rather than something else?' But is this true? 
In what ways is the transcendental argument unsatisfactory? Let me put it at some 
length. First of all, the form of argument is rather a negative one. Asking such a question 
seriously is nothing more than an expression that someone wants to 'come to know 
something'(White, 1982, p.lOl Indeed, this cannot positively justify why we should 
pursue knowledge for its own sake, although it may provide us with an answer to the 
question of whether the pursuit of knowledge in which I engage is worthwhile and of why 
8We, however, cannot straightforwardly say so, since it is geared to justifying worthwhile activities as a 
whole. That is, it is not used merely to justify the pursuit of knowledge but to justify the fundamental moral 
or ethical principles such as freedom, equality, etc. 
9ln this sense, the criticism that to some extent their justification is merely based on 'intuition' or 
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we should pursue knowledge for its own sake. If the pursuit of knowledge can be justified 
as being constitutive of questions about the good life or rational life, its justification rests 
on the place of such questions within the good life or rational life. This may raise a 
question: what makes up the good life or rational life? 10. This question should be 
answered; however, presumably the result will end up negatively, since its answer is 
inevitably diverse(Hirst, 1986, p.24). 
Secondly, the justification for the pursuit of knowledge supported by the concept 
of rationality is a circular one. Hirst himself also acknowledged this point. He says that 
'the apparent circularity is the result of the inter-relation between the concept of rational 
justification and the pursuit ofknowledge'(Hirst, 1965, p.127). Indeed, this argument, at 
best, can be used 'to justify theoretical pursuits in so far as they are concerned with the 
pursuit of reason for doing things'(Hirst, 1986, p.23), because it does not offer an answer 
to the question of 'why knowledge is to be sought for its own sake'(White 1982, p.10). 
In this sense, the transcendental argument is no more than a way of glorifying the 
'rational game' (Hirst, 1986, p.23). Hence, another justification, that is, whether 
rationality itself is good, is needed. 
Lastly, the justification for the pursuit (of forms) of knowledge, in general, cannot 
meet the particular demand for the justification of liberal education, nor justification of 
education as a whole. Even if we accept that the pursuit (of forms) of knowledge can be 
justified by the transcendental argument, or whatever, it does not follow that a 
justification for liberal education is assured. Even if the pursuit (of forms) of knowledge 
can meet the demand for the justification of liberal education, we can hardly conclude 
that it guarantees the justification of education as a whole. Hence, the pursuit (of forms) 
of knowledge in education stands in need of justification. It is, therefore, necessary to 
distinguish the value of knowledge in an educational sense from the value of knowledge 
itself. Indeed, it is one thing to say that knowledge is of value in itself and it is quite 
another to say that some kinds of knowledge are educationally worthwhile. Therefore, the 
'illusion'(Downie et.al., p.50, p.52). 
lOFor the purpose of this thesis, indeed, the question of what the good life consists in is important, because 
'what counts as education?' relies on that question. For Peters and Hirst, the good life might be expressed 
as 'the life of the pursuit of rationality, or knowledge', for White, it would be an 'autonomous life'. I must 
point out here, however, that these views seem to be commonly mistaken in seeing the good life as apart 
from social practices. For the details, see Chapter 3. 
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problem of justification remains unresolved(Shin, 1989). 
B. Liberal Education as the Promotion of Autonomy 
In the previous section, I examined a typical concept ofliberal education, i.e. the 
pursuit of 'rationality' in general or 'the pursuit ( of forms) of knowledge' in particular, 
by discussing the Peters-Hirstian conception of liberal education. According to the above 
argument, neither the relationship between mind and knowledge, nor the forms of 
knowledge themselves, nor the transcendental argument for the pursuit (of forms) of 
knowledge or rationality in education is convincing. From this point of view, we may 
conclude that liberal education in the Peters-Hirstian sense cannot be properly justified. 
In this section, I shall examine another typical notion of liberal education, i.e. 
'autonomy'. Indeed, over the past 20 years or so, a great deal of work regarding the 
concept of autonomy has been written by liberal philosophers or philosophers of 
education ll. Particularly, autonomy as an educational aim or ideal in modem liberal 
democratic societies has been popular with liberal philosophers of education(Stone, 1990, 
p.271; Norman, 1994, p. 25). Their conceptions of autonomyl2 can largely be divided into 
two: the rationalistic model and the desire-satisfaction model. The distinction between 
them rests on the answer to the question of what a key element for deciding one's 
autonomous choice is. In the rationalistic model, rational autonomy is underlined in that 
being equipped with reason, knowledge, judgement and rationality is a prerequisite of the 
exercise of personal autonomy. In the desire-satisfaction model, one's needs and desires 
playa pivotal role in deciding one's choice and thus exercising one's autonomy. Hence, 
in this section, I shall look critically at two models of autonomy. 
1. The Rationalistic Model of Autonomy 
General trends in the study of autonomy within philosophy of education circles 
IIFor instance, Peters, 1966; R. F. Dearden, 1968,1972,1975, 1984; White, 1973,1982,1990; Hirst, 1974; 
E.Telfer, 1975; M. Sandel, 1982; 1. Raz, 1986; A. Aviram, 1986,1995; G. Dworkin, 1988; E. Callan, 
1988,1994; C. M. Stone, 1990; S. E. Cuypers, 1992; R. Norman, 1994; 1. Morgan, 1996. 
12 For the analysis of the conception of autonomy in general, see Appendix II. 
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seem to go as follows: from the emphasis on rationality(or reason) to the emphasis on 
desire; from a detachment from the social! political context, to an attachment to it. White 
seems to show us this transition clearly. Henceforth, I shall follow his transition in 
understanding autonomy. 
First of all, in White's early writings such as Towards a Compulsory 
Curriculum( 1973), his notion of autonomy seems to be intimately connected to reason 
or rationality. His argument for autonomy goes something like this: for one's (rational) 
life planning, in logic, an autonomous life is required. And for the autonomous life, it is 
presupposed that one could choose something autonomously. Therefore, for autonomous 
choice and thus for the autonomous life, knowledge and understanding is necessarily 
required. He said that 'he [or she] must know of all possible things he [or she] may want 
to choose for their own sake'(1973, p. 22). In other words, for life-planning in general 
and for the exercise of autonomy in particular, its prerequisite condition, that is, the 
knowledge for choosing what he or she does or wants to do, is needed. He presents an 
ideal case for being autonomous: 
In the ideal case what is wanted for its own sake on reflection is what a man would want 
for its own sake, given at least (a) that he knows of all the other things which he might 
have preferred at that time and (b) that he has carefully considered priorities among 
different choices, bearing in mind not only his present situation but also whether he is 
likely to alter his priorities in the future (1973, p. 20. My italics). 
White's autonomy, as shown by the above passages, emphasises the role of knowledge 
and reflection in one's autonomous choices. For him, without careful reflection and 
knowledge about objects of choice, autonomy in a real sense is not possible. His 
conception of autonomy, in short, tends to underline 'rational' choice rather than 
'spontaneous' action itself. 
This tendency leads us into an intellectual interpretation of autonomy. Probably, 
the best example of this tradition is shown by Dearden's classical definition of it: 
A person is 'autonomous' to the degree that what he thinks and does cannot be explained 
without reference to his own activity of mind. This will, of course, be very much a matter 
of degree. And perhaps one should add that it is what a person thinks and does in the 
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more important areas of his life that we should expect to be explained by reference to his 
own activity of mind (Dearden, 1972, p. 453, emphasis added). 
In making clear Dearden's conception of autonomy, the term 'his [or her] own 
activity of mind' plays a key role, since his conception of autonomy cannot be explained 
without referring to 'his [or her] own activity of mind' and, furthermore, the 
interpretation of autonomy is quite different depending on whether we stress 'his [ or her] 
own activity' or 'mind'. The former interpretation seems to be followed by existentialists 
who stress 'choice by self. Rationalists such as Dearden follow the latter position. 
Indeed, Dearden seems to assume the conceptual link between 'autonomy' and 
'rationality' in that the activities which are constitutive of the exercise of autonomy, such 
as choices, deliberations, decisions, reflections, judgements, etc., are to offer the reason 
why the person thinks and acts 13. Hence, his conception of autonomy might properly be 
called the 'rationalistic model' of autonomyl4. However, we need not understand his 
conception of autonomy as confined to theoretical subjects or activities. Indeed, as he 
maintains, it is used 'in a whole range of daily and practical activities: in buying things, 
in choice of job or in the way that a job is interpreted, in arriving at a particular sort of 
domestic arrangement, in the uses that are found for leisure and so on'(ibid., p. 454). We 
should not ignore, nevertheless, that his conception of autonomy is fundamentally related 
to the exercise of reason. 
If we follow this line of argument, the following questions would be raised: what 
would autonomy in education be like? How should we do education for autonomy? Is 
there any difference between 'education for autonomy' and 'education for rationality'? 
It is more or less obvious that if we pursue autonomy as an educational aim, it would 
require' a knowledge of the methods, curricula and patterns of organization which will 
best promote it'(ibid., p.462). It is less obvious, however, to what extent 'education for 
autonomy' is different from 'education for rationality' when we see autonomy in relation 
to rationality. Indeed, for earlier White and Dearden, 'education for autonomy' is not 
13 He says elsewhere that the exercise of rational choice presupposes 'a well grounded understanding of 
one's situation in the world'(1968, p. 60) 
14White and Dearden may not agree with this. They may argue that the fact that autonomy presupposes 
having various sorts of knowledge and understanding does not make it rationalistic. If their claims refer to 
this, this would be true. However, their claims go beyond that. For their conception of autonomy, 'rational' 
25 
entirely different from 'education for rationality' in that they maintain that 'education for 
autonomy' is best understood insofar as 'autonomy should be kept in proper balance with 
rationality'(Lee, 1985, p.1l1). In this respect, it is not surprising at all that Dearden 
discussed autonomy in relation to Hirst's forms of knowledge. According to him, 
understanding of the forms of knowledge is important for that of autonomy in two ways: 
in terms of content, forms of knowledge 'contribute much to the background perspective 
from which choices, decisions, opinions and so on are made or formed in our society'; 
and 'these basic forms supply the general criteria in terms of which validity of various 
claims is to be assessed' (Dearden, 1972, p. 462). That is, why forms of knowledge are 
important might be shown by answering that the exercise, or the development of 
autonomy is only possible by possessing self-knowledge(ibid., p. 463). By the same 
token, for White, education for autonomy aims at providing the abilities for a person's 
autonomous choices which enables the person to do what he or she wants to do. Indeed, 
for him, developing the dispositions to make reflective and thus autonomous choices 
should be one of the fundamental educational aims. 
What I have discussed so far is what the claims of the 'rationalistic model' of 
autonomy are and what its educational claim is. This tendency was best found in early 
White's and Dearden's writings 1S . White summarised this: 'a central educational aim 
should be to produce children who think for themselves, who rely on reason rather than 
authority to substantiate their beliefs, and who, precisely because they think for 
themselves, work out their own plan of life according to their own lights, not swayed by 
the opinions ofthose around them'(1982, p. 26). 
Their logic seems to run as follows: the exercise of autonomy presupposes that 
someone has abilities by which he or she thinks and acts in accordance with his or her 
own activity of mind. These abilities can be developed by initiating into various forms 
of knowledge, and promoted by a fuller, and deeper, understanding of those forms. For 
'education for autonomy', therefore, 'education for rationality' is important, too. 
However, what I want to question, for the present purpose, are two things: does 'a 
rational person' assure 'an autonomous person'?; and is it possible to have 'his or her 
choice and action seem to be stressed. 
15Some would want to include O'Hear in this category. Indeed, we must admit that O'Hear's account of 
autonomy was certainly taken to be a rationalistic approach. See, his (1981). 
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own activity' without having 'others' or 'society'? Indeed, this 'rationalistic model' of 
autonomy, it seems to me, is mistaken in two ways: it tends to define autonomy too 
narrowly by confining it within a rationalist framework on the one hand, and on the other 
it divorces 'self and 'autonomous action' from 'society' and 'social activity'. These 
questions force us, and White, into modifying the notion of autonomy. 
2. The Desire-satisfaction Model of Autonomy 
Let me turn now to what we might label the 'desire-satisfaction model' of 
autonomy. In The Aims of Education Restated(1982), Education and the Good Life: 
Beyond the National Curriculum(1990) and Education and Personal Well-being in a 
Secular Universe (1995), White seems to suggest that autonomy is based on 
personal(and/or social) desires, although the term appears slightly differently in his 
writings, that is, 'post-reflective desire-satisfaction' in The Aims of Education Restated 
and 'informed-desires' in Education and the Good Life. 
Before considering White's autonomy as desire-satisfaction, it is worth noting 
that his main concern seems to be not autonomy itself, but rather personal well-being or, 
at best, the significance of personal autonomy in relation to personal well-being. 
Although in The Aims of Education Restated both autonomy and personal well-being are 
conflated in the phrase 'post-reflective desire-satisfaction', his current position seems to 
be addressing personal well-being in a broad sense, and 'informed desires' as its 
essential element, rather than personal autonomy. The reason may be this: a broad sense 
of personal well-being may be applied to any human society including a tribal society or 
tradition-directed society, but autonomy may be limited to, at best, a liberal democratic 
society. For instance, think about two persons in tribal society, of whom one has a good 
background such as good parents, wealth, health, etc., and the other has a poor 
background. Of course, both of them will be concerned about how to flourish in their life; 
however, probably the former person will be likely to maintain a more flourishing life 
than the latter person. Nevertheless, this result is nothing to do with their autonomous 
actions. It must be said, however, that White seems to hold, at least implicitly, the 
importance of personal autonomy, whether as an independent virtue in a liberal 
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democratic society or as a relative value in relation to personal well-being. Whether or 
not personal autonomy is linked with the 'satisfaction of informed desire' or 'post-
reflective desire-satisfaction', for White, personal well-being must involve it in modern 
societies l6. So, it seems to be almost impossible to imagine someone's well-being 
without the premise of his or her autonomy, although these are 'logically different 
kinds'(White, 1982, pA2). 
Let me now concentrate on White's later VIew of personal autonomy or 
autonomous personal well-being. To put it bluntly, he seems to change from autonomy 
which is based on 'reason' or 'reflection' as a human quality to autonomy which is based 
on 'desire' as an element of human nature. In his later view, knowledge is no longer 'a 
self-justifying state on its own'(l982, p.l22) and, accordingly, it is given a subsidiary 
status, not a central one(ibid., p.l24). This tendency seems to be more evident in 
Education and the Good Life and Education and Personal Well-being in a Secular 
Universe. In Education and the Good Life, he suggests the satisfaction of 'informed 
desires', as defining personal well-being, rather than 'post-reflective desire-
satisfaction' (p.29). An 'informed desire', roughly speaking, is something like this: 
individuals can make rational, informed choices of their own lives in terms of the 
satisfaction of their most important desires. This desire, thus, seems to be based on sound 
empirical and logical information about its object(ibid., p. 28). The satisfaction of 
'informed desire', too, is different from 'post-reflective desire-satisfaction' in that 'post-
reflective desire-satisfaction', unlike 'informed desires', is applied 'only to autonomous 
people' and it also does not necessarily presuppose being informed about desires, 
although it involves some reflection on various possible options(p. 29). 
There are, nevertheless, some common points between the two grounds for 
autonomy. Firstly, White's conception of personal autonomy, whether it involves the 
satisfaction of 'informed desires' or 'post-reflective desire-satisfaction', seems to assume 
a particular framework, viz., a 'liberal democratic society'. In fact, in his later books, 
unlike an earlier book(l973), he often explicitly mentions that framework: a liberal 
16We should not identify 'autonomy' with the 'satisfaction of one's infonned desires or post-reflective 
desires', although I use it for explaining the concept of autonomy. In a strict sense, for White, 'infonned 
desires' is part of his account of 'personal well-being' rather than personal autonomy. In this respect, we 
rather say that personal well-being is desire-satisfaction and, in modem society, this has to be autonomous 
desire satisfaction. Hence, his recent view of autonomy may be called 'autonomous personal-well being'. 
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democratic society should promote 'the personal autonomy of its all citizens' (1990, p. 
27, p. 24); 'personal autonomy ... is a central value in a liberal democratic society'(ibid., 
p. 95). It must be said, therefore, that personal autonomy has not always a necessary value 
in any society. What is more, 'the autonomous way oflife is not the best way oflife in 
every set of circumstances' (White, 1990, p.26). Indeed, one of the major, and serious, 
mistakes of his earlier view was in claiming that personal autonomy has a universal value 
in any society. It is safer to say, therefore, that its importance can only partly be assured 
within a liberal democratic society. 
Secondly, regardless of the role of the satisfaction of 'informed desire' or 'post-
reflective desire-satisfaction' in autonomy or personal well-being, the role of reason or 
'critical' reason is still important in deciding one's desires. In the case of the satisfaction 
of 'informed desires', we must admit the fact that critical reason is working when we 
make appraisals of given information about desires. For 'post-reflective desire-
satisfaction', we cannot help recognising the role of critical reason when we choose 
certain desires among various possible desires. We must inevitably allow that some 
degree of reason is needed for the satisfaction of desires, although reason is not the 
primary concern in that model. 
Thirdly, related, White's account of autonomy, at least implicitly, seems to 
presuppose a certain kind of hierarchical structure of desires in which more higher-order 
desires are more valuable. His terms such as 'informed' and 'post-reflective' imply that 
'desires are not all on the same level'(1990, p. 30) and which desires are more important 
may differ depending on individuals and the communities in which they are located. For 
some, academic life is more important than making money, and for others, vice versa. It 
must be said, however, that, for White, personal well-being is closely associated with the 
satisfaction of one's important desires and, further, education has something to do with 
promoting personal well-being, unless educational aims are nothing at all to do with it. 
Lastly, we should admit that, for White, personal autonomy is fundamentally 
linked to satisfying one's desires, although it involves reflection. Indeed, one of the 
striking features of his later view lies in addressing 'desires' rather than emphasising 
'rationality'. His addressing desires is best expressed in his inaugural lecture Education 
and Personal Well-being in a Secular Universe (1995). In his lecture, he seems to 
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maintain that personal well-being should be understood in the light of a 'cosmic 
framework' in general or a 'natural framework' in particular, which is broader than a 
social framework, rather than a religious framework. From this point of view, in deciding 
on values, human needs, pleasures, or desires are prior to other things such as the will of 
God and, thus, these human needs and desires playa pivotal role in the exercise of 
personal autonomy. For him, therefore, the nature-directed values, for instance, enjoying 
nature-oriented feelings, a love of natural beauty, etc., are essential. 
So far, I have explained White's account of personal autonomy that is based on 
his later writings. It can be summarised thus: his later account of personal autonomy is, 
in short, grounded in 'desire', that is, either the satisfaction of 'informed desire' or 
'post-reflective desire-satisfaction'. This should not be interpreted in an intellectual way 
or in a universal way. Furthermore, the value of personal autonomy can be assured if and 
only if it is related to personal well-being and/or it lies within a liberal democratic 
society. 
What, then, would education for 'desire-satisfaction' be like? What is important 
in education for 'desire-satisfaction'? What are the educational tasks for it? According 
to the desire-satisfaction model, crudely speaking, education might be seen as primarily 
concerned with the promotion of one's desire satisfaction. Indeed, from the perspective 
of personal well-being, White says that good education must include 'the satisfaction of 
one's most important desires, taking one's life as a whole'(White, 1990, p.30). One's 
most important desires, however, are immensely various among individuals and, further, 
these desires might also change over time through one's life as a whole. What is more, 
considering or reflecting on all one's desires in educational practice is, in reality, almost 
impossible. What, then, is the role of education? White suggests two tasks. One is 'to 
equip us with desires we previously did not have'. The other is 'to help us to organize our 
burgeoning desires, to impose a hierarchical structure on them and resolve conflict 
between them. This, too, is a matter of creating, or shaping, desires within us, only the 
desires are now of a higher order'. For White, therefore, education is necessarily required 
for children 'to be brought up to have some understanding of what the objects of their 
desires involve'(ibid., p. 31). 
This 'desire-satisfaction' model is, as hinted above, a more satisfactory one than 
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'the rationalistic model' of autonomy in some ways. Firstly, the former model is wider 
than the latter one. The 'rationalistic model' of autonomy tends to undermine other 
factors such as (non-)rationalistic dispositions, actions, feelings, attitudes, desires, beliefs, 
etc. in the spheres of human activities in general and educational activities in particular. 
Why, for human beings, are rational practices more important than other human 
practices? In fact, there is no good reason why non-rationalistic practices should be 
overlooked in human activities and educational activities. Nevertheless, in the 
'rationalistic model' of autonomy, many human practices, which should be regarded as 
essential parts of human life, are inevitably ignored without any good reason because the 
model is confined to rationalistic human activities. In contrast, in principle, in the 'desire-
satisfaction' model, unlike the 'rationalistic' model, any activity is not ruled out, if it is 
wanted and desired by someone. 
Secondly, related, the 'desire-satisfaction' model of autonomy seems to be more 
plausible than that of the 'rationalistic' model at least within a liberal democratic society, 
since the 'desire-satisfaction' model rests on a particular context, i.e. a liberal democratic 
society, whereas the 'rationalistic' model relies on the universal truth that rationality, 
irrespective of whether in every society or at every period, has a permanent value. The 
universal application of the 'rationalistic' model, however, is not so persuasive, 
particularly in a plural society. Rather, we might more plausibly say that the value of 
something might be different from society to society, from time to time, and even among 
individuals. Following White, as I indicated above, his 'desire-satisfaction' model seems 
to be suggested as a necessary element of liberal democratic citizenship. The idea that 
personal autonomy has an important value within a political framework seems to be 
influenced by political liberalism. However, I do not intend here to explore political 
liberalism, partly because, unlike White, political liberals- such as Rawls, Nozick, 
Dworkin, Raz, etc.- have said very little about education, and partly because I shall deal 
with this issue in section B of Chapter 3 at some length. Thus, let me now point out some 
possible criticisms of the idea of personal autonomy. 
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3. Internal Criticisms 
Many criticisms against the idea of personal autonomy for a justification of liberal 
education in general and a liberal aim of education in particular have been raised in a 
philosophical and educational context. These criticisms are of two kinds: internal and 
external criticisms. In external criticisms, the following claims may be included: 
autonomy, as feminists claim, is merely a masculine concept of self(Stone, 1990) and, 
thus, autonomy might not be relevant to the lives of many women(Griffiths and Smith, 
1989). Some would think that caring about oneself is more important than personal 
autonomy(Cuyper, 1992). Furthermore, for communitarians, community or the virtue of 
community is more desirable in a society(Sandel, 1982)17. 
Examples of the internal criticisms may include the following: whether to know 
something can be guaranteed to be autonomous action; whether we do not need to take 
account of emotions in giving a full account of autonomy; whether autonomy is 
compatible with commitments which are either given rather than chosen or held in such 
a way that they will not be revised; whether desire satisfaction as the criterion of 
autonomy is plausible; whether all desires are desirable, etc., etc. My concern here is 
confined to internal criticisms. Some criticisms would be more relevant to the 
'rationalistic' model of autonomy and others may be applicable to the 'desire-
satisfaction' model of it. Some criticisms could make sense against both models. 
Henceforth, it might be helpful to look at criticisms against autonomy in two ways: 
criticisms against the rationalistic model; and criticisms against the desire-satisfaction 
model. 
Let us begin with possible criticisms against the rationalistic model of autonomy. 
One possible attack might be related to the question of what is the relation between 
cognitive aspects of autonomy and action. The rationalist autonomy seems to be 
assuming that an individual can raise questions, rationally assessing any of his or her 
prior beliefs and values and, furthermore, he or she acts in accordance with his or her 
beliefs and values. Indeed, it is more or less obvious that rationality is an indispensable 
element in being autonomous, since without at least a certain degree of cognitive 
17For the detail of external criticisms of autonomy, in particular, communitarian views on that, see 
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judgement, in practice, one can hardly manage to live an autonomous life. We should not, 
however, confuse the following two propositions: that rationality is a temporal 
precondition of autonomous life, and that autonomous activity presupposes a minimum 
rationality. The two assertions have in common that autonomy and rationality, to some 
extent, are related to each other; however, in the former case, unlike the latter, one's 
autonomous activity cannot emerge without rationality already in place. Moreover, for 
the former case, the place of rationality in autonomy may be exaggerated. This leads us 
to an over-intellectualistic interpretation of autonomy, and even to equating a 'rational 
person' with an 'autonomous person'. However, the relationship between rationality and 
autonomy seems to be less direct than rationalists often thought. Many complicated 
elements, of course, are involved between them. What I want to point out, however, is 
that it is one thing to say that I know what is good or important for me, and it is quite 
another to say that I choose or do it autonomously. That is to say, to know what one 
should do does not necessarily lead to one's autonomous activity. 
The second criticism seems to link with a sceptical view on whether autonomy 
is compatible with commitments. This criticism seems to be grounded in an assumption 
that autonomy is separate from one's commitment about someone or something. Indeed, 
within the rationalistic model, rational reflection 'has priority over non-reflective 
commitments, and is conceived of as the sole source of the self s actions and 
traits'(Aviram, 1995, p. 63). The rationalistic autonomy that is based on rational 
reflection, therefore, does require one's flexibility in the face of new evidence or changed 
circumstances as well as one's rational decision-making(ibid., p. 66). This, in the end, 
leads us to conceive of autonomy and commitment as incompatible. If autonomy and 
commitment are incompatible, certainly the value of autonomy for education would be 
very limited, and even considered as a dangerous thing. Callan( 1994) argues, however, 
that a person who acts according to prior commitments, that is, the kind of commitment 
which has made him what he is and cannot be given up without a radical change in 
identity, can still be autonomous. It raises the question, however, how far a person, to 
count as autonomous, must have consciously become aware of and endorsed his or her 
own commitment? 
Section B of Chapter 3. 
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The third limitation might be that rationalist autonomy does not include feelings, 
emotions and desires. Indeed, it does not give a positive relation between autonomy and 
feelings, emotions and so on. Telfer(1975) tried to bridge the gap between them through 
suggesting a three-stage autonomy: the definition of one's feelings, emotions and so on; 
the (possible) appraisal of them given by convention, or by whatever; decisions or actions 
on the basis of those things. She seems to offer, to some degree, a way of understanding 
how emotions, etc. are connected to autonomous activity. However, Telfer seems to fall 
short of a full and sufficient explanation of the relationship between them. That is, what 
is not clear for her is what feelings, emotions, desires, etc. are appropriate for 
autonomous actions 18. 
Let me move on now to the criticisms against the 'desire-satisfaction model' of 
autonomy. The first attack goes like this: if we accept that rational choice is crucial, there 
is still the problem of whether the satisfaction of desire can be possible as a basis for 
rational choice. This criticism assumes that the satisfaction of desire as a criterion for 
rational choice is a rather subjective or even arbitrary one. The ground for this seems to 
run like this: the motive of one's autonomous action rests on his or her strongest desires 
or wants. However, one's strongest desires or wants may be different among individuals, 
and, moreover, these may be changeable from moment to moment within one's life as a 
whole. Therefore, the reason for choice may be at best subjective, or even arbitrary. Some 
would argue, however, that when we speak of one's strongest desires being satisfied, this 
does not mean one's particular desires which can emerge from time to time throughout 
our life, but one's pervasive desires over one's life as a whole, and these desires can also 
be seen as common ones which are, to a large extent, embedded in our human nature, 
rather than purely one's own desires (White, 1982, pp. 55ft). Nonetheless, we may admit 
that desire satisfaction as a condition of autonomy is more or less subjective in nature. 
What is more, it must be pointed out that human nature is rooted in a society and a 
particular tradition, not a vacuum or transcendental state. 
The second objection, as related to the first, raises the question: whether all 
desires necessarily involve desirability or moral character. If this criticism is plausible, 
autonomy as an educational aim would face a serious limitation. The notion of autonomy 
18For the details of the discussion of that argument, see Stone, 1990, ff. 275. 
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seems not necessarily to have built in desirability, since, as Dearden has pointed 
out(1984), 'it is perfectly possible, conceptually, for a person to be highly autonomous 
yet amoral'(p. 110). It is also true, in fact, that an autonomous person does not necessarily 
have to be 'altruistic', since autonomous people occasionally can act egoistically. Indeed, 
White seems to be acknowledging this kind of criticism, so that he tries to escape from 
it by distinguishing 'autonomy' from 'egoist autonomy'. According to him, while 'the 
autonomous egoist' chooses major ends which are 'in his or her interests alone', the 
autonomous person that White has in mind chooses ends in which 'personal and altruistic 
interests are inextricably involved'(1990, pp.74-75). In the advocacy of autonomy which 
involves desirability, White goes on to say that autonomous people 'come to make 
choices of wider and wider scope'. They gradually recognise that there are some 
hierarchies among desires and which desires are more important in that context. In this 
way, eventually, autonomous persons can choose higher-order desires and more global 
desires rather than lower-order desires and more local desires(ibid., p. 84). Some 
questions for White's argument, however, should be raised. Firstly, White's stipulative 
definition of autonomy, which involves personal and, at the same time, altruistic interests, 
can not be accepted as a universal one, since autonomy and morality are derived from 
quite different roots. It must be pointed out, then, that the argument for autonomy in 
terms of morality would be very limited and, thus, weakened. Secondly, even though we 
accept White's definition, the claim that autonomous people 'always' choose higher-
order and, thus, more desirable desires may be doubtful, since autonomous people, as he 
may admit, often choose desires which are not higher-order or desirable, and even they 
may be backsliding on occasion. 
To tum now to consider some further issues for autonomy, whether the rationalist 
or the desire-satisfaction model. The issue of the nature of autonomy and its justification 
may be mentioned. On any plausible account, autonomy may be a matter of degree rather 
than an all or nothing matter. Let us suppose two cases: a pupil at one moment is not 
autonomous at all and at the next moment is; an academic may be quite autonomous in 
some respects such as his or her research field but less autonomous in others such as 
social matters in which he or she might follow convention uncritically. We may say that 
autonomy is a matter of degree on the grounds that the former example is not plausible, 
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while the latter is possible. 
The issue of whether the value of autonomy can be universally justified also 
seems to be controversial. What is more or less obvious, as in White and Raz(1986), is 
that autonomy seems to be valuable in a liberal democratic society or pluralist society, 
since that kind of society demands that people make their own choices. What is not 
obvious, however, is whether there is some universal kind of justification for the value 
of autonomy. Certainly, in some societies, such as a tribal society, or any society which 
does not consider autonomy as valuable, autonomy cannot be justified. This kind of 
argument is also applied to autonomy as an educational aim. Indeed, it is controversial 
whether autonomy as an educational aim is justified locally or universally, i.e. whether 
the argument for autonomy is valid in a particular society, or independently of the 
circumstances of particular societies. We might say, thus, that if someone claims that 
autonomy can be justified in any society, it would be dubious. 
One more point I want to argue is to reflect on autonomy as an educational aim. 
In fact, personal autonomy as an educational aim is often commended or even taken for 
granted at least in a liberal democratic society. I am sure that autonomy is certainly a 
crucial element in an educational process. But I am not sure whether autonomy should 
be an educational aim. My point is that autonomy should be assured in educational 
practice as an educational principle. But it cannot be equated with autonomy as an 
educational aim. It seems to be a fallacy that autonomy as an educational process or 
principle substitutes for autonomy as an educational aim. What I want to insist is that 
autonomy seems to be more suitable as a starting point or principle for educational 
practices rather than as an educational aim, since, as Morgan says, 'all truly educated 
people are autonomous, but not all autonomous people are educated'(1996, p. 251). In 
this respect, we may say that an educated person is far more than an autonomous person. 
Even if we accept autonomy as an educational aim, the criteria for that still remain 
unresolved. 
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Chapter 3. Some Challenges to Liberal Education 
In the previous Chapter, I have pointed out the shortcomings of liberal education 
in the educational context. The arguments are summarised as follows: a typical liberal 
education tends to stress either 'rationality' or 'autonomy', although there are some 
different versions within liberal education. The Peters-Hirstian view represents liberal 
education as the pursuit (of forms) of knowledge and/or rationality, whereas the Whitean 
view represents liberal education as the promotion of personal autonomy. 
The Peters-Hirstian conception of liberal education addresses the development 
of rational mind or the pursuit of rationality, which is often regarded as initiation into 
worthwhile activities. Their central philosophical grounds for the pursuit of rationality 
in education, that is, the logical relationship between mind and knowledge and the thesis 
of forms of knowledge, are less obvious than they might expect. What is more, the 
transcendental argument for justifying the pursuit of knowledge for its own sake is also 
not so powerful in that it rests on tautology rather than presenting positive reasons. 
The White an liberal education is inclined to emphasise personal autonomy in 
education for the promotion of well-being. There are two different versions of autonomy: 
the rationalist model and the desire-satisfaction one. Whether we take the rationalistic 
interpretation of autonomy or autonomy as desire satisfaction, there must be some limits 
to it as an educational aim. When we adopt the rationalistic model, we may be faced with 
similar problems to those faced by liberal education as the pursuit ofrationality. When 
we take the desire-satisfaction model, liberal education has more or less a private or 
SUbjective nature and, thus, it might be difficult to find a common basis for teaching in 
a society. 
Besides these internal criticisms of liberal education as the pursuit of rationality 
and autonomy, there have been proposed more forceful challenges to liberal education 
such as vocational education and a communitarian view on education. These external 
criticisms seem to be more powerful and even radical in that they do not only attack the 
weakness of liberal education but advocate alternatives. But external criticisms can also 
urge liberal educators to reconsider and modify liberal education, and may even show that 
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it should be replaced by (other current) substantial social practices. For instance, 
vocational education may be suggested as a rival idea against the Peters-Hirstian liberal 
education. Communitarian views on education seem to challenge liberal education as the 
promotion of personal autonomy. 
In this Chapter, what I want to do is to explore external criticisms, which may be 
seen as fundamental attacks on liberal education. To this end, in the first section, I shall 
consider some different kinds of vocational challenges in relation to the Peters-Hirstian 
liberal education. In the second section, I shall deal with communitarian views of 
education compared with the Whitean liberal education. In the final section, I shall deal 
with some efforts towards the modification of liberal education in facing these 
challenges. 
A. Vocational Education 
The Peters-Hirstian conception of liberal education, as I explained in section A 
of Chapter 2, tends to be defined as 'initiation into the pursuit (of forms) of knowledge', 
which is regarded as worthwhile activity for its own sake. Following this account of 
liberal education, whilst the cognitive and theoretical aspect of education is highly 
important, the other instrumental values such as vocational value might be neglected or 
undermined. Why is the pursuit of rationality more valuable than vocational preparation? 
Is vocational preparation really not so valuable? May we ignore it in schools? 
I. Is Vocationalism a Bad Enemy against Education? 
A good starting point as to whether vocational education does not constitute 
worthwhile activities might be Cooper's 'bad enemy' thesis. He insists that for the 
development of philosophy of education, good enemies are needed. According to him, 
for instance, 'Progressivism' in the 1960s and 'sociology of knowledge' in the 1970s 
were examples, in that these arguments stimulated philosophers to elaborate their 
educational doctrines such as the justification of rationality on the one hand, and to 
combat opposite claims on the other. It is more or less clear that these 'good enemies', 
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as Cooper has acknowledged, seem to contribute to articulating the claims of liberal 
education. 
What is really controversial is, however, whether we can definitely say that 
vocationalism is a 'bad enemy'. Cooper once claimed that vocationalism is a bad 
enemyl9. He said: 'Today there is no good enemy. There is, to be sure, an enemy: that 
mindless technological vocationalism that dominates government educational policy. But 
philosophically, and otherwise, the policy is a bad enemy; for it is as devoid of 
stimulating ideas, even confused ones, as the kind of education it seeks to promote' 
(1986, p. 5 ). Is vocational education really a 'bad enemy', which acts as an 'obstacle' to 
stimulating and scrutinising philosophical arguments rather than as a 'medium' for 
generating and promoting philosophical argument in education? Why did he see 
vocational preparation as a bad enemy? What are the criteria of the distinction between 
a good enemy and a bad one? 
The answer to these questions seems to be depending on how we understand his 
phrase 'mindless technological vocationalism'. This phrase seems to need clarification. 
It can mean 'mindless and mere technological vocational training'. It can also refer to 
'vocational education as a whole'. If it refers to the former, as some liberals understood 
it, Cooper's 'bad enemy' thesis, to some degree, seems to stand on a sound ground, since 
the 'mindless and mere technology' that is equated with a narrow sense of vocational 
training has nothing to do with stimulating philosophical thinking. However, if it refers 
to the latter (and to some extent he seems to assume this position), his claims offer no 
strong reason for regarding all vocationalism as a bad enemy. 
It seems to be quite clear that vocational preparation in most contexts, in fact, will 
be involved as part of school education, although we can admit that it is doubtful whether 
vocational preparation should be central in school education. It seems that Cooper has no 
good reason for advocating liberal education and rejecting vocational preparation. In this 
sense, Cooper's claim that vocational preparation may be a bad enemy rather than a good 
19Besides Cooper, we might say that Oakeshott, Hirst and Bailey also stand in a similar line. For 
Oakeshott( 1972), liberal education has to do with emancipation 'from the immediate contingencies of place 
and time of birth, from tyranny of the moment'(p.74), not connected with providing skills for satisfying 
current demands such as vocationalism which is often regarded as the state ofthe corruption of education. 
Hirst(l972) and Bailey(l984) also similarly claimed that liberal education is different from vocational 
education in any sense and, further, it stands in contrast to all kinds of vocational education. 
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enemy, merely seems to show that his position stands in a rationalist tradition. That is, 
it is, as I mentioned, a kind of the glorification of the 'rational games'. Peters(1977) also 
admits that point. He no longer holds the sharp distinction between knowledge for its 
own sake and vocational ends, which he held in earlier writings. Rather, he now sees the 
distinction between them as a mistaken dichotomy. 
It is natural, therefore, that some philosophers have been trying to close the gap 
between liberal education and vocational preparation, or even to suggest vocational 
education as an alternative to liberal education. They must include Dewey (1916), 
Pring(1993; 1994; 1995) and Scheffler(1995b) who agree that vocational preparation 
must be considered in school education, regardless of whether their proposals are for an 
alternative, or at least a supplement, to liberal education, and of whether their suggestions 
are plausible or not. I shall examine these three different voices which raise vocational 
challenges and, then, I shall add some comments on their views. Before doing this, I shall 
look at some assumptions of vocational education and its background. 
2. Background and Assumptions of Vocational Education 
In Britain, as a rule, there has been growing pressure for vocational training or 
preparation over the past two decades. This demand in the British context seems partly 
to be a reflection of social, economic and political change, and partly to be a reaction to 
the dissatisfaction with liberal education. Let me put it in more detail. 
First of all, the vocational challenge to education is associated with social changes 
in a broad sense. They, of course, involve changes of political, economic context20. 
Economic concerns among them seem to be a powerful element in the changing social 
context as a whole. Britain's poor economic performance is often thought to be due 
largely to poor education such as poor training and inadequate preparation in the skills 
which are needed in the workplace. For economic utility, education should be reflecting 
these social needs. This claim presupposes that there is an intimate relationship between 
education and economic performance. Indeed, Prime Minister James Callaghan's 
2°For more details of this, see R. Pring(l995), R. Jonathan(l994), D. Lawton(1992). 
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speech21 and several subsequent government documents on education22 seem to show that 
this speech and the documents can be regarded as a reflection of this assumption. It is 
more or less obvious that economic performance, in fact, is related to education in terms 
of 'consumption and ofinvestment'(Aldrich, 1996, pp. 96-97). It must be said, however, 
that economic performance is not logically related to education, but contingently related. 
This means that, at times, the relationship between them is apparent and, at times, not 
apparent, even not present at all. From this perspective, there might be a danger of 
reducing education to economic, social demands. Nevertheless, it is evident that 
education should consider social and practical demands. 
Secondly, with respect to the dissatisfaction with liberal education, Pring(1993) 
presents four reasons for this(pp. 57-60). The first reason is that under liberal education 
too many pupils (about 30%) either drop out or fail in one subject and, thus, are excluded 
from the benefits of liberal education 'either because they are incapable of appreciating 
it or because they choose not to adopt the values it represents'. In this sense, the critique 
of the slogan, 'the liberal ideal for the few' and 'vocational alternatives for the many' 
seems to make sense(Pring, 1995, p. 186). The second reason is that liberal education 
tends to undermine economic needs and utilities. This leads young pupils not to prepare 
adequately for the world of work. The third reason is that liberal education is irrelevant 
to social needs. This is often regarded as a cause of the 'disconnection between the 
academic interests pursued at school and the social and moral values which education 
should promote'. The last reason is that liberal education is inclined to concern 'the 
individual and intrinsic value', which leads to 'the lack of public direction over a publicly 
endowed activity'(1993, p. 60). 
These criticisms, according to Jonathan(1994), presuppose three assumptions 
which are interrelated, i.e. 'macroeconomic view', 'social welfare' and 'individual 
21In 1976, Prime Minister's speech delivered at Ruskin College, Oxford. The outlines of this speech can 
be summarised in four points: the acquisition of basic skills which industry needed for schoolleavers; the 
promotion of more positive attitudes to industry and to the economic needs of society; equipping people 
with technological know-how for the technological society; and the development of personal qualities for 
the future. 
22DES(198l), White Paper, A New Training Initiative: A Programme/or Action, DE & DES(1984), 
Training/or Jobs, DE & DES(l985), Education and Training/or Young People, DE & DES(1985), 
Working together: Education and Training, DES, White Paper, (1987), Higher Education: Meeting the 
Challenge, DES(1991), White Paper, Education and Training/or the 21st Century, etc. The main contents 
of the documents, in short, are preparation for working life through vocational training. 
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benefit'. Let us examine these assumptions in turn. To begin with the macroeconomic 
view, as I mentioned above, 'jobs shortage' was inclined to be politically interpreted as 
'skills shortage'. Ifwe accept this view, as vocationalists often have, education in general 
and liberal education in particular in schools would be a main cause of the unemployment 
problem in that they do not offer practical skills for practical life, but rather they 
emphasise the theoretical and intellectual subjects at the expense of 'the practical and 
technical, raising expectations unrealistically, and ignoring the skills needed by the labour 
market'. The evidence suggests that 'the jobless are frequently without skills, with the 
implication that if those young people had skills on leaving school, they would also have 
jobs' (p.6700). Is this true? 
A number of researches show, however, that the secondary school curriculum is 
not so decisive for producing employment prospects on leaving school(Grasso and Shea, 
1979; Collins, 1979). Furthermore, increasing job scarcity is more linked with social 
backgrounds than with educational achievements. From this perspective, we can hardly 
say that the structure of the labour market is altered by changing educational 
practice(Oxenharn, 1984). This empirical evidence shows us that any strong 
macroeconomic view for vocational education and training would be false, or at least 
would not be satisfactorily justified. 
Secondly, the social welfare assumption, as related to the first, demands that 
education has to contribute to social good lives as well as to personal good lives. An 
extreme position on vocational education, according to Jonathan, often claims that 
'society is basically an economic collective in which the welfare of each can be 
unproblematically aggregated to yield the welfare of all, such that it is in each 
individual's interest to maximize the wealth-producing capacity of society. It disregards 
the effect of social structure on individual effort and opportunity, concentrates on the 
exchange value, and sees the education system as a labour force service rather than as a 
producer and modifier of values, cultural and social as well as economic' (pp. 6700-1). 
Moreover, those who hold the social welfare view tend to claim that 'education is every 
one's business, since collectively everyone pays dearly for it'(p.6702). 
This claim, however, has an ambiguity. It is not clear whether the term 
'everyone's business' used by advocates of social welfare means 'public 
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enterprise'(concern) or 'instruments of success in life for everyone'. If it refers to the 
former, their point may be correct, since education is never any particular individuals' 
possession. If it, however, refers to the latter, their assertion can never be justified. 
Another possible interpretation of 'everyone's business', in contrast to the second 
interpretation, is that individual freedoms should be sacrificed to the collective economic 
welfare. Again, there is a risk of replacing the autonomy of individuals and education 
with collective demands. 
Finally, individual benefit can be interpreted in two ways, i.e. as the state of an 
educated person, or in economic terms. In vocational training or education, 'individual 
benefit' means, in general, the latter. Thus, this assumption can be interpreted as meaning 
that education provides individuals with 'the relevance and use of education for their 
future development and with personal goals, including their economic goals'(p.6703). 
When we consider individual benefit in school education as empowerment of 
individuality in terms of economy, it is often tempting 'to seek to secure the commitment 
of young people to learning by offering programmes whose immediate and instrumental 
application to the world of work appears evident'(ibid.). 
If we follow this logic, education would be entirely different from liberal 
education. In this education, the following issues might be included at least in part: 
learning 'how the economic relates to the political and the social, how "economic 
imperatives" acquire their cultural necessity, and how the social agenda develops in a 
free-market democracy. With this kind of understanding, the pupils would be better 
equipped to be subjects rather than objects ofthe vocational impetus'(ibid.)23. In other 
words, this education would be extrinsically justified, i.e. an instrument of an individual's 
economic wealth. In this sense, liberal educators who ascribe the intrinsic value to 
education might criticise this view in that it is likely to distort the very nature of 
education. 
What I have done so far is to consider some assumptions of and possible 
objections to vocational training or education. At a logical level, it must be admitted that 
the logic of vocational preparation is neither adequately articulated nor strong enough 
23Politicalliberals might think that this would be likely to enhance students' autonomy and, thus, this might 
be seen as supporting their argument. 
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compared with that of liberal education. Does the vocational challenge, then, become 
meaningless? I would think not. At a substantial level, vocational demands are fairly 
influential in that they would be strong social demands when we acknowledge that 
education is a social practice. Of course, however, I do not maintain, as an extreme 
vocationalist, that education should be replaced by vocationalism or that vocational 
training should be compulsory at school. On the contrary, I also do not think that 
education can always fit or at times change social needs or the structure of the labour 
market. My assertion is rather that education should inevitably include initiating students 
into crucial current social practices, whether vocational preparation or whatever, although 
the issue of which practices are crucial is controversial. If my assertion stands on a sound 
ground, attempts to reconcile liberal education and vocational challenges would be 
natural. Indeed, some philosophers of education set out to perform this task. 
3. Bridging the Gap: Some Proposals 
Attempts to fill the gap between liberal education and vocational preparation have 
been made by a number of scholars, notably Dewey, Pring and Scheffler24 . Their views 
have in common that they try to reconcile these two, although their intention and ways 
of reconciling are more or less distinct. I shall explore their attempts in tum. 
Let us begin with Dewey's position25. He may be not only the first philosopher 
who gives detailed attention to and attempts to reconcile the liberal/vocational divide in 
education, but also he offers a good starting point on that issue. Dewey says: 'the conflict 
of philosophic theories focuses in discussion of the proper place and function of 
vocational factors in education'(1916, p. 358). What he says in this passage implies, to 
put it another way within this context, it is inevitable that (liberal) education should 
consider vocational elements at some level. But the disputable issues are: how far can we 
consider it in education? What is the proper place of vocational factors in education? Let 
us consider what his views on these issues are. 
Dewey's position, in a word, might be labelled 'liberal-vocational education' or 
24Besides them, recently a number of scholars have argued on this issue. See, P. Hodkinson(l989; 1991), 
Beck(l990;1991), L. Rosenstock(l991), W. Grubb et. al.(l991) and T. Lewis(1994). 
25For a fuller explanation on that, see Dewey (1916), chapter XV, chapterXXm and Scheffler(l995a), 
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'vocational-liberal education' in that he rejects the vocationailliberal education divide 
and, further, he does not allow any dualism, such as mind-body, knowing-doing, theory-
practice, leisure-labour, and so on26• How is it possible to mitigate such kinds of 
dualism? He seems to solve the problems by rethinking the scope of vocational 
education, that is, by redefining a list of vocation related terms such as vocation, 
occupation, career, etc. in a broader sense. He defined vocational education broadly in 
order to avoid misunderstanding of it, which is often regarded as too narrow, specific and 
practical27 . For instance, a 'vocation', he defines, is 'nothing but such a direction oflife 
activities as renders them perceptibly significant to a person, because of the consequences 
they accomplish, and also useful to his associates'(ibid., pp. 358-359). Regarding 
occupation, he says, 'it includes the development of artistic capacity of any kind, of 
special scientific ability, of effective citizenship, as well as professional and business 
occupations, to say nothing of mechanical labor or engagement in gainful pursuits'(ibid., 
359). Eventually, for Dewey, vocational education seems to be a factor in the 
transformation of industrial society itself rather than an adjustment of 'the untransformed, 
unrationalized, and unsocialized phases of our defective industrial regime' or 'a means 
of securing technical efficiency in specialized future pursuits' (ibid., p.369). And school 
would be regarded as an agency for transferring the older dichotomies into 'a society 
minimally democratic'(ibid., p.372). In summary, for Dewey, as Scheffler has pointed 
out, 'an education in the fullest meaning of vocations is at the same time an education in 
the fullest capacity of control and hence of democratic freedoms'(Scheffler, 1995a, p.37). 
Dewey's attempt to integrate the dualism between liberal and vocational 
education, however, does not seem to succeed, since he did not offer concrete proposals 
as to how to reconcile them, except redefining the notion of vocation and vocational 
education. Dewey's main concern does not seem to lie in suggesting specific principles 
pp.27-45. 
26In a similar vein, A.N. Whitehead(l950) insists that the liberal/vocational divide which is seen as 'an evil 
side of Platonic culture' would be mistaken(p.77). He says: 'the antithesis between a technical and a liberal 
education is fallacious. There can be no adequate technical education which is not liberal, and no liberal 
education which is not technical: that is, no education which does not impart both technique and intellectual 
vision'(p. 74). However, it must be admitted that his overall liberal education is ultimately based on 
knowledge rather than technique. 
27From this perspective, some might claim that Dewey's position represents a 'liberal vocational 
education'(T. Lewes, 1994, p.213). However, this claim, it seems to me, draws too hasty a conclusion, 
because Dewey's main intention was to break down the false dichotomies between liberal(or, in using his 
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or programmes for the integration of liberal and vocational education, but rather in 
showing that education can, and should, meet social and practical demands such as 
vocational education. 
Another difficulty for Dewey, however, lies in his terminology. He does seem to 
deny any distinction between liberal and vocational. The difficulty that arises from 
serious semantic variation is that, for Dewey, the term 'vocational education' is too 
inclusive to make any differentiation between vocational and liberal education(ibid.). 
This might lead to the vagueness of education, whether in conceptual distinction or in 
practical situations. From this point of view, S. Hook's assertion that 'his vision is 
utopian' (1971) seems to be plausible, although Dewey himself would deny it. 
Nevertheless, the significance of Dewey' s emphasis on vocational education, if any, lies 
in raising two fundamental questions: 'whether intelligence is best exercised apart from 
or within activity which puts nature to human use; and whether individual culture is best 
secured under egoistic or social conditions'(Dewey, op. cit., p.374). What is his answer 
to these questions? He did not explicitly give the answer. Presumably, however, his 
position would be like this: liberal education should be grounded in human activities and 
current social practices. 
Secondly, Pring's vie~8 is similar to Dewey's in that he tries to reconcile the 
vocational/liberal education gap by redefining the terms. However, the object of 
redefinition and the forms of definition are quite different. Whilst Dewey tried to 
integrate liberal education with vocational education by reconceiving the notion of 
'vocational education' , Pring tried to close the gap by reconceptualising the conception 
of 'liberal education'. There is also a difference in that Dewey does not tend to admit the 
division between the two concepts, whilst Pring recognises variations of the distinction. 
He says: 'Vocational education is a fairly elastic term and it covers many different ways 
in which the relationship between education and preparation for the world of work might 
be understood' (Pring, 1993, p. 60). Nevertheless, there would be some important 
differences between vocational education and liberal education. How, then, does Pring 
try to bridge the liberal/vocational divide? 
own term, cultural education) and vocational education rather than liberalising vocational training itself. 
28Pring's view on this has been gradually articulated in his series of writings: Pring(l993), 'Liberal 
Education and Vocational Preparation'; Pring(l994), 'Liberal and Vocational Education: A Conflict of 
46 
Pring's view can be labelled 'vocationalising liberal education' in that his main 
concern lies in how to meet vocational needs in education, although his basic position 
seems to be grounded in liberal education. His attempt to reconcile liberal education and 
vocational preparation goes like this: there is basically a difference between liberal 
education and vocational education; the main pillar of education is liberal education; at 
the same time, (liberal) education should be considering social demands such as the 
vocational challenge; and in doing this, there is an inevitable vocationalising of liberal 
education. The following citation illustrates this point: 
The vocationalising of liberal education has arisen from the criticisms emerging from 
quite different quarters- the exclusion of so many from the liberal idea, the disconnection 
of education from the practical world of business, the failure to incorporate the moral 
and social formation of the next generation, the lack of public accountability in a 
publicly funded service. But the 'vocationalising' of education in response to those 
criticisms may be most significant not in the curriculum proposals so much as in the 
language through which that transaction between teachers and pupils is described and 
evaluated (Pring, 1993, p. 64). 
Pring here seems to have a double dilemma. That is, he must reflect the 
vocational demand within (liberal) education on the one hand and, on the other, he should 
present a compromise between liberal and vocational education, which are sharply 
distinguished in terms of the aims and values to be pursued, the structure and content of 
the knowledge to be acquired, the representative virtues and dispositions to be fostered, 
and the authorities to be obeyed. For instance, the aim of vocational preparation, unlike 
liberal education, may lie in the development of competence for the future life rather than 
the pursuit of knowledge for its own sake. The content of a vocational programme, in 
contrast to that of liberal education, may be the acquisition of skills, qualities, attitudes 
and knowledge for the world of work rather than theoretical knowledge, which is 
represented by forms of knowledge. The justification for vocational preparation, unlike 
liberal education, may rely on external or practical justification rather than internal or 
intrinsicjustification(Pring, 1993, pp.66-76;1994, pp.l6-18; 1995, pp.186-188). How 
Value'; and Pring (1995) Closing the Gap: Liberal Education and Vocational Preparation. 
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does he try to achieve vocationalising the liberal education agenda? 
He seems to search for the possibility of reconciliation through re-examining the 
conception of liberal education. Liberal education is mistakenly inclined to be defined by 
contrast with vocational education. According to Pring, however, liberal education is 
neither incompatible with, nor the opposite of, vocational preparation. For him, the 
dichotomy between liberal education and vocational education, like a well known list of 
dichotomies, such as that between theory and practice and that between thinking and 
doing, is simply false. In what way is this so? Pring tries to bridge the liberal/vocational 
divide by reinterpreting the term 'liberal'. For him, the term 'liberal' should be 
interpreted in a broader sense, which includes not only the pursuit of rationality but also 
human capacities in general which we engage in such as thoughts, feelings, doings, skills, 
and so forth. But where we should not be confused is that when he suggests 
'vocationalising liberal education', the term 'vocationalising' does not necessarily mean 
that education should be very limited training or skill for the job. Pring's view of 
'vocationalising liberal education', in the end, could be summarised thus: liberal 
education should be reinterpreted in the light of new situations and new challenges, such 
as vocational demands, since education cannot be established without considering the 
following questions: 'what it is to live fully human lives; and what the connection is 
between personal development and the wider social framework in which that 
development might take place'(Pring, 1995, pp. 194-5). Being faced with vocational 
demands, education should be reinterpreted so as to satisfy these demands, since 
education is a necessary part of human social practices. From the perspective of liberal 
education, however, Pring's reconciling agenda might be criticised as making the concept 
of education vague. 
Finally, Scheffler's reconciling attempt is of quite an opposite kind to Pring's 
View. Having faced demands of vocational preparation, Pring's attempt lies in 
'vocationalising' liberal education. By contrast, Scheffler's tries to reconcile them by 
'liberalising' vocational education. From this perspective, his view might be labelled 
'liberalising vocationalism'. Scheffler's position does not differ from Pring's view in 
seeing that education has to consider social needs; however, there is a fundamental 
difference between them in that Scheffler claims that vocation also has to become a field 
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of (liberal) education, whereas Pring's attempt lies in expanding the conception ofliberal 
education by accepting demands of vocational preparation. Scheffler's position, therefore, 
seems to be liberal at a more fundamental level than Pring's in claiming that all education 
including vocational preparation should pursue a liberal ideal. In what way does he think 
that? What is his agenda for the integration? How is it possible? 
Scheffler's overall reconciling agenda seems to go as follows. For him, all 
education, if we are to call it 'education', should satisfy some criteria such as developing 
one's capacities and dispositions for intelligent activities. These capacities and 
dispositions are not only required for vocation but, further, education can eventually be 
seen as a reflection of the necessity of vocation. Hence, vocational education can hardly 
be seen as a 'kind' of education which is distinguished from education as such or as a 
'particular' education which aims at preparation for certain occupations. From this point 
of view, the phrase 'vocational education' is nothing more than a 'sheer 
redundancy'(Scheffler, 1995b, p.45). How, then, can we avoid that redundancy of 
vocational education? There could be two possibilities: one possibility is to separate 
'vocation' from 'education' by paying attention to pure vocations in a narrow sense, i.e. 
focusing on particular trades or crafts; and, the other strategy is to reinterpret the concept 
of (liberal) education in relation to vocational preparation, that is, (liberal) education is 
seen as involving liberalising vocation. Scheffler seems to stand in the latter track. For 
him, the concept of education involves character traits, such as reliability, punctuality, 
honesty, etc., intellectual dispositions and skills which are needed in coping with variable 
situations for any vocation. For him, therefore, education in this sense can encompass 
vocational demands. 
Scheffler's proposal, in tum, can be summarised thus: education, to some degree, 
should meet current social and practical needs including vocational demands. His way, 
however, does not seem to lie in preparing students 'for unpredictable job markets by 
providing either general skills or the peculiar techniques of given jobs' . But, rather, he 
holds that it would be possible 'to educate students to organize their knowledge and 
exercise their critical powers of judgement in dealing with the problems presented by one 
or another realm of practice'. Such education, for Scheffler, would be 'a central avenue' 
of liberal education (Sheffler, 1995b, p.54). What is more, beyond claiming that 
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education should bring up educated workers who have abilities to solve diverse practical 
problems, Scheffler seems to suggest that society in general and vocation in particular 
also provides students with educational opportunities or fields. 
Scheffler's agenda for reconciling through expanding the conception of liberal 
education, however, would be too ideal in at least two ways: the educationalising or 
liberalising of vocation, in practice, may be impossible, even if we accept his extension 
of the concept of education; and even if it is possible to liberalise vocational education, 
we must admit that, from the vocational point of view, there is still the gap between 
Scheffler's attempt and vocational demands, since his view is too speculative to meet 
strong vocational demands. In this respect, Hook's critique, i.e. 'his vision is utopian' 
which was made of Dewey seems to fit Scheffler's agenda rather than Dewey's. 
So far, I have examined three attempts to bridge the gap between liberal education 
and vocational preparation. Three authors, i.e. Dewey, Pring and Scheffler, have in 
common that education is able to reflect vocational demands and that vocational demands 
should be considered in the concept of education. Their views are also similar in that their 
reconciling attempts involve the expansion or redefinition of main concepts such as 
vocational education, liberal education, and so on. However, there are differences among 
them as to the interpretation of what the phrase 'reflecting vocational demands' means 
and in how they reinterpret the crucial concepts. It can be shown as the following 
<Figure. I>. 
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To put this crudely, Scheffler's agenda is directed towards liberalising vocational 
education through expanding liberal education. But his main concern in liberal education 
is to predict and provide intellectual competencies that are needed in vocational practice. 
Through this, it is possible to bridge the gulf between liberal and vocational education 
or practice. Pring's proposal is not different from Scheffler in that he tries to reconcile 
them through the reformulation of the conception of liberal education. However, his way 
of reconciliation, in contrast to Scheffler's, relies on a broad conception of liberal 
education which includes vocational elements, not on a rigid and narrow sense of liberal 
education. Through the vocationalisation of rigid liberal education, he attempts to close 
the gap. Dewey's position stands in a middle way between Scheffler and Pring in that on 
the one hand he advocates a broad account of vocationalism which has, to some extent, 
liberal meaning, and on the other he emphasises practical and pragmatic matters. 
Whichever position we take among these, however, the reconciling agenda might 
be criticised in certain ways. From a vocational perspective, their attempts are too 
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negative or weak in satisfying vocational demands. Vocationalists may call for education 
to have a more positive commitment to labour markets. From a liberal educator's 
perspective, to a large extent, their conceptions of education are not clear. Further, some, 
like extreme liberals such as Oakeshott29, would regard the reconciling position as an 
attempt at the obliteration of education or schools. From a school educator's point of 
view, their attempt may not provide practical guidelines in school education, i.e. how to 
teach vocational education in schools. Indeed, the attempt to reflect vocational demands 
in education, whether at a theoretical level or at a practical level, seems to have many 
difficulties. 
On what points, then, does the reconciling agenda challenge educational theory 
and practice? We may include at least two points. One challenge is that, being faced with 
demands of vocational preparation, there should be changes in the conception of 
education and thus educational perspectives at a conceptual level. Another challenge is 
that education should not undermine practical demands and the various tasks that are 
demanded in social and educational practice at a practical level. 
What I have so far done is to explore the limitations of the Peters-Hirstian liberal 
education from the perspective of vocational education. What then does vocational 
education contribute or challenge to education? Vocational preparation challenges, in 
short, that education should be understood in relation to practical demands both at a 
conceptual and substantial level. This may be a much more satisfactory understanding of 
education. Nevertheless, there is still a temptation for people to think of education, 
whether liberal or vocational, as a means to personal achievements or benefits. However, 
we should not think of education as a purely individual or practical matter, rather than a 
social matter. We must recognise thus that, whether liberal education or vocational 
education, education can be fully understood in the light of its social context in a broad 
sense. This leads us, further, to consider communitarian views of education. 
29His cynical metaphor 'the character of a school of dancing' reveals this point. According to himC 1972), 
education can never be a business and/or schools must not become market places. Rather, education must 
initiate young people into conversations about mankind and cultural heritage. In this sense, schools should 
be more like 'monasteries' than 'market places'. That education is related to the cultural heritage is more 
or less obvious. Both extreme positions seem to be hardly justified. In monasteries, education might be apart 
from social practices and, thus, education is likely to become 'inert' or remain at a linguistic level. In 
market places, by contrast, education might easily lose its autonomous character. For the debate on the 
market metaphor in education, see Bridges and McLauglinCeds.)(l994), part II. 
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B. Communitarian View of Education 
In the prevIOus section, I have considered whether vocational education 
challenges the view of liberal education as the pursuit of knowledge for its own sake and 
in what way vocational education could challenge it. My argument may be summarised 
thus: the Peters-Hirstian account ofliberal education that is based on 'the logical analysis 
of the nature of knowledge and of the concept of education' seems to be contrasted with 
vocational education that relies on 'educational practice' or 'practical demands'. No 
matter what vocational education's challenge to liberal education is, it seems to me, 
educational practice and practical demands in education need to be seriously, and 
sufficiently, considered not merely in the sphere of the theory of education, but of 
education as a whole, since education seems to be basically a practical matter rather than 
a theoretical concern. What is more, this leads us to reconsider the conception of 
education as a whole, that is, education should be anchored in practices. 
In this section, what I want to do mainly is to contest another liberal view of 
education, viz., that personal autonomy, whether in a political context or not, should be 
an important educational aim, in the light of the communitarian view. In a liberal 
democratic society, autonomy is often regarded as having a taken-for-granted value. Even 
if we accept that our society is a liberal democratic society, the following question should 
be answered: why should autonomy be regarded as the supreme value rather than 
communal affairs, religious doctrine, and so on? A fuller understanding of the meaning 
of this question seems to be possible when we consider the communitarian's 
perspectives, since this question is often raised by communitarians. The following issues 
might be considered: what exactly from the perspective of communitarianism are the 
shortcomings of liberal education with regard to promoting personal autonomy? In what 
way does communitarian thinking contribute to education in general? Before proceeding 
to a detailed discussion of these questions, it is necessary to outline overall 
communitarian assertions. 
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1. What is Communitarianism? 
What counts as communitarianism is often in dispute, smce different 
communitarians have different views of what communitarianism is. It is more or less 
obvious that communitarianism, in contrast to liberalism, addresses 'sociality' or 
'community' rather than 'autonomy' or 'individuality'. However, many communitarians 
have different conceptions of what constitutes society or community, in what way society 
or community is important, and so on. They would also differ in their categorisation of 
communitarianism. 
Having clarified the conception of communitarianism, first of all, it might be 
helpful to draw a distinction between 'low' communitarianism and 'high' 
communitarianism. The former refers to communitarianism as a 'movement' at the 
practical level. Its main concern lies in making certain sociological claims, such as about 
political arrangements. The best examples of it may be found in currently well known 
exponents, A. Etzioni in the USA and H. Tam in the UK30. Their common concern seems 
to lie in constructing a good society which is governed or realised by communitarian 
principles at a practical levee!. On the other hand, 'high' communitarians, like 
MacIntyre, Sandel, Taylor and Walzer32, are mainly concerned with making certain 
claims about how we can offer sound philosophical grounds for the nature of human 
beings, or conditions, which are contrasted to liberalism, rather than with practising 
communitarianism as a practitioner. 
For the 'low' communitarians, as Tam puts it, communitarianism would be like 
this: 'in order to build inclusive communities in every sphere, and at every level of social 
existence, communitarian politics requires the development of citizens who can take part 
30Their view is well illustrated in the following their works, respectively: Etzioni(l995), The Spirit of 
Community; Etzioni(l997), The New Golden Rule: Community and Morality in a Democratic Society; 
Tam(l998), Communitarianism: A New Agendafor Politics and Citizenship. 
3 1 Regarding the movement character of communi tar ian ism, Etzioni's following phrases are well expressed: 
the goal is 'to provide the social bonds that sustain the moral voice, but at the same time avoid tight 
networks that suppress pluralism and dissent'(l995, p.I22) 
32The issue of whether these figures are communitarian would be controversial, since they are hesitant 
themselves to be called 'communitarian'. Some, like Walzer, would think that their position is close to 
liberal or does not necessarily reject a liberal position. Even, like Maclntyre, some would manifest his 
position that' I am not a communitarian', because' I do not believe in ideals or forms of community as a 
nostrum for contemporary social ills'(G. Borradori, 1991, p. 151). Whether or not they themselves agree 
that they are communitarian, it is more or less clear that their assertions belong to communitarianism or, 
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in co-operative enquiries determining a wide range of issues; who recognize that they 
share a respect for common values and accept the responsibilities these values imply; and 
who actively support the transformation of power relations for the common good'(Tam, 
1998, p. 8). Such developments, presumably, involve the following: changes to the form 
of citizenship education, the motivation of citizens for engaging in productive work for 
their communities, and capacities for protecting themselves from the threats to their 
common values(ibid.). According to Tam, communitarianism has something to do with 
providing 'an alternative to both individualism and authoritarianism' and, thus, social 
practices can be changed 'in relation to their contributions to the development of 
sustainable forms of community life'(p.7). Furthermore, 'low' communitarians' real 
concern is to apply the communitarian principles, i.e. cooperative enquiry, mutual 
responsibility and citizens' participation, to the practical problems of 'how claims about 
what should be believed are to be judged, what common values should shape the 
responsibilities to be undertaken by all citizens, and how existing power relations are to 
be transformed'(pp.l2-13). 
For the 'high' communitarian, the conception of communitarianism is more 
difficult to grasp, since their assertions are quite different from each other. One obvious 
thing is that their assertions are associated with the rejection of liberalism, the central 
issue of which is the constitution of self. According to communitarians, in contrast to the 
liberals, self is inevitably located in its social, cultural and historical contexts; that is, 
human beings are essentially social and, thus, their identities are shaped and revealed by 
the communities to which they belong. The issues concerning the relation between 
personal autonomy and society are ongoing current debates between communitarians and 
liberals. What I am concerned with here is to point out the limits of liberalism in general 
and the weaknesses of the promotion of personal autonomy as an educational aim in 
particular in terms of communitarian view. In order to do that, I shall examine the liberal-
communtarian debate in more detail. 
at least, these involve communitarian factors. 
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2. The Liberal-Communitarian Debate 
The idea of communitarianism can be clearly understood vis-a-vis liberalism 
which is its conceptual counterpart, although we must admit that there are a number of 
cross-purposes and misconceptions in each33. The heart of the debate between them 
seems to depend on how we can understand individuality or autonomy and society or 
community, and the relationship between them. To put it crudely, liberals tend to 
emphasise personal autonomy, individual liberty and rights, whereas they often 
marginalise the social nature of the person, the value of community and historical 
surroundings. Liberals even tend to think the value of autonomy, explicitly or implicitly, 
is so obvious that it does not require any justification. Is it really so? Can liberalism that 
relies on a highly individualistic conception of the self be justified? If we adopt this 
position, the primary task of education would lie in the maximisation of the promotion 
of personal autonomy resulting in 'the eventual social benefit of all'(Jonathan, 1995, 
pp.93-4). That is, liberals presuppose that the individual virtues, such as the promotion 
of personal autonomy, eventually offer social well-being to all of us. Is this assumption 
correct? 
The answer to these questions depends on the relationship between 'society' and 
'individual'. But we might properly say that the logic that the development of social well-
being follows that of personal well-being is a rather 'naive illusion of romanticism', in 
the light of the analysis of liberal education history. This point is more clearly revealed 
by the communitarians' counter-argument. Let me briefly look in tum at four 
communitarian arguments against liberalism's 'self thesis': the embeddedness thesis, the 
narrative thesis, the social thesis and the cultural options thesis34. 
First of all, let us start with Sandel's 'embeddedness thesis' that the self is 
fundamentally embedded in one's society. His attack focuses on Rawl's 'metaphysical' 
conception of the person and asocial individualism which might be called 'the 
33See Taylor (1991). He tries to make this clear in terms of 'ontological issues' and 'advocacy issues'. 
34K ymlicka critically examines the five arguments as to why the liberal view of the self is inadequate, 
although his position stands in the advocacy of liberalism. These are 'the liberal view of the self i) is empty; 
ii) violates our self-perceptions; iii) ignores our embeddedness in communal practices; iv) ignores the 
necessity for social confirmation of our individual judgements; and v) pretends to have an impossible 
universality or objectivity'. For a detailed argument, see his(1989), chapter 4. And also see his (1990), 
chapter 6. 
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unencumbered self35. Liberals, notably Rawls, have a strong tendency to address the 
conception of the person as an 'autonomous chooser of ends' and 'an antecedently 
individuated subject'(Mulhall and Swift, 1996, p. 47). For liberals, thus, 'the self is prior 
to the ends which are affirmed by it'(Rawls, 1971, p. 560). According to Sandel, this 
Rawlsian position is basically anchored in 'the individualist and asocial metaphysical 
foundations ofliberal principles'(Mulhall and Swift, op. cit., p.55). For Sandel, however, 
the self is by no means prior to its ends, but rather the self is constituted by its ends and 
'embedded in some shared social context'(Kymlicka, 1989, p.51). Sandel's argument 
goes like this: persons are fundamentally understood within substantial communities 
rather than in relation to a metaphysical conception of the person, since persons are 
embedded in (political) communities. Their identity is also constituted by their 
membership of community. Therefore, persons cannot be understood at a distance from 
their society and culture. 
This argument, as Kymlicka showed, can be called into question in the following 
way: how can we prove to both positions that 'we can't perceive a totally unencumbered 
self and that 'we can't perceive our self without some specific end or motivation'(ibid., 
p.53). Indeed, this question shows a clear-cut philosophical difference between the 
liberal's and the communitarian's position. However, I must point out that Kymlicka's 
question is an extreme one, since any communitarian, however thick, to my view, would 
not hold that position. Rather, communitarians would insist that it is, in fact, impossible 
to think of the self or autonomous person without supposing a particular context at the 
practical level and, further, even if it is possible, we can hardly find our just identity 
which makes sense of our lives at a philosophical level. 
Secondly, in a similar vein, MacIntyre criticises liberalism on the one hand36, and 
advocates an 'embedded self thesis on the other. Why does he criticise liberalism and 
how does he conceive of liberalism? On what points does liberalism deserve to be 
criticised and what is his alternative? The conception of liberalism that MacIntyre 
35Rawls' this position is appropriated from his well-known book, A Theory of Justice(l971). However, his 
position was modified in his later paper, 'Justice as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical'(l985). For the 
differences between 'metaphysical' and 'political' injustice as fairness, see P. Neal(l990). 
36His criticisms against liberalism, according to J. Horton and S. Mendus(l994), can be summarised in three 
points: 'the liberal conception of the self, 'liberalism's denial of a tetos for man' and' liberalism's disregard 
of social contexf(p.8). For the details of it, see section A of chapter 5. 
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criticises seems to be identified with 'liberal individualism' which is associated with an 
emotivist view of the self that derives from the Enlightenment tradition. For him, this 
liberalism is the main cause of the incommensurable fragments of moral languages which 
are seen as just another name for confusion and chaos, and so represent a great 
catastrophe in that they reflect echoes of 'the Tower ofBabel'(J. Stout, 1988, p.191). 
This liberal individualism, it seems to me, can mainly be criticised on two related 
grounds: one is its Janus-faced character, i.e. a mistaken universal assumption, but, in 
reality, a subjective character. The other is that liberal individualism tends to overlook 
its social contexts. Hence, MacIntyre's criticisms, that hint at solutions, are connected 
with these points. 
His 'narrative thesis' that individuals can be fully understood within their 
narratives shows us the precise shortcomings of liberalism and, at the same time, what 
his solution is. He criticises and revises liberalism's errors and weaknesses on the one 
hand. On the other, he addresses 'the importance of communal life to the identity and 
integrity of the individual'(Mulhall and Swift, op. cit., p.71). MacIntyre argues that one's 
narrative can be appreciated by looking at his or her own narratives of life and one's 
narrative in the end becomes a part of others' narratives, since my narrative is not 
independent of others' narratives, but rather intertwined with others' narratives, that is, 
the narrative of my life is 'embedded in a history which locates me among others, and 
implicates my good in the good of the communities whose stories I share' (Sandel, 1984, 
p.9). Therefore, a fuller understanding of the self can only be possible within one's 
history of narratives and, further, the contexts of his or her community(Avineri and de-
Shalit, 1992, p.3). MacIntyre himself illustrates this: 'we all approach our own 
circumstances as bearers of a particular social identity. I am someone's son or daughter, 
someone else's cousin or uncle; I am a citizen of this or that city, a member of this or that 
guild or profession; I belong to this clan, that tribe, this nation. Hence what is good for 
me has to be the good for one who inhabits these roles ... the story of my life is always 
embedded in the story of those communities from which I derive my identity'(1984, pp. 
204-205). For MacIntyre, the self is always embedded or situated in his or her society, 
whether he or she is conscious of that or not, and, further, the self comes to have meaning 
within his or her histories and communities. He tries to show this by deploying a triad of 
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conceptions, i.e. the conception of a practice, that of the narrative unity of human life and 
that of a tradition. For him, individuals are located in an overarching and nested set of 
inherently social matrices including overlapping communal practices and historical 
traditions which lie deep within our culture and are embedded in our everyday life and 
institutions. The real understanding of the self, therefore, allows us to make reference to 
the engagement of individuals in social practices and traditions. In this sense, we might 
say that MacIntyre's 'narrative thesis' is a tighter and extended form of Sandel's 
'embeddedness thesis' and, thus, it is more plausible than Sandel's. 
The third communitarian response to liberalism's 'self thesis' would be Taylor's 
'social thesis'. His social thesis that those human capacities could not develop outside 
society or outside a certain kind of societl7, is contrasted with the 'atomism' that 
'represents a view about human nature and the condition which makes a doctrine of the 
primacy of rights plausible'(1985, p. 189). Against atomism, Taylor argues that 'since the 
free individual can only maintain his identity within society/culture of a certain kind, he 
has to be concerned about the shape of this society/culture as a whole'. For him, the 
identity of the autonomous and self-determining individual requires a social matrix which 
enables us to recognise the individual's identity through series of the practices of our 
society(p. 207). If his social thesis is correct, the primacy of right, which atomists 
claimed, would be wrong. 
Taylor's thesis seems to go further than 'the embeddness thesis' and 'the narrative 
thesis' in that he, like Sandel and MacIntyre, not only rej ects 'the unencumbered self, 
but he also insists that the development ofliberal virtue, such as personal autonomy, can 
be only possible within a particular society. For Taylor, 'even ifliberals are right about 
our capacity for choice', they overlook the fact that the capacity for individual choice can 
only be developed and exercised in a certain sort of society, 'in and through relations and 
interactions with others'(Kymlicka, 1989, p.74). What is more, for communitarians, the 
cornmon good that is understood by liberals 'as the result of a process of combining the 
preferences' is conceived of' as a substantive conception of the good which defines the 
community's 'way of life". For the communitarian, this common good provides 'a 
37Liberal thinkers may not hold an extreme view that human capacities could develop outside human 
society. Nevertheless, it may be true that liberals' primacy of right thesis at least implicitly, might involve 
that idea. See R. Nozick(l974). 
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standard by which those preferences are evaluated' rather than 'adjusting itself to the 
pattern of people' s preferences' (ibid., p.77). According to Taylor(1985), people can 'only 
develop their characteristically human capacities in society. That claim is that living in 
society is a necessary condition of the development of rationality, in some sense of this 
property, or of becoming a moral agent in the full sense of the term, or of becoming a 
fully responsible, autonomous being' (pp. 190-191). 
The fourth attack against liberalism's self thesis can be found in Walzer's 
'cultural options thesis'. His thesis assumes that 'human society is a distributive 
community'(1983, p.3). For him, human society is fundamentally defined as follows: 
'people distribute goods to (other) people' or, more precisely, 'people conceive and 
create goods, which they then distribute among themselves'(p.6). How does he develop 
this thesis? 
Walzer's overall argument goes something like this: 'that the principles of justice 
are themselves pluralistic in form; that the different social goods ought to be distributed 
for different reasons, in accordance with different procedures, by different agents; and 
that all these differences derive from different understandings of the social goods 
themselves- the inevitable product of historical and cultural particularism'(ibid.). This 
involves two distinctive arguments: one is the 'differentiated substance' thesis that 
'different social goods ought to be distributed for different reasons'. The other is the 
'particularistic methodology' thesis that these differences derive from different 
'understandings of the social goods themselves' and that such understandings are 'the 
inevitable product of historical cultural particularism'. 
With respect to the 'differentiated substances', as Mulhall and Swift put it(1996), 
Walzer insists that 'different goods constitute different distributional spheres within 
which specific distributive arrangements are appropriate' (1996, p. 128). With respect to 
the 'particularistic methodology', Walzer rejects Rawl's methodological abstraction by 
using two kinds of argument, the conceptual and democratic argument. According to 
Mulhall and Swift, Walzer defends the position that 'the way to see how particular goods 
should be distributed is to look at how those goods are understood in the particular 
culture in question'(ibid.). Walzer's conceptual argument seems to be connected with the 
view that 'all the goods with which distributive justice is concerned are social 
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goods'(1983, p.7). For him, the meaning or value of a particular good is not natural or 
individual, but it is necessarily derived from the societies to which individuals belong 
and, thus, it is a social one. His democratic argument seems to show us that distributive 
principles are good-specific and good-specific principles are also culture-specific. This 
means that both goods and their meanings and principles must be inherently social, 
namely, these are constructed and maintained 'by the community and its practices and 
institutions rather than by the thoughts and deeds of any individual'(Mulhall and Swift, 
op. cit., p.155). 
If these arguments are sound, goods may have different meanings in different 
societies and principles of justice are also different from society to society. What does 
this conclusion imply regarding the conception of the person and the relationship between 
autonomy and society? Walzer might say that cultural conditions are prerequisites of the 
exercise of autonomy and, thus, the exercise of autonomy is facilitated by a pluralistic 
culture. Hence, autonomy may require a social infrastructure involving wider range of 
opportunities, 'the purpose of the infrastructure is to enable 'the mass of citizens to 
participate in ... valued social activities'(1986, p. 137). 
So far I have argued against liberalism's unencumbered self thesis from 
communitarian perspectives, that is, the embeddedness thesis, the narrative thesis, the 
social thesis and the cultural options thesis. To put it crudely, the communitarians share 
the view that the self is fundamentally social, which includes historical/cultural contexts, 
and that one's self is, at least, inevitably influenced by social practices to which one 
belongs. Being faced with these communitarian criticisms, what are liberals' responses? 
Communitarian attacks on liberalism, whether wittingly or unwittingly, have made 
liberals reconsider and modify their theory in order to withstand communitarian 
criticisms. Under this situation, it is natural that many liberals try to reconcile their more 
or less extreme views. Indeed, many liberals, explicitly or implicitly, seem to accept or 
even endorse the social embeddeness thesis. Let us briefly sketch their positions. 
First of all, let me consider Rawls' response38. Rawls' response to communitarian 
attack is a key in understanding the overall liberal position, since his position is not only 
38My exposition of Rawls' revised version is, by and large, indebted to D. A. Bell's argument(l993). He 
argued Rawls' position under the following headings: the liberal self, liberal universalism and liberal 
atomism. For more details of this, see pp. 9-13. 
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influential among liberals but also communitarian attacks on liberalism are concentrated 
on his position. Rawls' philosophical position, as we can see from 'Justice as Fairness: 
Political not Metaphysical'(1985) and Political Liberalism( 1993), has, to some extent, 
changed. In response to the objection that liberalism is premised on an overly 
individualistic theory of the person, Rawls himself denied that liberal justice appeals to 
that or any other metaphysical conception of human nature. For him, the conception of 
the person is seen as political, not 'metaphysical'. Justice as fairness, Rawls insists, is 
intended 'as a political conception of justice' which works out in a 'society's main 
political, social, and economic institutions, and how they fit together into one unified 
system of cooperation' (1985, pp. 224-5). This justice does not depend on philosophical 
'claims to universal truth, or claims about the essential nature and identity of 
persons'(p.223). Rawls, like other liberals such as Kymlicka and Dworkin, no longer 
holds the view that liberalism has something to do with choosing our own life plans as 
if unencumbered by social ties and commitments. Rather, he thinks now that liberalism 
founded on the value of self-determination requires only that we are able critically to 
evaluate our ends; and so 'no end or goal is exempt from possible re-
examination'(Kymlicka, 1989, p. 52). 
With respect to liberal universalism, Rawls has significantly modified his 
original position that principles of justice are universally valid. He argues that the task 
of political philosophy is 'to articulate and to make explicit those shared notions and 
principles thought to be latent in common sense'. The liberal conception of justice may 
not be 'suitable for all societies regardless of their particular social or historical 
circumstance'(1980, p. 518). This view is, in fact, not far from the communitarian view, 
as MacIntyre understood it, that conceptions of justice are results of social practices and 
traditions and, thus, they may be different from society to society, from tradition to 
tradition39. Both are concerned with interpreting the community's shared understandings, 
and their dispute would seem to tum on who provides a better account of them. Rawls' 
position seems to be a significantly 'communitarianised' liberal position. We can find 
this tendency in other liberals, for example, Raz, Dworkin, Kymlicka, and so on. 
Raz maintains that autonomy can be compatible with the social embeddedness 
39See Whose Justice? Which Rationality?(l988) and Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry(l990). 
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thesis in that autonomy does not require a 'perfect existentialist with no fixed biological 
or social nature who creates himself as he goes along'(l986, p.155). For him, 
autonomous personality can only develop and flourish against a background of social 
constraints. Similarly, Dworkin also recognises that personal autonomy cannot exist apart 
from a social context which provides meaningful choices and develops the capacity to 
choose options(1985, pp.230-233). 
By the same token, Kymlicka makes it clear that the importance of the social 
thesis, which communitarians address, needs to be emphasised 'for civic participation 
and political legitimacy' as well as 'for the exercise of our capacities for choice(1990, 
p.229). Furthermore, liberalism is not necessarily incompatible with stressing community, 
but rather provides an interpretation of it. What does make a real difference between 
liberals and communitarians is, according to Kymlicka, the issue of what 'the proper role 
of the state' is, that is, of whether society depends on the state, not of whether the 
individual depends on society(p, 230). Whatever their differences are, they all seem to 
agree on the communitarian claim that autonomy requires some instantiating forms of 
life. 
Having sketched out political liberals' responses, we can identify political 
liberalism, unlike other liberalisms, as not so far from the communitarian position that 
the self is inevitably socially constituted. However, the question of whether the political 
liberal's conception of self can be equated with the communitarian's and if so, in what 
way and how far they are similar, would still be controversial4o. What recent debates 
between liberalism and communitarianism show us, for present purposes, may be 
something like: being faced by the communitarian attack, liberals tend to accept the 
communitarian social thesis and this tendency seems to be more satisfactory than the 
original liberalism. From the communitarian perspective, nevertheless, the liberal's way 
of conceiving of the community would not be satisfactory in terms of the conception and 
role of society and community. Liberals would want to keep their basic premise that 
personal autonomy is important not only in choosing and evaluating one's own actions, 
but also in making judgements of social and communal interests. This conception of 
Henceforth, WJWR and TRV, respectively. 
40For instance, D. Vokey(1993) discusses how far there are differences and similarities between 
communitarianism and liberalism in the light of a comparison of MacIntyre with Rawls. 
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society and its status would be too thin, since communitarians assume that society or 
community 'must be constitutive of the shared self-understandings of the participants and 
embodied in their institutional arrangements', and not be simply an attribute of certain 
of the participants' life plans(Sandel, 1984, p.167). Furthermore, they criticise liberalism 
as being at least partly responsible for the 'failure of a liberal society to foster a sense of 
community'(Hirsch,1986, p. 423). 
This leads us to reconstruct the concept of autonomy as a social one. If we were 
to reconstruct the concept of autonomy as socially located, i.e. having a social value, 'we 
would not only begin the reconstruction of a theory of liberal education for all, but would 
also address what is beginning to be acknowledged as a theoretical impasse for political 
philosophy' (Jonathan, 1995, p. 106). The liberal education that stresses the promotion 
of personal autonomy needs to be reconnected with social theory and social practices. If 
we accept that Jonathan's suggestion is on the right lines, the essential tasks that we 
should tackle may lie in establishing what a communitarian view of education should be 
and how to integrate the liberal view of education and that of the communitarian. What 
kind of education would best realise this aim? This line of questions is by no means easy 
to answer. One of the possible answers, for the present purpose, would be something like: 
education should be aiming at either 'equipping students to become good citizens, 
capable of contributing meaningfully to public deliberations and pursuits' (Sandel, 1984, 
p.6) or, to use MacIntyrean phrases for the purpose of my thesis, education should 
comprise 'initiation into various social practices and traditions' beyond 'equipping 
students to become autonomous individuals,41. 
C. Reflections and Preludes to Searching for the New Direction 
What I have discussed so far is in Part I, a single question: is liberal education 
really ideal or the best we have? To do this, I have drawn a distinction between two 
typical versions of liberal education, i.e. liberal education as the development of 
rationality and as the promotion of personal autonomy. My argument can briefly be 
41This does not mean that 'equipping students to become autonomous' cannot be an educational aim. Some 
liberal-democratic societies, perhaps, stress autonomy as an educational aim. My assertion is that this aim 
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summarised thus. 
First of all, the idea of liberal education as the development of rationality in 
general and the pursuit of knowledge for its own sake in particular, which is linked with 
theoretical pursuits, was best addressed by Peters and Hirst. For them, the pursuit of 
theoretical activities is a natural result of the analysis of the concept of education and, 
thus, it is intrinsic to education. When we define education in this way, it follows 
logically that education must be confined to the theoretical activities which are intrinsic 
to education, whereas values extrinsic to education such as vocational education are 
inevitably undermined or even entirely excluded. 
Is this claim correct? I have pointed out that the Peters-Hirstian basic premises 
that there is a logical relationship between mind and knowledge and that there are 
distinctive forms of knowledge are controversial. Furthermore, their transcendental 
argument, that is the justification of their claim which rests entirely on circular logic, may 
also be dubious. It is, then, natural to reconsider what Peters calls the 'extrinsic value of 
education'. Is it really so unimportant that it should be neglected in education? I have 
argued that vocational education should not be neglected in educational practice. I would 
insist that 'logical logic' is not more valuable than 'practical logic'. Education is 
fundamentally a practical matter rather than a theoretical matter, and thus it is inevitable 
that it will reflect practical demands such as vocational education, although it would be 
absurd to conclude from the fact that education is a practical matter that it should reflect 
any and every practical demand. 
Secondly, the view of liberal education as the promotion of personal autonomy, 
explicitly or implicitly, can be found in White's writings. For him, autonomy is 
important, so far as personal autonomy leads to human flourishing, although he seems 
to deny a logical connection at a surface level. In White's claims for personal autonomy, 
we need to distinguish the 'rationalistic' model which his earlier view rests on from the 
'desire-satisfaction' models which his later view relies on. The rationalistic model of 
autonomy addresses the individual's ability to make autonomous choices that he or she 
needs and to exercise one's autonomy in education. In contrast, the desire-satisfaction 
model for autonomy, whether 'post-reflective desire-satisfaction' or 'the satisfaction of 
should be based on social practices, if this can be plausible as an educational aim. 
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informed desire', tends to emphasise 'desire' as a common aspect of human nature. 
Education, therefore, should help children to realise their most important desire in their 
life as a whole by critical reflection. 
However, liberal education as the promotion of personal autonomy must be 
confronted with some questions: is autonomy valuable? If so, in what ways?; even if we 
accept that autonomy is valuable, is this value universal?; even if we recognise that the 
value of autonomy should be considered within a particular society such as a liberal 
democratic society, does this show an adequate relationship between the individual and 
the society? My brief arguments in response to these questions are something like this: 
education for autonomy can be a central value within a liberal democratic society. 
However, this statement needs to be cautiously interpreted. It must not be understood as 
implying that in any society, or even in any liberal society, autonomy has a universal 
value42 . Of course, different societies can have different values. Even within similar 
societies such as liberal democratic societies, there is no good reason why we should have 
the same opinion of a particular value such as autonomy. Some liberal democratic 
societies, like the USA, would stress the value of justice rather than autonomy. Even 
within the same liberal democratic society some minor societies, like Amish society, 
would regard religious virtues as more valuable than personal autonomy. What this shows 
us is, as communitarians indicate, that autonomy also should be understood in the social 
context to which one belongs, and the promotion of personal autonomy in education 
entails a very limited conception of society and community. 
In conclusion, liberal education, whether it refers to the development of 
rationality or the promotion of personal autonomy, ought to be challenged at least in two 
ways. One is that its success is limited in dealing with practical matters which are based 
on practical logic. It is, therefore, necessary to include practical demands such as 
vocational needs. The other is that liberal education does not sufficiently and adequately 
accommodate the value of society or community and the relationship between individual 
and community, although political liberalism is partly concerned with social and political 
421 would not maintain that autonomy must be a central educational value, nor that it must be a central 
educational value in any democratic society. Some would argue that one cannot make sense of democratic 
institutions without understanding personal autonomy that is embedded in them. But that something is 
valuable in understanding democracy does not necessarily imply that something is educationally valuable. 
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backgrounds. Hence, liberal education must face the communitarian's challenge that 
tends to stress the value of society and community. 
If we adopt the whole line of argument I have discussed in Part I, what follows 
about education? What kind of education could meet these challenges? Being faced with 
these challenges, I would suggest 'the social practices' thesis. This thesis has an 
assumption that education should be fundamentally based on practices that are social in 
nature. It can be expressed, in a word, as 'education as initiation into social practices'. 
I would say that 'education as initiation into social practices' can meet the demands I 
have outlined. 
I am, of course, not the first to assert the 'social practices' thesis in education. 
This tendency has been raised in various forms by various scholars- such as Wittgenstein, 
Bourdieu, MacIntyre, etc.-, even if they have said little about education. The discussion 
of the 'social practices' thesis in an educational context seems to appear in 
Langford(1985; 1989) and Hirst(1992; 1993; 1998). In the 1990s, it seems to me, the 
educational pendulum swings in western countries away from 'liberal education' that 
addresses either the development of a rational mind or the promotion of personal 
development as having universal value divorced from a particular society, to 'education 
as initiation into social practices' which holds that, whatever education is, it must reflect 
ongoing traditions of social practices. Before proceeding to further arguments about the 
social practices thesis, let us briefly sketch the preludes to the social practice thesis. 
Paradoxically, we can find these preludes in the liberal educators I have mentioned. 
Peters, White and Hirst in their recent writings seem to recognise the limitations 
of liberal education in the face of internal and external criticisms. Peters(1983), in 
reviewing the trends of philosophy of education in Britain, has pointed out two major 
mistakes for liberal education in Britain: the concept of education was defined too 
specifically and narrowly; and a convincing transcendental justification was not 
provided(p.37). What is more, he has also pointed out that crucial concepts in liberal 
education, such as 'rationality' and 'autonomy', etc. tend to be treated in 'too much of a 
vacuum' and he has even suggested that an 'alternative to or revision of 'forms of 
knowledge' as a basis for the curriculum as a whole' is required(ibid., 53). He goes on: 
Somebody must come up with a convincing alternative to Hirst's 'forms of knowledge' 
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thesis as a philosophical foundation to the curriculum - or he must develop his theory in 
greater detail to meet more adequately important objections to it as it stands. Without 
such a theory modem discussions of the core curriculum, etc., seem very ad hoc- a 
paradise for gimmickry and sociological speculation(Peters, \983, p. 53). 
Peters seems to recognise the limits of liberal education both as the development 
of rationality and as the promotion of personal autonomy. The former sense of liberal 
education is too specific and too narrow, since it is mainly confined to the pursuit of 
knowledge for its own sake. The latter sense of liberal education may be undermining its 
social connection. This diagnosis seems to stand on sound grounds. Being faced with 
these suggestions, what are Hirst's and White's responses? 
Surprisingly, they, to a large degree, seem to accept Peters' recommendations. 1. 
White tries to modify his position in 'Education, Liberalism and Human Good'(with P. 
White,1986) and Education and the Good Life(1990). In 'Education, Liberalism and 
Human Good', White criticises the tendency of liberal education simply to stress personal 
autonomy without morality. For him, the main educational task is to bridge the gap 
between personal autonomy which aims at the realisation of satisfaction in keeping with 
human nature, and morality which is necessarily required for collective living. Indeed, 
according to White, MacIntyre conceives the maximisation of one's preferred desires in 
a way compatible with morality. In this sense, in White's evaluation, MacIntyre provides 
a reasonable ground for liberal education by seeing that one's well-being involves moral 
elements in a broad sense(pp.155-156). However, MacIntyre's great contribution, it 
seems to me, lies in introducing social practices and traditions in understanding (moral) 
education rather than in maintaining that moral elements are built into the realisation of 
one's satisfaction, as far as education is concerned. 
Whether or not we are satisfied with White's evaluation on MacIntyre's 
perspective, we may admit that White's position represents one step forward in terms of 
social practices. His next step, as we can see in Education and the Good Life, may be to 
consider social/political frameworks when we consider educational aims. However, this 
position is not strong enough for satisfying social concerns, since his concern is limited 
to the flourishing of personal well-being and its political context and, thus, his ground for 
this relies on circular logic. Therefore, a more positive interpretation is needed. Like other 
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kinds of education, liberal education, whether the development of rationality or of 
personal autonomy, also should be regarded as constituted by social practices in that 
without social practices, there is no liberal education. This line of thinking is best found 
in Hirst's later writings. 
Hirst has gone beyond mere modification of his theory; he has jettisioned his 
earlier view on education; moving from liberal education in general and 'initiation into 
forms of knowledge' in particular to education as social practices in general and 
'initiation into social practices' in particular. His departure point appears in his 
'Educational Theory '(1983). He recognised his mistake which is a distorting emphasis 
on theoretical rationality. Furthermore, he seems to emphasise practical rationality. As 
he puts it: 
... if we are to develop rational educational practice, it now seems to me we must start 
from a consideration of current practice, the rules and principles it actually embodies 
and the knowledge, beliefs and principles that the practitioners employ in both 
characterising that practice and deciding what ought to be done. The practical discourse 
in which what is going on can be expressed will have much in common with the 
discourse of everyday practical activities ... The activities and practices of everyday life 
are developed and modified in a wide context of knowledge, beliefs and values about 
men and their physical and social context... Educational theory I still see as concerned 
with determining rationally defensible principles for educational practice. The adequate 
formulation and defence of these principles I now see as resting not simply on appeal to 
the disciplines, but on a complex pragmatic process that uses its own appropriate 
practical discourse(ibid., pp.l6-26, my italics). 
Although we cannot see, in the passages quoted above, his total conversion from 
liberal education43 , it is more or less clear that he no longer holds the following 
philosophical grounds which his earlier view relied on: education is concerned with 
living a good or rational life; liberal education is the core part of education for the good 
43Some would claim that Hirst never asserts that education should be defined as liberal education or that 
he never undermines other values of education, such as specialist education, physical education and 
character training. It, however, must be admitted that Hirst (over-)emphasises a liberal education as 
initiation into forms of knowledge. Hence, his switch from 'education into forms of knowledge' to 
'education into social practices', at first glance, is radical. However, I would say that the issue of whether 
his switch is radical is less obvious than someone might think. For more details of it, see Section B of 
Chapter 7. 
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or rational life; therefore, the pursuit of rationality in (liberal) education is central; and 
the pursuit of rationality can be well justified by the 'transcendental' argument. 
His thorough conversion is explicit in his' Educational Aims: Their Nature and 
Content' (1992) and 'Education, Knowledge and Practices '(1993 )44. Indeed, he radically 
changed his view of liberal education. He proclaims this: 
... there has been a shift in much philosophy of education from seeing education as 
primarily concerned with knowledge to seeing it as primarily concerned with persons and 
that it is now time to move on further to seeing it as primarily concerned with social 
practices (1992, p. 40) . 
... we must shift from seeing education as primarily concerned with knowledge to seeing 
it as primarily concerned with social practices(1993, p.184). 
Education, following him, should be defined as a 'wide' range of practices and, 
furthermore, as having 'social' activities or practices which involve all the knowledge, 
attitudes, feelings, virtues, skills, dispositions and relationships. If his jettisoning of his 
earlier view is on the right lines, the questions that must be answered are: what exactly 
does 'education as initiation into social practices' mean? When we see education as 
'initiating children into social practices', what would it be like in school education? Why 
should education be defined as 'initiation into social practices' rather than 'the pursuit 
of rationality' or 'the promotion of personal autonomy'? I shall tackle these issues in Part 
III. Before doing this, it is necessary to examine what' social practices' are. I shall deal 
with this in Part II. 
44Th is paper is a revised and extended version of 'Educational Aims: Their Nature and Content'(1992). 
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Part II. An Understanding of Social Practices 
In Part I, I have discussed the claims of liberal education and its limitations. 
Internal and external criticisms of liberal education, in turn, lead us to look for an 
alternative, or at least a complement, to liberal education. Presumably, one of the 
plausible alternatives is 'education as initiation into social practices' or 'social practices-
based education'. The following questions, then, need to be addressed: is education as 
initiation into social practices a plausible alternative? If so, in what aspects can we say 
that? If we accept 'education as initiation into social practices' as an alternative, what 
would it be like? Before answering these questions, in this Part, let us explore the notion 
of social practices. 
This Part aims at establishing the notion of a social practice( s) as a preliminary 
task for developing the idea of 'education as initiation into social practices'. To do this, 
I shall analyse the notion of 'a social practice(s)' in two ways: by examining a 
conventional but inadequate notion of practice, and by discussing some influential 
conceptions and distinctions. In Chapter 4, as a preliminary analysis of the concept of a 
social practice, I shall argue that a conventional usage of 'practice', which is often used 
in distinction from 'theory', is inappropriate in terms both of the Greek notion of 'praxis' 
in relation to poiesis(section B) and of Ryle's distinction between 'knowing that' and 
'knowing how' and Wittgenstein's language-game theory(section C), and is also 
inappropriate from an educational perspective(section D). 
In Chapter 5, I shall discuss some influential conceptions of and distinctions 
within social practices. In section A, I shall explore what MacIntyre means by a 'social 
practice'. In section B, I shall address three dimensions of a social practice( human 
activity, society and tradition) by analysing MacIntyre's account of 'a practice', along 
with other writers who back them up. In section C, I shall elaborate MacIntyre's 
conception of a 'social practice' through discussing Miller's distinction between 'self-
contained' practices and 'purposive' practices, and Schatzki's distinction between 
'dispersed' practices and 'integrative' practices. Through this process, I shall establish 
my own, modified Maclntyrean, conception of social practices. 
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Chapter 4. Inappropriateness of the Conventional Usage of 
'Practice' 
In order to fully understand what 'education as initiation into social practices' is, 
the question of what counts as a (social) practice plays a key role. The notion of 'practice' 
has often been used as sharply demarcated from that of 'theory'. But this demarcation can 
not be seen as correct, because it overlooks too many factors which can be involved in 
the issue of theory and practice. Therefore, what I want to point out in this Chapter is that 
the extreme position that separates theory from practice may be mistaken in the light both 
of etymological sense and modem philosophical discourses, and from an educational 
point of view. Firstly, what I want to show through analysis of the two Greek concepts 
of praxis and poiesis is that the distinction between theory and practice does not make 
sense, whereas the distinction between different kinds of action, i.e. praxis and poiesis, 
makes sense. Secondly, two influential modem philosophers, i.e. Ryle and Wittgenstein, 
show that theory should be regarded as (a social) practice or at least understood in 
relation to practice, rather than as having supreme status. Lastly, in an educational 
context, theory and practice also should not be separated in that educational theory cannot 
be pursued apart from educational practice in which someone engages. 
A. Preliminary Remarks on the Dualism between Theory and Practice 
The precise meaning of 'practice' might not be easy to grasp, since the term is 
diversely and even incompatibly used depending on authors and contexts. One of the 
easiest ways of understanding the notion of practice is probably to analyse the concept 
of 'practice' by comparing it with 'theory'. Indeed, the notion of practice is often used 
with 'theory' which is regarded as the counterpart term. When we use the notion of 
practice in this way, 'practice' is often defined as 'something that is not theory (at all)'. 
In other words, theory is concerned with the pursuit of universal, objective and theoretical 
knowledge, whereas practice is concerned with particular, context-bound and human 
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actions that occur in a concrete everyday life. From this point of view, the notion of 
practice is often regarded as 'lived life as opposed to abstracting ideas, or else man's 
acting as opposed to his 'mere' thinking and reflecting'(Lobkowicz, 1967, p.3), because 
we have a tendency to think that 'practice' is connected with 'doing' or 'making'!, 
whereas 'theory' is linked with 'seeing' or 'knowing'. 
When we consider this notion of practice as part of a dichotomy between theory 
and practice, we can often imagine two extreme positions. One is a rational-liberal 
position, the other is a pragmatic-utilitarian position. They do not differ in assuming that 
theory and practice are different and thus separated. But they are quite opposite in terms 
of the priority of theory and practice. Rational liberals often too much emphasise the 
priority of theory over practice, so that the importance of practice is overlooked. This 
claim presupposes that theory and practice are strictly (at least logically) distinguished 
or even divided. However, for them, the reasons why theory is more important than 
practice and why theory and practice are separated, are often regarded as not in dispute. 
On the other hand, pragmatic-utilitarians tend to (excessively) stress the importance or 
necessity of practice as a reaction against the rationalistic liberal education tradition. The 
logic of this claim is, roughly speaking, as follows: liberal education is inclined to stress 
theoretical knowledge and subjects. There is, however, another aspect such as practice 
or practical activity that is part of our lives. We should consider, therefore, practice or 
practical activity in education. This claim might also be a fallacy if taken to the opposite 
extreme. That is to say, the emphasis on practice or practical activity might be ignoring 
theoretical aspects of education in particular and of life in general. Whether we stress 
theoretical activity or practical activity in this way, it seems necessary to allow that 
theoretical and practical activities are separated and, further, one of them should be given 
priority. 
Both positions, however, never give us a satisfactory explanation of the 
relationship between theory and practice in that they assume the dichotomy between 
theory and practice. When we think of the conception of practice, then, what is wrong 
with understanding it in terms of the theory/practice dichotomy? The limits of this may 
be grounded on at least the following three reasons. Firstly, this dichotomy stands on a 
lIn a strict sense, however, this common sense, as will be explained later, is not correct, since' doing' and 
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misunderstanding of the Greek term praxis and its related conceptions. There are series 
of misconceptions about the relation of theory to practice and of making to doing. This 
misunderstanding seems to have originated from misinterpretations of the crucial Greek 
terms such as praxis, poiesis, phronesis and techne. What these Greek terms show us is 
that the distinction is adequately applied to two different kinds of human action, i.e. 
'doing'(praxis) and 'making'(poiesis) and, further, to the forms of disposition or 
knowledge, i.e. practical knowledge andjudgement(phronesis) and technical knowledge 
and skill(techne)2, not to the relation of theory to practice (Dunne, 1993, chapter 8; Carr, 
1995, pp. 67-72). 
Secondly, this dichomotised understanding of practice overlooks underlying 
contexts. The theory/practice divide is grounded in a false assumption that the concept 
of practice and its relationship to theory are universal and static. This false assumption 
seems to be caused by overlooking its temporal and spatial contexts. Without temporal 
(or historical) contexts and spatial (or social) contexts, we cannot properly and fully 
understand the meaning of practice, because it is by no means to be seen as universal or 
static, but rather its meaning is heavily dependent on historical and social contexts. The 
conception of practice, like most other terms, has little meaning apart from temporal and 
spatial contexts which give a fuller and vivid meaning to it. Hence, the conception of 
practice should be understood in the light of the ongoing traditions of philosophical 
arguments. 
Thirdly, this dualistic account of practice cannot appropriately consider the 
'making' are different concepts. 
2Some could argue that there are three kinds of reasoning based on different aims: theoretical, practical and 
technical reasoning. 'Theoretical' reasoning is directed towards good understanding of how things are. For 
instance, disciplines, such as science, history etc., belong to the theoretical thinking. 'Practical' reasoning 
is designed to making good decisions. For instance, political decision-making is a case. 'Technical' 
reasoning is related to making good products. For example, drawing a portrait, making a desk might be 
cases. These distinctions correspond to three kinds of social practices, i.e. theoretical practices, practical 
practices and technical practices, respectively. See P.Walsh(l993), chapter 8; see also Schwab's series of 
papers on 'The Practical', i.e. 'The Practical: A Language for Curriculum '(National Education 
Association, 1970); 'The Practical: Arts of Eclectic'(School Review, 79: 493-542); 'The Practical: 
Translation into Curriculum' (School Review, 81: 501-22) and 'The Practical: Something for Curriculum 
Professors to Do' (Curriculum Inquiry, 13:3, 239-365). The former three papers were reprinted in 
his(l978), I. Westbury & N.J. Wikof(eds.), Science, Curriculum and Liberal Education: Selected Essays. 
Also see 'Structures and Dynamics of Knowledge', in M. Levit(ed.)(l97 I), Curriculum, pp. 181-214. This 
argument seems to be plausible when we consider the curriculum. My concern here is not in discussing the 
curriculum but in pointing out the inappropriateness of the distinction between theory and practice. The 
arguments for the curriculum will be dealt with in Chapter 7. 
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dynamics that can occur between practitioners and practice, and theory. In particular, 
insofar as education is concerned, the strict dichotomy between theory and practice is 
never satisfactory, since educational problems are so complicated that they cannot always 
be labelled as either 'theoretical'(,theory') or 'practical' ('practice')and, further, they 
cannot be solved in such a way. What is more, this dichotomy tends to underestimate, to 
a large extent, practitioners who engage in educational practices and to undermine what 
they are trying to do. In this sense, practice should not be seen as opposed to theory, but 
rather theory and practice should be seen as being integrated into educational activities 
in which teachers are engaging. When we define education as initiation into social 
practices, the term 'social practices' never denotes that kind of practice which is isolated 
from theory. Rather, it is much safer to say that social practices should be seen as 
integrating theory and practice. 
So far, what I have tried to show is that it is impossible to understand adequately 
the conception of practice through simply comparing it with that of theory, since this is 
too simple, and also perhaps distorted, to give a full and appropriate account of the 
concept of practice. In order to get a fuller understanding of practice, it is necessary to 
understand it along with crucial conceptions that are closely related to the account of 
practice, its historical and social contexts, and philosophical traditions on this issue. 
Hence, I shall explain the details of the foregoing arguments in turn. These arguments 
will show why the theory/practice divide is not appropriate, particularly in the educational 
context. All of them constitute a preliminary exegesis of conceptions of social practices 
which I shall deal with in the following Chapter. 
B. The Greek Notion of Praxis 
The task of this section is to show that the dichotomy between theory and practice 
is not plausible in the light ofthe Greek understanding of praxis. This should include 
exegeses of praxis with its related concepts and its context, and of ways of life, because 
conceptions themselves are socially constructed and, thus, are reflections of human lives 
in their time. 
Firstly, let me start by elucidating the cluster of terms. A good starting point for 
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this might be a distinction between praxis and poiesis, because many problems involved 
here are closely related to this distinction. The classic articulation of the distinction 
between technical and practical reasoning is to be found in Aristotle's Nicomachean 
Ethics(henceforth, EN). In Book Six of EN, he analyses the concepts of techne and 
phronesis. According to him,phronesis and techne are two modes of what we would call 
'practical knowledge or reasoning'. They are, roughly speaking, distinguished by the 
overall purpose and by which modes of human activities are connected. For Aristotle, 
techne as productive(poietike) knowledge or reasoning is connected with a kind of 
activity that he calls 'making' or 'producing'(poiesis). This activity 'issues in a durable 
outcome, a product or state of affairs' which can be precisely specified by the maker 
before he engages in his activity and which provides it with its ends or purpose(telos). 
Techne 'is a kind of knowledge possessed by an expert maker' (Dunne, 1993, p.9). 
On the other hand, phronesis as practical(praktikos) knowledge is linked with 
another type of activity, i.e. praxis, 'which is conduct in a public space with others in 
which a person acts in such a way as to realize excellence that he has come to appreciate 
in his community as constitutive of a worthwhile way of life'. Praxis is different from 
poiesis. Although both of them involved a self-realisation and concern with other people, 
praxis 'engaged one more intimately than ... the poiesis over which one exercised an 
uncompromised sovereignty'. It needs practical knowledge(phronesis), which knowledge 
is fitted to praxis(ibid, p.l 0). Aristotle strictly restricts praxis to phronesis which has to 
do with the conduct of one's life, particularly as a citizen of the polis, whereas techne is 
restricted to poiesis which has to do with making or bringing about a product or outcome. 
Aristotle illustrates this: 
Making and acting are different... so that the reasoned state of capacity to act[i.e., 
phronesis] is different from the reasoned state of capacity to make[i.e., techne]( 1140a2-
5); phronesis cannot be ... techne ... because action and making are different kinds of 
things(ENI140bl-4, quoted in Dunne, p.262). 
As we can see from the quotation above, phronesis and techne have in common that they 
both are a 'reasoned state of capacity', that is, practical activities that require rationality 
or reasoning for exercising them. But they are different in that techne results in 'making 
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action' through providing (effective) product-related knowledge in which artisans 
engage, whereas phronesis is directed towards the process of taking action, which is 
related to human good, that is, how to live well. 
Given that praxis is connected to taking morally good actions guided by 
phronesis, let me say more to put the Greek notion of praxis into its social and temporal 
contexts. Although the Greek notion of praxis can be roughly translated as 'practice', the 
usage of the term is quite different from our own. What is really meant by praxis is, 
indeed, a matter of dispute. The notion of practice might be different in every period. 
Similar examples can be easily found in philosophical terms, such as virtue, well-being, 
and so on. For example, the notion of 'arete' in Greek and 'virtue' in modem English 
may be quite differene. The term arete in Greek at least encompasses intellectual 
excellence and moral goodness. It would be more accurate to say it has one meaning, 
which is 'excellence', whether intellectual or moral, or whatever. Virtue in English does 
not seem to involve both meanings. So some philosophers would like to distinguish 
'intellectual virtues' from 'moral virtues'. However, in a strict sense, this is not correct 
in that the conception of 'virtue' in English seems to have merely the latter meaning. 
Presumably, we can say that the term 'arete' reflects the social contexts of the ancient 
Greeks. Hence, without referring to any context, to fully understand the notion of praxis 
(and/or of any concept) is almost impossible. 
For Aristotle, a more apparent understanding of the notion of praxis may be 
possible through seeing it with the polis as its setting, in that it contains shared answers 
of its citizens to the question 'what is the best mode oflife for human beings?'(WJWR, 
p.133). In this respect, we might say that the polis is a presupposition of ongoing inquiry 
into the nature of the supreme good(ibid., p.135). Therefore, one cannot know the current 
account of the supreme good or other goods and cannot have rational judgement and 
rational action which is connected with a capacity for identifying and ordering the goods 
of the good life, without participating in the polis. From this point of view, for Aristotle, 
membership in a polis is essential for both the good life and capacity to reason 
3 Eudaimonia is another example. The term' eudaimonia' in Greek, etymologically, (eu : well, good + 
daimon: god who is called 'daimon') has various meanings. It is difficult to translate into English. It is, 
therefore, translated variously in its context such as 'well-being', 'happiness', 'flourishing', , the good life', 
and so on. We can hardly say that the modem sense of well-being is a precise meaning of the Greek notion 
of eudaimonia, although we use these translations. 
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practically. The polis exists primarily for the sake of the goods of excellence. Aristotle's 
emphasis on the polis presupposes a positive world-view; the life of human beings is 
naturally a life of virtue, not survival, and the city, as the perfect or complete human 
community, must naturally be for virtue as well. In this sense, the polis can be seen as the 
perfect community in that the life of virtue and logos was fully realised(Simpson, 1990, 
p. 156). When we see the notion of praxis within the polis, it is closely connected to 
living the good life through participating in the polis which can fully realise the good life. 
What this analysis shows us is that the conception of praxis (and/or other 
conceptions) is embedded in a society and social practices that are outcomes of forms of 
social life. From this point of view, we could say that the differences between the ancient 
Greek concepts and the contemporary English usages of them reflect 'not simply a 
linguistic difference, but a difference between two forms of social life' (Carr, 1995, p.65). 
It leads us to an attempt to understand the notion of praxis in the light of forms oflife in 
ancient Greece. 
The purpose of Greek people's life in the polis, as I mentioned above, lies in 
realising the good life through participating in the polis. However, for Aristotle, the 
question of what form of life is fully realised in eudaimonia is not clear, although his 
conception of eudaimonia plays a pivotal role within his theory. What seems to be clear 
is that eudaimonia is the ultimate human good on the following grounds: the highest good 
(teleion agathon) should be most final and self-sufficient; eudaimonia is most final(EN, 
1097a35-b5) and self-sufficient (EN, 1097b 14-16); therefore, eudaimonia is the highest 
good(1097b 20-1). It is more or less clear that eudaimonia can be realised through 
participating in the polis which comprises 'citizens, self-sufficiency, the good life and a 
certain constitution' (Richardson, 1992, p.351). 
What seems to be unclear is, however, what the relationship of eudaimonia to two 
ways of life, i.e. the bios theoretikos(contemplative or theoretical life) or the bios 
politikos kai praktikos(practicallife), is4. Indeed, the debate between interpretations of 
eudaimonia is very complicated. These interpretations, roughly speaking, fall into two 
4In a strict sense, contents of eudaimonia fall into three: the life devoted to pleasure (bios apo!austikos), 
practical and political life (bios politikos kai praktikos) and contemplative or theoretical life (bios 
theoretikos). This tripartition, in fact, can be reduced to 'practical' and 'theoretical' life. This is, in tum, 
becoming the first explicit contrast between 'theory' and 'practice', even though it is not correct. 
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categories: exclusivist or intellectualist interpretations5 and inclusivist interpretations6. 
The former takes eudaimonia in Aristotle's EN to be contemplation(theoria), while the 
latter takes eudaimonia to include both contemplation and morally virtuous activity. 
Exclusivist interpretations 7 adopt one of two contents of eudaimonia, i.e. bios either 
theoretikos or praktikos, even though most exclusivists tend to adopt the former position. 
On the other hand, inclusivist interpretations8 include in some manner both of the bioi, 
theoretical and practical. These views seem to be closer to the spirit of Aristotle than the 
exclusivist view in that they see in eudaimonia two aspects of life and its realisation, not 
two separated lives. This explanation may be enough to further my argument, because my 
intention lies not in exploring the debate concerning eudaimonia, but in revealing a 
mistaken dichotomy between theory and practice in the light of the Greek context. 
It seems to me that the dichotomy between theory and practice was derived from 
the misunderstanding of eudaimonia which involves two ways of life, i.e. theoretical 
life(bios theorektikos) and practical life(bios praktikos}. The rationalistic view of the 
relation of theory to practice tends not only to take an intellectualistic interpretation of 
5Strictly speaking, the exclusivist interpretation and intellectualist interpretation are not the same. 
Nevertheless, we often equate the exclusivist position with the intellectualist one, since someone who 
adopts the former position tends to interpret eudaimonia in an intellectual way. Roughly speaking, 
Kenny(1992) seems to show the standard intellectualist line. This line of thought seems to make a 
distinction between theory and practice and, further, see theoretical life as superior to practical life. Liberal 
educators seem to accept this line of thought. 
6C.D.C.Reeve (1992), unlike Kenny, seems to take an inclusive interpretation. His logic is roughly as 
follows: i) eudaimonia is exercising the human function well. ii) virtue is what exercises a function well. 
iii) therefore, eudaimonia is virtuous rational activity. There are two sorts of reason or rationality, i.e. 
practical(phronesis) and theoretical(nous). Therefore, for him, eudaimonia requires both morally virtuous 
activity and contemplation. Some would argue that Kenny does not deny it. This might be right. But it is 
also true that he addresses the theoretical aspect of eudaimonia. It is obvious, nevertheless, that Kenny's 
position is different from Reeve's one. 
7 According to L.Nannery(1981 ), the two interpretations each have three different positions, respectively. 
One exclusivist view is that Aristotle's eudaimonia is identified with the bios theoretikos tout court. 'This 
generally goes by the name of the strict intellectual view. The activity of theoria is the human good, either 
a) to the exclusion of ethical life altogether or b) with the understanding that the ethical virtues derive any 
value they may have from an instrumental relationship to theoretic virtue'. A second possible exclusivist 
view is that Aristotle's eudaimonia is equated to the active life tout court, e.g. eudaimonia is civic life; and 
the last possible interpretation takes the developmental view, that is, 'Aristotle was evolving from the view 
that the bios theoretikos by itself constituted eudaimonia to the view that eudaimonia is constituted solely 
by the ethical virtues, and that the EN was composed short of the final development'(Nannery, 1981, pp. 
278-280). 
8According to Nannery, there are three interpretations: 'The Trade-Off View' which is that 'a maximization 
of both practical and theoretic virtuous actions can be calculated, with each type having a equal value'; 
'The Absolute Priority View' which is that 'one never can trade off theoretic for practical virtues'; and 'The 
Superstructure View' which is that the moral life imposes certain minimum requirements which should be 
satisfied before engaging in theoretical activity(pp. 280-1). 
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eudaimonia, but also to understand theoretical life and practical life as being separated. 
In other words, rationalists often assimilate eudaimonia to the life dependent on 
leisure( or contemplation or theory). There may be nothing wrong in this; however, their 
real problems lie in seeing the life devoted to leisure as separate from practical activities 
and in seeing theoretical life and activities as having independent value without 
considering any contexts. Let me put these two points in more detail. 
The first point that I want to make is that we should not confuse the relation 
between practical life and theoretical life with so-called 'dualism', which refers to the 
lines of distinction between theory and practice, knowledge and action, thinking and 
doing, and so on. The Greek distinction between theory and practice has little to do with 
such a dualistic distinction. Rather, it is 'a way of articulating two different forms of 
socially embedded human activities, each within its own intellectual commitments and 
its own moral demands'. Hence, it hardly follows that theory and practice can be 
separated, from the fact that there are two ways oflife, i.e. practical and theoretical. It is 
thus unsurprising that we rarely find discussions about the relationship between theoria 
and praxis in Aristotle's discussion concerning the ways oflife (Carr, 1995, p.67). 
The second point is that the two ways of life are anchored in the concrete context 
and in a public domain, not transcending the context or in a private( or secret) domain. In 
other words, as I indicated, any form of life, whether theoretical life or practical life, or 
a life of pleasure, cannot be fully realised without participating in the polis, insofar as the 
good life is concerned, because all citizens and their lives constitute the polis. From this 
perspective, the rationalist assumption that theoretical life is, unlike practical life, more 
or less apart from the concrete context and everyday life may be fallible, as far as the 
ancient Greek context is concerned. Rather, theoretical life is fully fulfilled only through 
participating in the activities of the polis. 
The rationalists' understanding of the forms of life, in the end, results in a false 
understanding of the notion of practice. Surely, praxis in Greek also linked with two 
distinctive ways of life, that is, practical life that refers to the life which is devoted to 
right living through the pursuit of the human good and theoretical life that refers to the 
life which is devoted to theory and contemplation. However, we should not think that 
'practice' is only linked with 'practical life' , whereas 'theory' is only connected with 
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'theoretical life', as rational liberals often assume. Their views of practice may be too 
narrow in that their uses of practice are only restricted to the practical life and its related 
activities. What is more, their views are mistaken in that they assume the theory/practice 
dichotomy and thus lack any dynamic character. It seems to me that theoretical life and 
practical life, and theory and practice, are neither separable nor distinct. Rather, for the 
purpose of this thesis, I might say that the two ways of life may be outcomes of two 
different practices, and theory and practice also may be seen as two different practices, 
which come to be fully understood through engaging in the relevant activities and 
communities. 
What I have outlined so far can be summarised as follows. The view that the 
meaning of practice can only be determined by clarifying how it relates to theory would 
have made little sense, as far as the Greek notion of praxis is concerned. The reasons are: 
firstly, praxis should be understood in relation to poiesis, rather than theoria. Secondly, 
praxis should be fully understood in terms of the polis that provides the context of 
ancient Greece, rather than without considering any context. Lastly, praxis can be more 
fully understood in the light of ways of life at that time. Accordingly, the rationalistic 
view of the relation between theory and practice that takes for granted the theory/practice 
dichotomy and the priority of theory over practice is also not a proper understanding of 
the conception of practice. This, eventually, will lead us to the assertion that the relation 
of theory to practice should be identified and developed by traditions of participation in 
the practice itself to which one belongs. In the next section, therefore, I shall tum to 
modem philosophers' arguments on the relation between theory and practice. 
c. Theory and Practice in Ryle and Wittgenstein 
In the previous section, I tried to show that the conception of practice as separated 
from theory is not appropriate in the light of the meaning of the Greek term praxis. In this 
section, I shall show the absurdity of the theory/practice dichotomy through analysing 
ways of treating the conception in modem philosophers, notably Ryle and Wittgenstein. 
81 
1. Ryle's Distinction between 'Knowing That' and 'Knowing How' 
A plausible reaction against the dualistic approach of rationalists regarding the 
conception of practice can be found in Ry1e's The Concept ofMind(l949). Particularly, 
in chapter 2 of this book, he tries to draw a distinction between 'knowing how' and 
'knowing that' and, furthermore, to assert the independence of practice. Before 
explaining that, it is worth noting that his distinction was intended to point out a special 
kind of 'category mistake' in our concept of mind, a mistake inherent in the 'mind-body 
dualism', or what Ry1e calls 'the dogma of the Ghost in the Machine'(Ryle,1949, pp. 
16ft). The most typical 'modem' type of dualism can be found in Descartes. His dualism 
is associated with the idea that there are two worlds, i.e. the physical world and the 
mental world and, thus, the two realms are separated, i.e. mutually exclusive and 
exhaustive. For Descartes, the essential feature of human beings is mind and the essence 
of mind is consciousness. This line of thought has become one of the most widespread 
views of mind among educated people in the West and even among most contemporary 
philosophers who criticise 'Cartesian dualism', inasmuch as they tend to regard all mental 
concepts in terms of cognition(Kenny, 1989, pp. 1-2). For instance, Schon (1983) tried 
to avoid Cartesian dualism, but his 'reflective practitioner' thesis shows the continuing 
influence of Descartes' legacy in that he addresses cognitive aspects of practice, such as 
'knowing-in- action' and 'reflecting-in-action'. For Schon, action or practice should be 
followed by 'thinking' or 'reflection', although he may deny that practice is an 
application of (prior) thinking. 
Ryle, however, strongly rejects two mistaken assumptions used in support of 
dualism, viz., that 'theorising is the primary activity of minds and that theorising is 
intrinsically private, silent or intentional operations' (Ry1e, 1949, p. 27). These 
assumptions lead inescapably to the wrong conclusion that the mental epithets indicate 
a separate occult place of operation apart from the practice itself, and, moreover, that 
intelligent practice is nothing but 'a step-child of theory' (ibid., p.26). 
Ryle also criticises the common tendency that is often found in the liberal 
tradition, in which 'knowing' is interpreted exclusively as a matter of 'knowing that', and 
'propositional knowledge' is given a privileged status in the domain of knowledge. 
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According to Ryle, it is one thing to 'know that' something, and it is quite another to 
'know how' to do something. To take his own example, the intelligence in medical 
practice involved in translating the prescriptions into practice('knowing how') is not 
identical with that involved in intellectually grasping the prescriptions('knowing that') 
such as knowledge of medical science(p. 49). Rather, his position seems to be that 
'knowing that' is to be better defined in terms of 'knowing how' and in terms of manner 
or ways of dealing with what one knows. Not all forms of intelligent 'know how' 
presuppose that the person possesses the 'know that' of the relevant principles. For 
instance, good cooking came before relevant recipes and next we can formulate the 
principles of good cooking. 
Hirst also seems to share Ryle's view. Hirst insists that 'rational action can, and 
in certain respects must, precede rational principles, the latter being the result of 
reflection on rational actions'. This, however, does not mean that 'principles, once 
formulated, are not useful in promoting rational action, or that the range of rational action 
cannot be extended by modifying the principles of such action in specific ways' (Hirst, 
1983, p.1 0). What he really tries to rej ect is that' an adequate account of rational action 
in general can be given simply in terms of principles determined prior to action and 
justified independently of such action' (p.11). 
If we examine the 'logical behaviour' of mental concepts, Ryle argues, we 
inevitably reach the conclusion that 'theorising is one practice amongst others and is itself 
intelligently or stupidly conducted'(1949, p. 26). For him, the rationalists' major 
concepts, such as knowing that, understanding, theorising, etc., should be regarded as a 
part of 'knowing how'. This view of Ryle's seems to be grounded in two reasons: one 
is that 'knowing how' is logically prior to 'knowing that'. It means that rational action 
is not predetermined by rational principles or theory. From this point of view, practice 
is not 'the step-child of theory', but rather theory can be fully understood only in terms 
of practices in which practitioners engage. To put it another way, theory or theorising is 
itself' a form of practice, which requires skill, competence and know-how of various 
kinds', but, on the contrary, a practice can never be reduced to theory9(Carr, 1995, p. 63). 
Indeed, this was an apparent fallacy of the rationalists and liberals in education. The other 
9In this sense, what counts as a practice is very important. A more extended conception of that can be 
83 
reason is associated with overcoming the weakness of the 'dualism' which is often 
entitled 'the dogma of the Ghost in the Machine'. Indeed, for Ryle, 'Cartesian dualism' 
leads us into other mistaken dualisms such as 'knowing that and knowing how', 'theory 
and practice', 'knowing and doing', and so on. What is more, this dualism misleads us 
into 'the source of double-life theory'(Ryle, op. cit., p.18). 
Let me tum now to think of what Ryle's distinction shows us. It is quite clear that 
he criticises the Cartesian dualism and the priority of theory over practice. Instead, he 
maintains that 'knowing how' cannot be reduced to 'knowing that'. Indeed, the greatest 
contribution of Ryle's theory may lie not only in revealing the importance of practical 
knowledge that is undermined by rationalists, but also in taking one step forward in terms 
of social practices through insisting on the priority and independence of 'knowing how' 
in relation to 'knowing that'. Certainly, 'knowing how' is at least as important as 
'knowing that' in a flourishing life and social life. Perhaps, it would be more accurate to 
say that 'knowing how' is by and large more important than 'knowing that' in that 
'knowing how' is rooted in the practical real world rather than in the abstract world and 
thus 'knowing how' is more relevant to everyday life, unless a flourishing life is not 
related to our everyday life. The emphasis on 'knowing how' leads us to draw attention 
to the 'social practices' thesis, because the significance of practical knowledge can be 
best revealed when one engages in social practices to which one or society belongs. 
It is less clear, however, whether the priority of 'knowing how' can clearly 
overcome the theory/practice dichotomy and whether it is sufficient for the understanding 
of educational phenomena. It seems to me that there is possibility of a danger that leads 
to another type of dichotomy, or rather, the same dichotomy under a different name. 
Indeed, the subsequent debates between 'knowing how' and 'knowing that' show this 
point in that these conceptions are often used in a very limited way in an educational 
context lO• We can find this tendency even in Ryle himself. In 'Teaching and Training' 
(1967), Ryle suggests that the focus of educational discourse should be shifted from 
'teaching that' and 'learning that' towards 'teaching to' and 'learning to'; to put this 
another way, education should be more concerned with teaching and learning abilities, 
found in Chapter 5. 
lOSee, 1. R. Martin(l961; 1970, chapter 8 and 10). 
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skills, competencies and practices rather than 'teaching that' and 'learning that'. The 
plausibility of his argument relies upon the assumption that 'teaching that' takes the form 
of 'telling' or 'informing', and 'learning that' is identified with the 'old notion of 
propositional cramming'(Ryle, 1967, p.llO). When we use 'knowing how' in this 
restricted way, we can hardly say that Ryle's advocacy of 'knowing how' satisfactorily 
overcomes the theory/practice dichotomy, since this might lead to a 'transformed' 
dualism, that is, 'theory' and 'practice' are replaced by 'knowing that' and 'knowing 
how'. 
What is more, seen in this way, Ryle's 'knowing how' cannot be equated with the 
notion of a 'social practice' in the strict sense that I shall explore, at least as far as 
education is concerned. Many examples of 'knowing how' in a Rylean sense, for 
instance, how to lay bricks, how to throw balls, how to plant turnips, etc. are by no means 
social practices themselves at least in MacIntyre's sense, although they constitute (part 
of) architecture, football and farming, respectively. In other words, a social practice is far 
more than a knowing how. On similar grounds, we should certainly say that 'education 
as initiation into social practices' involves much more than merely 'knowing how' or 
'learning (and/or teaching) to' do something. To put this another way, the assertion that 
education should be understood in terms of social practices goes far beyond the claim that 
education should be addressing learning abilities, skills and competencies. I would 
conclude, therefore, that education can be fully understood in terms of social practices 
and, in this regard, knowing, whether 'knowing how' or 'knowing that', should be 
regarded as (part of) a 'practice'. 
2. Wittgenstein's Language-games 
Wittgenstein is similar to Ryle in that he rejects the rationalists' series of 
mistaken assumptions: that mind and activity are separated from each other; that mind 
is a prerequisite for activities and, thus, that mind is superior to activities. For 
Wittgenstein, unlike the rationalists, 'mind' can not be seen as either an abstract or 
cognitive apparatus, or an inner or subjective consciousness, which is contrasted to 
'activity', treated as behaviour which is related to individual intention. Rather, mind is 
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not separated from activity in that mind is 'a collection of ways things stand and are 
going that are expressed by bodily doings and sayings' and words for mental phenomena, 
such as 'pain', 'doubt', 'thinking', etc. are used 'to articulate how things stand and are 
going for someone' (Schatzki, 1996, p. 23). From this perspective, mind should be 
understood as part of a (social) activity which expresses activities and how things are, not 
as an abstraction or inner consciousness. We conclude, thus, that activity is the 
appearance of mind and mind is the expression of bodily activity, or more fully, mind is 
not a feature of subjective consciousness, but rather activity which is socially formed by 
'participation in extant social practices'(ibid., p.87). 
The correctness of the rationalists' view that mind is prior, and thus superior, to 
activity also relies entirely on the validity of their view of mind and activity. Thus this 
may be meaningful if and only if the traditional view on mind is correct. According to the 
above explanations, however, it is obviously wrong in terms of the relation between mind 
and activity. For Wittgenstein, mind is a symptom(not a criterion) of social activities, 
rather than an independent entity, and thus it can be fully understood by engaging in 
social practices which Wittgenstein might call 'language-games'. Hence, all activities, 
theoretical or practical, result from ongoing social practices rather than being isolated 
from social practices. In Cartesian doubt, for instance, we never know what his claim of 
doubt means, without understanding its setting in customary practices. In this sense, 
doubting that is regarded as a mental phenomenon may perhaps be not only part of 
language-games but also be 'constituted within and carried by social practices'(ibid., p. 
25). 
In summary, Wittgenstein's view of mind and action is something like this: that 
mind as human activities which express how things are, should be seen as part of social 
practices as well as of language-games. What we should bear in mind is that this view of 
Wittgenstein's certainly goes beyond Ryle's theory in that he does not merely attack the 
theory/practice dichotomy and the priority of theory over practice, but he argues this in 
terms of a broader social context. In order to fully understand this, therefore, we need to 
explore Wittgenstein's language-game theory in relation to social practices at some 
lengthll . 
II Wittgenstein's language-game theory is well expressed in his later works such as Philosophical 
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For Wittgenstein, language-games go far beyond 'naIve' or 'pure' abstractive 
language-games which rely on the 'grammatical' aspects of the use ofwords(PI, s. 496; 
s. 558; s. 664). In a Wittgensteinian sense, there is an intimate link between language and 
social life. Language-games are fundamentally part of social activities which are 
ultimately anchored in forms of life. It is natural thus that a language-game cannot be 
called a pure abstractive language play, but rather a (part of) social activity or a social 
practice. 
This may be explained as follows. For Wittgenstein, language-games are basically 
regarded as human activities, which are characterised as multiple rule-governed activities 
with family resemblances. These activities are fundamentally anchored in forms of life 
in general and surrounding circumstances in particular, to which one belongs, and thus 
the meaning of these activities is dependent on them. Forms of life include various 
human practices, such as playing games, theoretical and practical activities, and so on. 
To put it more exactly, various human activities are reflections of various human forms 
of life. The meaning of all kinds of human practices is ultimately interpreted in the light 
of forms of life which are a kind of presupposition that everybody who engages in human 
practices must accept. For, forms of life are something which are given and, thus, have 
to be accepted, not something which can be chosen or discarded at will 12. In this sense, 
'forms of life' seem to be the one and only ground for any language-game if it exists, 
insofar as what people accept as a 'ground' or 'justification' lies in showing 'how they 
think and live'(PI, s. 325), since forms oflife embodied in language-games provide the 
underlying reasons for our lives 13. Indeed, for Wittgenstein, without imagining a 'form 
of life', it is impossible 'to imagine a language'(PI, s.19). 
If a language-game is meaningful, therefore, it must be based on what he calls the 
'forms of life', and the activities which are expressed in the language-games are fully 
Investigations, Blue and Brown Books, Zettel and On Certainty(Henceforth, PI, BB, Z and OC, 
respectively). However, it is necessary to note that I do not intend to spell out his language-game theory 
as a whole. His language-game theory is partly revealed in section B of Chapter 5, along with this sub-
section. 
12Wittgenstein says: 'what has to be accepted, the given, is - so one could say- forms of life '(PI, s. 226). 
J3In a similar vein, we can speak of what Kuhn calls a 'paradigm'. Forms of life and paradigms have in 
common that they are frameworks for interpretations which we must participate in if we are to have 
adequate understanding. Forms of life are much broader than 'paradigms' in that 'forms of life' are not 
confined to particular fields, whereas a 'paradigm' is in general confined to the academic and theoretical 
world. (See Kuhn, 1974). 
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understood when we see them in terms of 'forms of life', since forms of life offer the 
minimum rule or ground for the game, the ground on which the game is possible and 
which provides the 'agreement in judgment', which is essential for engagement in the 
same language-game. He says: ' 'So you are saying that human agreement decides what 
is true and what is false?' - It is what human beings say that is true and false; and they 
agree in the language they use. This is not agreement in opinions but in forms oflife'(PI, 
s. 241. italics in original). If certain language-games are meaningful, above all, they 
require people to be initiated into the forms of life which constitute the background of the 
language-games. Hence, to say that someone is engaging in the language-games 
presupposes that someone is initiated into the forms of life which are embedded in the 
language-games. And forms of life are articulated and developed within their own 
societies and traditions. 
From this point of view, a language-game is a social practice, not just talking or 
theoretical activity. He says: 'Here the teaching of language is not explanation, but 
training. .. the children are brought up to perform these actions, to use these words as they 
do so, and to react in this way to the words of others' (PI, s. 5-6. italics in original). For 
Wittgenstein, a language-game is primarily not a linguistic utterance or statement, but a 
social practice that relates to bringing about some actions and doings through engaging 
in the activity. Hence, language-games are never conceivable apart from traditions of 
social activities in which people engage. For Wittgenstein, therefore, human activities on 
the one hand and understanding of language on the other are 'bound together within 
social practices'(Schatzki, 1996, p.25). That is to say, the performance of certain human 
activities presupposes practices which constitute the background of understanding (of 
language). Hence, they are bound together 'by virtue of participating in these presupposed 
practices'(ibid.). Wittgenstein's understanding oflanguage-game theory is much closer 
to MacIntyre's account of a social practice which I shall deal with in the next Chapter, 
beyond Ryle's solution of the dichotomy between theory and practice. 
I have so far argued that, in a Wittgensteinian sense, all language-games are social 
practices, beyond simply a literal sense of language. The overall picture of this is more 
or less clear. It is not clear, however, whether Wittgenstein's intention is to show that 
language-games are necessary social practices or to explain social practices as a whole 
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through the idea of a language-game, and whether all social practices are language-
games, or if not all, which social practices are constituted by uses of language. The 
former issue may be a key for the understanding of Wittgenstein's overall picture of 
language-game theory and the latter issue might be a stepping stone for discussing 
educational phenomena. Nevertheless, these issues may be related to each other. 
Wittgenstein's overall position is something like this: all language-games are inevitably 
reflections of social practices in a broad sense; however, we should not conclude, from 
this, that all social practices can be reduced to a language-game or that all social practices 
can be expressed in language(ibid., p.13). Perhaps, theoretical practices and/or second-
order practices are mainly constituted by uses of language, whereas at least some basic 
practices including affective and conative domains of human practices might not be 
constituted by uses of language. For instance, Bourdieu's habitus that emphasises 
preconscious disposition may not completely be expressed by language. Hence, we may 
conclude that, although language is one of the most powerful instruments for transmitting 
social practices, it cannot express all social practices and, thus, it cannot be equated with 
social practices nor comprise all aspects of human practices. 
D. Theory and Practice in an Educational Context 
In the previous section, I mentioned that the dichotomy between theory and 
practice in an educational context cannot be plausible. However, the dichotomy between 
theory and practice in an educational context has been widespread, although it has been 
shown to be more complicated. We can easily identify it in the O'Connor-Hirst debate 
on the nature of educational theory, or in educational practice. Hence, in this section, I 
shall argue the inappropriateness of the dualism in the educational context in terms of the 
nature of education or educational theory, and in terms of the teacher's role. 
With respect to the nature of education, many philosophers of education tend to 
emphasise one or other side of either the practical nature or theoretical nature of 
education. A typical case is to be found in the O'Connor-Hirst debate. 14 For O'Connor, 
14See the following writings regarding their debates: D. J. O'Connor(1957), An Introduction to the 
Philosophy of Education; P.H. Hirst(1966), 'Educational Theory'; D. J. O'Connor(1973), 'The Nature 
and Scope of Educational Theory (1)'; P.H. Hirst (1973), 'The Nature and Scope of Educational Theory 
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in short, theory in the educational context is at best no more than 'a courtesy title'. He 
concludes: 
We can summarize this discussion by saying that the word 'theory' as it is used in 
educational contexts is generally a courtesy title. It is justified only where we are 
applying well-established experimental findings in psychology or sociology to the 
practice of education. And even here we should be aware that the conjectural gap 
between our theories and the facts on which they rest is sufficiently wide to make our 
logical consciences uneasy. We can hope that the future development of the social 
sciences will narrow this gap and this hope gives an incentive for developing these 
sciences(l957, p. 110). 
This conclusion is a natural result following his account of 'theory'. According 
to him, theory can be used in two ways. Firstly, 'theory', as contrasted with 'practice', 
refers to 'a set or system of rules or a collection of precepts which guide or control action 
of various kinds... Educational theory would then consist of the those parts of 
psychology ... which directly guide or concern the work of the teacher'(p. 75). Secondly, 
'theory' is used as it occurs in the natural sciences where it refers to a single hypothesis 
or a logically interconnected set of hypotheses that have been confirmed by observation. 
It provides us with 'standards by which can assess the value and use of any claimant to 
the title of 'theory"(p.76). For O'Connor, educational theory cannot justly be called 
educational theory according to the standard meaning of theory. O'Connor's intention 
here was not to close the gap between theory and practice. Rather, his intention was to 
show the absurdity of the claim that educational theory should have any significant 
practical implications on the one hand and, on the other, to confine the nature of 
educational theory to the production of 'empirically' or 'factually' established findings, 
since in a strict sense, educational theory cannot be rightly called 'theory' (Carr, p. 31). 
Hirst's view, by contrast, seems to run in the following way: educational theory 
fundamentally belongs to practical theory, which is 'concerned with formulating and 
justifying principles of action for a range of practical activities'(1983, p.3). Education, 
(2)'; and also see J. Gribble, Introduction to Philosophy of Education( 1969), particularly pp.179-90 and 
T.W. Moore(l974), Educational Theory: An Introduction. In addition, a more recent position of Hirst's 
is found in his(l983), 'Educational Theory'; and for the relation of theory to practice in terms of social 
practices, see section A of Chapter 8. 
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of course, includes scientific predictions and explanations, but it is not limited to them 
but goes far beyond them. That is, besides many kinds of knowledge, education includes 
beliefs including metaphysical, moral and religious and value judgements. What is more, 
education is, in more fundamental aspects, mainly concerned with making practical 
judgements in answer to practical questions. In this sense, it is much safer to say that 
educational theory is practical in its nature. Moore seems to go along with Hirst in 
claiming that educational theory is primarily a 'practical theory', although in some cases 
educational theory could not be used to explain what is happening in a lesson(1974, p.7). 
In summary, Hirst and O'Connor agree that scientific theory and practical theory 
are quite different in nature and, thus, it is important to decide what the nature of 
educational theory is. Their answers, however, are quite different. That is, Hirst insists 
that educational theory in its fundamental aspect is practical, whereas O'Connor claims 
that educational theory should be scientific. Hirst's conception of educational theory 
seems to be more adequate than O'Connor's in claiming that educational theory should 
be understood in terms of educational practice. As far as his earlier writings are 
concerned, however, he did not see educational theory as a social practice and, 
consequently, failed to close the gap between theory and practice in education. 
On the other hand, unlike O'Connor and Hirst in his earlier writings, Langford 
understands education as a practical activity. He writes: 'education is activity, like 
politics, manufacturing or farming, which aims at practical results. A practical activity 
may be contrasted with a theoretical activity which is concerned to discover how things 
are; physics, etc.' (1968, p.16). For Langford, education is fundamentally a practical 
activity, the purpose of which is to bring about practical results in some desirable ways 
rather than theoretical activity which aims at describing how things are. Certainly, 
Langford's educational theory opens the possibility of the interpretation of education 
theory in terms of social practices in that he sees education as fundamentally linked with 
bringing about practical results or practices. However, as far as his earlier writings are 
concerned, he still did not explicitly see educational theory as a social practice in a strict 
sense, because he often thought that education is no more than a practical activity and 
thus often overlooked the fact that education involves a theoretical activity. Langford's 
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view leads us to consider 'educational theory' in terms of social practices15 . 
When we see 'education as initiation into social practices', all activities, whether 
theory(theoretical) or practice(practical), should be seen as outcomes of social practices 
in which people engage. From this point of view, as Kemmis rightly points out, 'theory 
is not merely words, and practice is not simply action in the educational context. They 
are mutually constitutive aspects of one another'(Kemmis, 1995, p.l5). They are linked 
through social practices in which someone engages. Hence, when we see the conception 
of 'practice' as being in opposition to theory in an educational context, we overlook many 
'aspects of educational practice which are not constrained by criteria of immediacy, 
particularity, context-dependency and the like'(Carr, 1995, p.62). 
Let me tum now to the dichotomy between theory and practice in relation to the 
teacher's role. Many teachers often claim that educational theory is not relevant to their 
practice, that is, educational theory does not give useful guidance in teaching practice. 
Indeed, from the practitioners' point of view, educational theory might not be 
satisfactory. It is natural in a sense, therefore, that they demand practical theory that is 
directly related to practice. This view, however, seems to see the relation of theory to 
practice in too simple a way. They tend to define practice too narrowly. Neither theorising 
education without engaging in any practical activities nor practising education without 
engaging in any kind of theorising is possible and desirable(Carr, 1995, pp. 52-3). In 
general, practitioners tend to overlook the fact that theoretical activities as well as 
practical activities are social practices, but different kinds of social practices which are 
developed within social contexts and within existing and ongoing traditions in which 
each social practice is undertaken. 
For me, as I roughly pointed out above, practitioners' views of educational theory 
are also not grounded in strong foundations nor give a fuller explanation of the 
relationship of theory to practice, although they address the importance of practice. The 
reasons are: firstly, they fail in integrating relationship between theory and practice, since 
their explanation is located in one side or the other side. Secondly, they seem to be 
neglecting the dynamics of the relationship between theory and practice. Namely, they 
15However, I do not intend to explore the relation of educational theory to educational practice in terms of 
social practices, because my aim here is to show the implausibility of the dichotomy between theory and 
practice in an educational context. Regarding debates on educational theory in terms of social practices, 
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seem to overlook the mutual influence between educational theory, practitioners and 
social contexts. These dynamics can never be shown without recognising that theory is 
a part of social practices. Lastly, all practices may have their conceptual frameworks. To 
put it another way, practices are 'theory-laden', not 'opposed to theory'; since 
'educational practice is always guided by some theory about the ethical goods internal to 
that practice, it cannot be made intelligible in terms of an opposition to theory. But at the 
same time, it becomes equally clear why this does not mean that educational practice can 
be sufficiently characterized as a theory-guided pursuit'(Carr, 1995, p. 72). In short, 
educational practice 'can only be made intelligible as a form of praxis guided by ethical 
criteria immanent in educational practice itself, criteria which serve the distinctions 
between educational practices and non-educational practices, and between good practices 
and bad practices(ibid. p.73). 
We should not think, therefore, that closing the gap between theory and practice 
is simply a matter of finding ways of improving the practical effectiveness of particular 
theory, that is, that theory has to be completed before it can be effectively applied. Rather, 
closing the gap is a matter of improving the theories employed by practitioners to make 
sense of their practices. We can conclude, therefore, that matters of the gap between 
theory and practice in education can be solved when we see education or educational 
theory in terms of social practices in which practitioners are engaged. Carr points it out 
clearly: 
There are no 'educational phenomena' apart from the practice of those engaged in 
educational activities, no 'educational problems' apart from those arising from these 
practices and no 'educational theories' apart from those that structure and guide these 
practices. The only task which 'educational theory' can legitimately pursue, then, is to 
develop theories of educational practice that are intrinsically related to practitioners' 
own accounts of what they are doing, that will improve the quality of their involvement 
in these practices and thereby allow them to practise better(p. 37). 
As shown in the above passage, although Carr's position is, to some extent, a narrow and 
extreme one in claiming that educational phenomena and theories can only come out 
see Chapter 8. 
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from practitioners' practices16, he clearly shows us that the relation between theory and 
practice can be properly understood in terms of a social practice, and, furthermore, it is 
possible to close the gap between them, by seeing the relation in this way. 
What I have tried to show so far is that theory and practice cannot, and should 
not, be separated at least in an educational context. Nevertheless, we can often see the 
conventional gap between theory and practice in every domain, particularly in educational 
contexts. Why does this happen? The main reason I have pointed out lies in the fact that 
educators do not see education as social practices, although they engage in educational 
activities. That is, they do not recognise that 'seeing education as social practices' and 
'engaging in educational activities' are not different. Hence, 'theorising, too, is a public 
process and a social practice. Who participates in this public process, this social practice, 
is crucial not only in terms of whose interests are served by educational theorizing, but 
also in terms of what the substance of educational theorizing will be- what educational 
theorizing will be about'(Kemmis, 1995, p.17). If the problem of the gap between theory 
and practice in educational contexts can be solved in terms of social practices, the matter 
of how we define 'social practices' would be a crucial key in education. It is, therefore, 
natural to ask what 'social practices' mean. 
16In fact, educational phenomena and theories can occur or be produced without practitioners' practices. 
My assertion is rather that they are best understood in terms of social practices. 
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Chapter 5. Conceptions of Social Practices 
In the previous Chapter, I pointed out the implausibility of a common view of 
'practice', which assumes a sharp distinction between theory and practice, in terms of 
the Greek notion of praxis, modem philosophers' writings and an educational context. 
The upshot of this may be thus: theory and practice should be integrated in terms of social 
practices. From the perspective of social practices, theory and practice cannot be 
separated, since they both belong to the sphere of a practice, but they are different in that 
they are 'different kinds' of practice. We can say, therefore, that the common view of 
practice errs in that instead of treating theory and practice as different kinds of practice 
it places them in different domains. 
This leads us to explore a positive account of a (social) practice, as shown partly 
in the previous Chapter. However, the question of what exactly counts as 'a (social) 
practice' is very difficult to answer, because the conception of a (social) practice is 
differently used by various writers in the field of philosophy and sociology. For instance, 
a (social) practice is often equated with Wittgenstein's 'the inherited background' or 
'language-game', Ryle's 'knowing how'(and 'knowing that'), Schon's 'tacit knowledge', 
Bourdieu's 'habitus', and so on 17. These various forms of idea in the field of philosophy 
and sociology certainly show us, at least to some degree, the characteristics of a social 
practice, although it is in dispute that they can precisely be equated. What is more, 
recently some philosophers of education have tried to understand educational phenomena 
in terms of social practices. For instance, Hirst's 'education as initiation into social 
practices' and Langford's 'teaching as a social practice', Walsh's(1993) 'education as a 
philosophical practice' and so on, are cases. Hence, in order to fully and properly 
understand what 'education as initiation into social practices' means, it is necessary to 
properly understand the conception of 'social practices'. 
In this Chapter, therefore, I shall establish my conception of social practices 
through discussing some influential conceptions of 'social practices'. In section A, I shall 
introduce MacIntyre's conception of 'a practice', since his conception of 'a practice' 
17, already mentioned these in the previous Chapter. For other examples, see S. Tumer(l994). pp. 1-3. 
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provides the overall structure of social practices which I shall make explicit. In section 
B, I shall emphasise three dimensions of a social practice through analysing MacIntyre's 
conception of a practice and using other writers' arguments. In section C, I shall 
articulate MacIntyre's conception of a social practice and establish my conception of 
social practices through discussing Miller's distinction between 'self-contained' and 
'purposive' practices, and Schatzki's distinction between 'dispersed' and 'integrative' 
practices. 
A. MacIntyre's Conception of a Social Practice 
1. Preliminary Remarks 
MacIntyre, unlike other authors, introduces the idea of a (social) practice for 
explaining his virtue or moral theory, not vice versa. His argument for moral theory in 
general and virtue theory in particular which is based on practices, is linked to his 
reaction against sceptical modem 'individual liberalism' that is mainly derived from the 
Enlightenment project. Indeed, in After Virtue(1984, Henceforth, A V), he begins with a 
'disquieting suggestion': 
The most striking feature of contemporary moral utterance is that so much of it is used 
to express disagreements; and the most striking feature of the debates in which these 
disagreements are expressed is their interminable character(AV, p. 6). 
He, as we can see from the passage quoted above, expresses deep discontent with 
modernity and, accordingly, with the liberalism which gave rise to it, in terms of a state 
of disorder, fragments and chaos of contemporary moral language. Why is he sceptical 
ofliberalism? 
His criticisms, according to Horton and Mendus(1994, p. 8), are threefold: 'the 
liberal conception of the self, which implies that moral value is determined by individual 
choice or decision'; 'liberalism's denial of a telos for man, which results in its inability 
to differentiate satisfactorily between what we are and what we ought to be'; and 
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'liberalism's disregard of social context, which results in its inability to acknowledge 
fully the role of what is 'given' in moral life' . For MacIntyre, the problems ofliberalism18 
in tum are summarised in two categories: one is that liberalism does not recognise the 
social context including history and tradition as the referential framework of the self, the 
other is that it does not acknowledge the telos which human beings ought to have. 
Being faced with these problems, MacIntyre tries to offer a more satisfactory 
moral theory which might be called 'a reconstructed version of Aristotle' in a broad 
sense
l9
. His moral theory relies heavily on Aristotle's ethics on the one hand and he tries 
to overcome Aristotle's limits on the other. To put it more fully, MacIntyre accepts the 
idea of Aristotle's human telos; however, his understanding is grounded in the 'narrative 
unity of a human life' instead of 'metaphysical biology,20 which Aristotle relies on but 
which is now dubious. MacIntyre also adopts what Dunne might call 'the rough 
ground'(Dunne, 1993, p. 377), which refers to the social, cultural contexts which play the 
constitutive role for morality; however, he tries to find the idea of a community in 
morality without presupposing utopian social settings. That is, MacIntyre deploys the 
notion of a 'practice' and that of a 'tradition' instead of the polis which Aristotle's 
tradition rests on. It is thus natural to explore 'tradition' together with 'narrative' and 
'practice' which lie at the heart of his moral theory( Mulhall and Swift, 1992, p. 82). 
With respect to the narrative unity of human life, MacIntyre rejects the view that 
a person should, as liberals claim, be simply seen as a chooser and decider, since human 
actions cannot be fully intelligible without the 'history of the agent's life and of settings 
18The issue of whether social practices-based education overcomes the weakness of liberal education will 
be dealt with more fully in Chapter 8. 
19His Ie/os and social! historical contexts are also found in Aquinas in a similar way. For Aquinas, like 
Aristotle, the good life for humans is always connected to his notion of eudaimonia which synthesises 
Aristotle's teleology of natural goods with Augustine's metaphysics of the transcendent Good. Hence, for 
him, there is still a teleological element, although his human goal is slightly different from Aristotle's one. 
On the other hand, the human goal also should be understood in the light of social contexts which we might 
call the 'civitas Dei '. Aquinas lived in a society which might be described as containing pluralism of 
thought on the one hand and attempting to reconcile rival versions of thought on the other. Therefore, his 
thought also should be understood as a product of the social context in which he lived. Indeed, according 
to MacIntyre, the superiority of Thomism consists in 'its ability to construct a rational narrative within 
which the advances and crises of other traditions can be described and transcended '(J. Haldane, 1994, p. 
102). In this sense, it might more accurately be called 'Aristotelianism- cum- Thomism'. However, we 
must admit that there are big gaps between them. For more details of these, see WJWR, particularly 
pp.l03ff. 
20 Regarding this, MacIntyre says: 'although this account of virtues is teleological, it does not require the 
identification of any teleology in nature, and hence it does not require any allegiance to Aristotle's 
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in which it occurs,21. It rather is understood that 'action has a basically historical 
character, our lives are enacted narratives in which we are both characters and authors; 
a person is a character abstracted from a history'( Mulhall and Swift, 1992, p.87). His 
narrative understanding of the self 'implies that answers to questions of what we ought 
to do involve not merely choosing what to do as individuals, but also, and essentially, 
discovering who we are in relation to others'(Horton and Mendus, I 994, p. 9). In this 
respect, we are not entirely autonomous. We are, sometimes, influenced by others and 
by our surroundings. Nevertheless, what seems to be obvious is that the narrative of our 
lives provides us with a certain teleological character. The narrative unity of human life 
provides the framework within which we make rational choices concerning the 
conflicting demands of different practices and, further, it directs us towards the good life 
for human beings. In short, MacIntyre attempts to restore 'teleological concepts to our 
culture via the narrative features of human life'(McMylor,1994, p.69). His narrative 
conception of human life and community 'focuses on the quest of defining the good life 
itself(ibid, p.73) and it is determined by a particular social context(p.86). 
Secondly, virtues should be understood in terms of various forms of human 
activities that MacIntyre calls 'practices'. That is, it is difficult to see virtue as having a 
unitary meaning or to see its meaning as being always fixed and determined (AV, p.194). 
For MacIntyre, practices playa central role in his virtue and moral theory, because 
morality is fundamentally seen as 'practice-based' activity. Acting morally, like playing 
chess well, is 'not a matter of individual preference or decision' . Rather, it is related to 
the actualisation of virtues and the criteria for it are basically determined by the practice 
itself in which we are engaged. For him, morality is 'construed primarily in terms of a 
life embodying the virtues; and our understanding of what the virtues are, and why they 
are virtues, is crucially dependent on coming to recognise their place in the practices' 
which are situated in a wider context(Horton and Mendus, op.cit., pp.l 0-11). 
Lastly, MacIntyre's moral theory tends to stress the role of tradition. To 
understand the concept of a tradition more fully, it is necessary to grasp its relation to 
practices and the narrative order of a human life. A practice provides the contexts of 
metaphysical biology'(A V, p.196). And also see D. Achtenberg(1992), pp. 317-340. 
21Regarding this, Dunne explains it using two metaphors: 'navigating the sea' and 'the rough ground'. We, 
like sailors, must navigate our passage in the sea on the one hand and we also must start from, and return 
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human action 'by locating the action with reference to the person's own history' and 'by 
reference to the actor's role in the history of settings' (McMylor, p.l54). The history of 
narratives shows us how best to live, that is, it provides stories of the pursuit of the good. 
Hence, a practice of morality cannot be imagined in isolation from its history and 
tradition. In this respect, we might say that his conception of tradition is an extended form 
of the narrative of an individual's life in respect of both social and historical context. In 
short, the traditions of our lives are embedded in the larger narrative of a historically and 
socially extended argument about the goods which constitute those traditions(AV, p. 
222). 
What I have explained so far is that MacIntyre's moral or virtue theory can be 
understood in terms of tripartite elements: of narrative unity of human life, practices and 
traditions. Given this, let us explore his conception of a practice. Before doing this, it 
might be helpful to note some remarks. Firstly, regarding MacIntyre's overall framework, 
as I pointed out above, it should be borne in mind that his conception of practices tends 
to be connected with virtues and, at the same time, virtues can be effectively possessed 
and exercised in the course of social practices, although he denies that they are always 
so(AV, p. 187). This connection becomes a matter of definition, as virtue is associated 
with the realisation of goods internal to practices: 'A virtue is an acquired human quality 
the possession and exercise of which tends to enable us to achieve those goods which are 
internal to practices and the lack of which effectively prevents us from achieving any 
such goods'(AV, p.l91). Hence, in order to understand the virtues we must examine the 
ways in which these qualities are essential to achieve the goods that are internal to a range 
of such practices. More specifically speaking, they are related in the following ways: on 
the one hand, virtues not only keep practices from the corrupting power of institutions, 
but also 'sustain practices and enable us to achieve the goods internal to practices', by 
furnishing us with knowledge of the good and sustaining us in the relevant quest for the 
good(AV, p.219) and, on the other, practices give the meaning of virtues in two respects: 
'we cannot know what it means in concrete terms to possess a virtue unless we are 
familiar with the range of practices within which that virtue is displayed'; and 'we cannot 
understand why justice, say, is a virtue unless we grasp its role in sustaining such 
to, the rough ground on the other(Dunne, 1993, p. 377). 
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practices' (Miller, 1994, p. 249). 
Secondly, with regard to MacIntyre's definition, it is worth noting two points. 
The first point I want to point out is, as MacIntyre himself says, that he uses the term 
'practice' in 'a specifically defined way' which is not always consistent with ordinary 
usages(p. 187). We can find this in Ryle's case, as I mentioned. Ryle might say that a 
'knowing how' is a practice, but it is not necessarily so in MacIntyre's sense. 'How to lay 
a brick', for example, may be a practice in Ryle's sense, but not a practice in MacIntyre's 
sense. From this point of view, we may say that MacIntyre's conception of a practice is 
more strictly defined than an ordinary conception of it. The second point that I want to 
note is that MacIntyre's conception of 'a practice' can be interchangeably used with 'a 
social practice' in that he always recognises that a practice is social by nature and thus 
it cannot be properly and fully understood without relying on a social context, although 
he did not directly mention or define the conception of' a social practice'. Given the place 
of a social practice within MacIntyre's framework, let us look in the next sub-section at 
his conception of a social practice. 
2. MacIntyre's Criteria of a Social Practice 
The conception of a 'social practice' may be less clear than we often think. 
Although many authors mention the term, they do not give a fuller explanation of it. 
However, MacIntyre provides us with a powerful inspiration as to what is meant by a 
'practice'. In order to understand what social practices are, therefore, the best way might 
be to start with his definition. Indeed, MacIntyre offers more or less a good framework 
for the concept of a 'practice'. He illustrates: 
[By a 'practice' 1... mean] any coherent and complex form of socially established co-
operative human activity through which goods internal to that form of activity are 
realised in the course of trying to achieve those standards of excellence which are 
appropriate to, and partially definitive of, that form of activity, with the result that 
human powers to achieve excellence, and human conceptions of the ends and goods 
involved, are systematically extended(A V, p.187). 
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He extends his definition. He goes on to say: 
A practice involves standards of excellence and obedience to rules as well as the 
achievement of goods. To enter into a practice is to accept the authority of those 
standards and the inadequacy of my own performance as judged by them. It is to subject 
my own attitudes, choices, preferences and tastes to the standards which currently and 
partially define the practice. Practices of course ... have a history: games, sciences and 
arts all have histories. Thus the standards are not themselves immune from criticism, but 
nonetheless we cannot be initiated into a practice without accepting the authority of the 
best standards realized so far(ibid., p. 190). 
According to MacIntyre, tic-tac-toe is not a practice, nor is throwing a football with skill, 
whereas the game of football and playing chess are practices. Bricklaying is not a 
practice but architecture is. Planting turnips is not a practice, but farming is. Arts, 
sciences, games, politics in the Aristotelian sense, the making and sustaining of family 
are included in practices. What, then, are the criteria that make a distinction between a 
practice and non-practice? 
As indicated in above passages, following MacIntyre, there are, roughly speaking, 
five criteria of a (social) 'practice': 'a coherent and complex form of socially established 
cooperative human activity', 'the achievement of internal goods', 'standards of 
excellence', 'obedience to rules' and 'the development or progression of form of 
activity'. These five conditions must be met if we can legitimately call something a 
(social) practice in a MacIntyrean sense. To put this another way, it should satisfy the 
following questions: 1) Is it a coherent and complex form of socially established 
cooperative human activity? 2) Does it promote the achievement of internal goods? 3) 
Are there standards of excellence inherent in the activity of it? 4) Are there rules to which 
one is obedient? 5) Does it improve or progress through its traditions? 
To begin with, a '(social) practice' is, he says, 'a coherent and complex form of 
socially established cooperative human activity'. This condition may involve at least 
three elements: a complex human activity, a coherent human activity and a socially 
established cooperative human activity. This implies that not all human activities are 
practices, although a practice is defined as a human activity. Let me pursue this in more 
detail. 
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If some human activities are to be practices, the activities should satisfy at least 
the following three conditions. Firstly, the activities should not be too simple, such as tic-
tac-toe, bricklaying, kicking a ball, and so on. These examples are not practices, since 
these are not complicated skills. Rather, practices are more or less 'complicated' ones, 
such as playing chess, architecture, playing football as a game and so on, although there 
are still differences of degree. Secondly, complexity of an activity alone does not always 
guarantee that this activity deserves to be called a practice. In order to satisfy the concept 
of a practice, a human activity should have not merely a complex form but also 
'coherence' within it. For instance, think of the situation in which there are two people 
and one ball. If whichever person is closest to the ball kicks it randomly in any direction, 
not backwards and forwards from one to another, this could be incoherent and thus 
cannot be properly called a practice. Furthermore, an activity shared in by more than one 
person cannot be cooperative without to some degree being coherent22• Lastly, if some 
activity is to be a practice, the activity must be a 'socially established cooperative human 
activity'. That is to say, the concept of a practice is 'social' in character, meaning that it 
has a public nature. In this respect, as I noted earlier, a practice should be equated with 
a social practice, because there are no practices without 'social' character. On this 
ground, henceforth, I prefer to use a 'social practice' rather than a 'practice,23. Indeed, all 
MacIntyre's examples, such as football, farming, architecture, etc., are socially 
established activities and are also sustained and developed within a society and its 
traditions. These examples, therefore, cannot be fully understood in isolation from the 
social contexts in which they occur. 
Secondly, with respect to the achievement of internal goods, a social practice is 
necessary to explain MacIntyre's sense of 'internal goods'. It presupposes that there is a 
distinction between goods internal to social practices and goods external to social 
practices. Goods internal to a practice are distinguished from those external to it by two 
facts: one is that we 'can only specify them' in terms of the specific kind of activity; the 
other is they 'can only be identified and recognized by the experience of participating in 
22 Although it is far from clear what MacIntyre means by 'coherence', we may say that the category of 
coherence/incoherence would not apply to a single person kicking a ball and, further, coherence does not 
really have any status as an independent criterion. 
23More exactly speaking, my most favorite term is the plural expression' social practices'. For the rationale 
for this, see section C of this Chapter. 
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the practice m question' (AV, pp.188-9). In contrast, 'external goods' are only 
'contingently' related to practices, and also, 'in principle', could be obtained 
independently of practices(Mason, 1996, p.192). For instance, the good that consists in 
playing chess well is an internal good, since it cannot be obtained in any other way but 
only by playing chess. By contrast, obtaining the money, status and prestige through 
becoming a champion chess player is an external good, because money can be got 
without engaging in the practice of chess. It is, however, not simple in practice, because 
we can think of the case in which the aim is to achieve the prestige, status, and money by 
'participating well in' a genuine social practice like chess, not by 'cheating' at chess or 
by participating in some 'other' forms of activity. One obvious thing is, nevertheless, that 
money, status, prestige etc. are not intrinsically related to playing chess, although it is 
possible to achieve such things by participating appropriately in that social practice. 
Thirdly, related to the internal goods, if something is a social practice, it would 
fit 'standards of excellence'. In fact, the concept of good itself presupposes that it should 
be achieved by attempting to excel, i.e. reaching or exceeding existing standards of 
excellence, as far as human activities are concerned. Such internal goods can only be 
experienced if the learner is willing to accept the authority of the standards of the subject 
and their own inadequate performance as judged against them. The standards, as those 
of practices, are not immune from criticism and may undergo change over time. It might 
be different in accordance with societies and traditions. 
Furthermore, there are differences in the standards of excellence which a practice 
should achieve within different social practices. In some practices, the standards of 
excellence will be relatively straightforward, whereas the standards in other practices are 
less obvious. For instance, in the practice of chess, it would seem that there would be 
relatively less controversy about the standards of excellence to be applied. Teaching is 
a social practice that relates to many other concerns of life in various ways; however, the 
practice of teaching may be open to dispute regarding its standards of excellence, since 
the issue of what kind of teaching can be regarded as good teaching is controversial 
according to societies and their traditions. Nevertheless, it is clear that teaching does 
involve such standards, even though there are difficulties and controversies in identifying 
the standards(Pearson, 1989, p. 91). 
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Fourthly, with respect to obedience to rules, all practices are necessarily rule-
governed activities. To say that an activity is rule-governed or that an activity has rules 
which one should obey can be understood in two possible ways according to two types 
of rule. One is what Pearson calls' basic' rules such that without keeping the rules, it is 
impossible to do the activity. This rule is the rule which everybody who is engaging in 
the activity must observe. The other is what Pearson labels 'strategic' rules, relating to 
good and bad ways to perform an activity. According to him, in playing chess, there are 
two sorts of mistakes: basic mistakes and strategic mistakes. A basic mistake, such as 
moving the knight straight ahead, may be the case that 'someone violates one of the 
explicit rules of chess'. If someone refuses to make corrections to basic mistakes, we 
would conclude that 'the person is not playing chess'. When someone makes strategic 
mistakes in chess, it would not be said that he or she is playing some other game in that 
he or she does not violate the explicit rules. But he or she may be rightly accused of 
failing to take the game seriously, since strategic mistakes 'are likely to lessen the 
chances of success in the game'(p. 92). So, some rules are constitutive of the activity 
itself, others are constitutive of success in the activity. To engage in the activity seriously, 
one must be willing to see the rules as correctives to one's moves when performing the 
activity. To see rules as correctives to what one does is to put oneself in the position of 
being obedient to the rules of the activity. 
This distinction implies that different social practices have different kinds of 
obedience to rules. For instance, the standards and rules of playing chess might be 
different from those of painting and of teaching, etc. Roughly speaking, rules of painting 
and teaching might be more flexible and thus more difficult to specify than those of 
playing chess24. Nevertheless, it is more or less obvious that teaching and painting are 
rule-following activities. 
Lastly, a major character of social practices might lie in the progression of 
practices themselves. Social practices are necessarily required to be 'systematically 
extended', although MacIntyre uses this phrase of human powers and concepts. This 
includes the following elements: the improvement of a 'practice itself'; the improvement 
ofthe 'understanding' of the practice by its practitioners; and thirdly, the improvement 
24For discussion of teaching as a rule following activity, see Chapter 7. 
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of the 'situation' in which practices take place(Carr and Kemmis, 1986, p. 165). We 
would argue that there might be deteriorating practices as well as improving ones. This 
may be right, because practices are not always developing or improving, as can be 
identified in human history. However, at least in a MacIntyre's sense, practices are 
intended to progress so that, unless they improve, they have little meaning. 
Social practices are developed through ongoing traditions in which someone 
engages. To say that social practices are improving or progressing implies the 
development of the criteria of a 'practice' such as 'coherent and complex form of 
activities', 'internal goods', 'standards of excellence' and 'obedience to rules,25. Let us 
take MacIntyre's own example, portrait painting. According to him, there are at least two 
different kinds of good internal to the painting of human faces and bodies. One is 'the 
excellence of the products, both the excellence in performance by the painters and that 
of each portrait itself. This excellence ... has to be understood historically. The sequences 
of the development find their point and purpose in a progress towards and beyond a 
variety of types and modes of excellence ... It is in participation in the attempts to sustain 
progress and to respond creatively to problems that the second kind of good internal to 
the practices of portrait painting is to be found. For what the artist discovers within the 
pursuit of excellence in portrait painting - and what is true of portrait painting is true of 
the practice of the fine arts in general- is the good of a certain kind oflife ... but it is the 
painter's living out of a greater or less part of his or her life as a painter that is the second 
kind of good internal to painting. And judgement on these goods requires at the very least 
the kind of competence that is only to be acquired either as a painter or as someone 
willing to learn systematically what the portrait painter has to teach' (A V, pp.189-190). 
As we can see in this example, a social practice is more or less elaborated and improved 
through ongoing traditions of the social practice in which they engage. 
The upshot of what I have tried to explain so far seems to be affirming 
MacIntyre's conception of a social practice. Some disputes, however, still remain. First 
of all, there is still unclarity in the distinction between practice and non-practice. The 
unclarity of this distinction comes mainly from the fact that MacIntyre does not consider 
matters of degree within social practices. There are some differences in terms of degree 
25 For discussion of these criteria in an educational context, see section A of Chapter 7. 
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both within social practices and within non-practices. It is the case that bricklaying would 
be harder to exclude from the class of social practices than tic-tac-toe, if there is a 
possibility at all of including them in the class of social practices. The relation between 
goods internal to a social practice and goods external to it also seems to be problematic. 
'Goods can be external to a social practice in more than one way'. Some goods, like the 
satisfaction of hunger, thirst or sexual desire, may not belong to a particular social 
practice, because one can achieve them without engaging in any of the coherent, 
complex, socially extended cooperative forms of activiry26. 'Other goods are external to 
one social practice while internal to another' (Stout, 1988, p. 272). Genetically modified 
foods, for example, may be goods internal to a food industry, but may be external to, or 
conflict with, the practice of environmental conservation. 
What is more, MacIntyre does not seem to recognise that modes of social practice 
could vary within the same social practice. In other words, even within the same social 
practice, for instance, what we call 'farming', there might be different activities according 
to cultures and societies. Amish farming, for instance, is quite different from modem 
American farming in various aspects such as concept of farming, manner, technique etc., 
although we can call 'farming' a social practice. Take another example of a voting 
practice. In communist countries the people participate in voting activity. Their voting 
is, however, quite different from that of western countries. In order to understand the 
meaning of an activity, therefore, it is necessary to understand the backgrounds against 
which that activity is performed. 
Secondly, even if we accept his definition, it is not clear how we can distinguish 
one practice from other practices. This distinction is very important at least in an 
educational context. For instance, in what aspect is teaching different from medicine, 
politics, and so on, on the one hand and different from indoctrination, conditioning, 
training, preaching and so on, on the other? Certainly, MacIntyre did not give the answer 
to that. There are many possible ways: internal goods that a particular social practice 
pursues, rules that people who engage in it should obey, its standards of excellence, the 
overall purpose of a social practice, and so on. Ifwe define education as 'initiation into 
26 Although hunger, thirst, or sexual desire can be satisfied without engagement in social practices, this is 
not normal in what we call civilised societies. We do not just drink and eat when we have meals. Ways of 
preparing food, serving it, and so on, may be seen as social practices with cultural variations. Satisfaction 
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social practices', this question should be answered. 
Thirdly, are all practices always good? MacIntyre certainly recognised this 
critique: that some practices, for instance, torture and sado-masochistic sexual activities, 
are evil. He responds to that question: 'there may be practices' which simply' are evil' . 
But, he does not in fact believe that 'either torture or sado-masochistic sexuality answer 
to the description of a practice which his account of the virtues employs'(p. 200). (In this 
sense, MacIntyre would be reluctant to say that torture and sado-masochistic sexual 
activities are evil social practices, although we may often say that they are evil practices.) 
Even if we do not think that some social practices are definitely evil, however, we 
can still appropriately ask the question 'are all practices always good?' For MacIntyre, 
the notion of 'internal good' is a crucial concept in his explanation of a social practice. 
However, it is not clear whether all internal goods are necessarily desirable. For instance, 
playing chess in certain society could be regarded as at best a way of spending time or 
even as a disgraceful or illegal act. The standards of value judgement in a social practice 
may be different according to social traditions. We can hardly say, thus, that all social 
practices are valuable or desirable, even though we recognise his modified and 
supplemented view that a social practice should be 'enriched and supplemented by being 
connected with the notions of the good of a whole human life and of an ongoing 
tradition'(AV, p.275). On the other hand, we may say that chess would retain its internal 
goods, even if it is regarded as a waste of time. This means that not all internal goods 
necessarily entail that they are good or desirable. Borrowing Miller's term27, not all 'self-
contained' practices guarantee shared or social goods. This may show a limit of internal 
goods in sustaining flourishing society. From this perspective, we may open up other 
arguments that the distinction between 'intrinsic'(internal) and 'extrinsic'(external) can 
be seen as not a matter of good or bad but a matter of practical choice, and not clear-cut 
but a matter of degree. 
Lastly, in an educational context, we can ask what the place of a social practice 
is. On the one hand, education can be defined 'initiation into social practices'. On the 
other hand, education is far more than a social practice, although this depends on how we 
of sexual desire may be surrounded by all sorts of social practices, such as dating, courtship, marriage, etc. 
27 Miller draws a distinction between 'self-contained' and 'purposive' practices. For the details of it, see 
section C of this Chapter. 
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understand the notion of a social practice. What is the difference between two claims, i.e. 
'a particular form of education is a social practice' and 'education as a whole can be 
reduced to a social practice'? 
What is more, in order to reveal the educational meaning of a social practice 
fully, the following questions should be asked: what does 'following a social practice' 
mean and how should we do this in an educational context? What are the differences 
between so-called liberal education and social practices-based education in terms ofthe 
educational aims, curriculum construction, teachers' attitude and teaching method, and 
so on? What kinds of a social practice should be transmitted in schools and universities? 
Is there any difference between schools and universities? (different social practices? or 
another part of the same practices?, or different level of the same practices?) Are there 
any priorities among social practices? If so, what are the criteria on which social practices 
are chosen? What is the status of theoretical knowledge compared with other social 
practices? Although I do not entirely agree with MacIntyre's detailed account of a social 
practice, I do want to argue that education can best be understood in terms of social 
practices. 
So far, I have examined a widely accepted concept of a practice that is defined 
by MacIntyre. As I pointed out above, although MacIntyre's account of a social practice 
shows many characteristics of a social practice, the concept of a social practice still needs 
to be further elaborated. In the next section, I try to articulate it by considering three 
dimensions of a social practice. 
B. Three Dimensions of Social Practices 
In the previous section, I explored MacIntyre's account of a social practice. His 
account of a social practice can be summarised as follows: 'a coherent and complex form 
of socially established cooperative human activity', 'the achievement of internal goods', 
'standards of excellence', 'obedience to rules' and 'the development or progression of 
form of activity'. This definition seems to provide us with at least three dimensions of 
a social practice: action, society and tradition. Hence, in this section, I shall emphasise 
each dimension of a social practice. 
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1. Activity Dimension 
In order to understand an activity dimension, it might be helpful to remind 
ourselves of MacIntyre's definition: 'any coherent and complex form of socially 
established co-operative human activity ... ' This definition involves at least three qualities 
of human activity: a complex human activity, a coherent human activity and a socially 
established human activity. This clearly shows us the first dimension of a social practice, 
i.e. a 'human activity'. What I want to address here is whether a practice is fundamentally 
defined as a 'human activity', rather than a 'language' or a 'subject'. Why should a 
practice be defined in terms of 'activity-words'? 
states: 
In a similar vein, Wittgenstein sees uses of language as human activities. He 
Giving grounds, however, justifying the evidence, comes to an end;- but the end ... it is 
not a kind of seeing on our part; it is our acting, which lies at the bottom of the 
language-game(OC, s. 204, italics in original); ... but the end is not an ungrounded 
presupposition: it is ungrounded way of acting(OC, s. 110, my emphasis ). 
Here the term 'language-game' is meant to bring into prominence the fact that the 
speaking of a language is part of an activity, or of a form of life(PI, s. 23, italics in 
original). 
What this citation shows us is largely two things: we should see uses of language as 
activities or actions; and thus language-games should be understood in terms of forms 
of life in general and activities in particular beyond language itself. He clearly has 
'speech acts' in mind here. Of course, 'language-games' are broader than 'speech acts' 
in that language-games include 'giving orders', 'describing the appearance of an object', 
'reporting an event', 'making up a story', 'making ajoke' and so on(PI, s. 23). What is 
obvious is that, whether speech acts or language-games, they should be understood as 
actions or activities. Hence we can say, as Habermas(1971) has said, that language and 
action or activity are closely connected and, thus, are interpreted reciprocally in 
Wittgenstein's language-game( p.168). 
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'Language-games' are also part of multiple or complex human activities with 
family resemblances. For Wittgenstein, language-games are plural. This presupposes the 
multiplicity of uses of language. He compares words and their uses to tools and their 
uses
28
. Just as tools are used to do things; hammers to drive nails, screw-drivers to drive 
in screws, and so on, so, words are used to perform certain acts. There might be various 
kinds of game whose nature is quite different. We might say, therefore, that the meaning 
being expressed in the language is largely' dependent on its use in the language-game 
wherein it occurs' rather than language having a single meaning beyond its usage and 
contexts(Thomson, 1981, p.18). This raises a question: is there any common element to 
all different language-games? Wittgenstein illustrates this: 
Consider for example the proceedings that we call 'games'. I mean board-games, card-
games, Olympic games, and so on. What is common to them all? .. For if you look at 
them you will not see something that is common to all, but similarities, relationships, and 
a whole series of them at that. .. And the result of this examination is: we see a 
complicated network of similarities, overlapping and criss-crossing: sometimes overall 
similarities, sometimes similarities of detail(PI, s. 66). 
I can think of no better expression to characterize these similarities than 'family 
resemblances'; for the various resemblances between members of family: build, features, 
colour of eyes, gait, temperament, etc. etc. overlap and criss-cross in the same way. -And 
I shall say: 'games' form a family (PI, s. 67). 
The passages quoted above show us that games can be related to each other in all sorts 
of different ways which he calls 'family resemblances'. Within games, there are 'a 
complicated network of similarities, overlapping and criss-crossing', as there are 'various 
resemblances between members of family: build, features, colour of eyes, gait, 
temperament etc.'. Some of a family have a similar nose, others have similar eyes and 
others again a similar way of walking. And these likenesses overlap. We cannot be a 
member of family by virtue of possessing certain characteristics, such as eyes, nose etc. 
in common, but rather family members have nothing common except that they are a 
family member. Indeed, it may be true that 'brothers have in common that they are male 
28He explains: 'Think of the tools in a tool-box: there is a hammer, pliers, a saw, a screw-driver, a rule, a 
glue-pot, glue, nails and screws- the functions of words are as diverse as the functions ofthese objects'(PI, 
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siblings, but their having in common that they are male siblings is their having in 
common that they are brothers, and not their having in common something in addition 
to their being brothers'(Bambrough, 1966, p. 194). Similarly, games have nothing in 
common except that they are games. Hence, we might say that language-games have not 
any common essence except they all use language. 
In conclusion, a social practice in Wittgenstein's sense should be grounded in a 
complex 'human activity' which is expressed by language-games with family 
resemblances. For Wittgenstein, engaging in language-games does mean participating in 
what we call language-games as social practices, which are continually accumulated and 
elaborated by their traditions. 'Understanding a language' and 'being able to speak' refer, 
then, to skills that one has acquired, to activities that one has learned to carry out in 
common with others. This internal connection of language with practice, with knowing 
how to do certain things, is evident in the learning situation itself(McCarthy, 1979, 
p.163). In this sense, as Habermas has said, we could say that language-games are 'not 
only language, but also practices'(quoted in McCarthy, p.166. emphasis in original). 
2. Society Dimension 
The second dimension of a practice that I want to address is a society dimension. 
To this end, it might be useful to raise the following question: are all practices necessarily 
social? If this is so, we would prefer to speak of a 'social practice' rather than a 
'practice'. In my view, as I implicitly or explicitly indicated, all practices are 
fundamentally social, although there is a matter of degree. For instance, studying physics 
and playing football are quite different in the nature of the activity, as well as in its 
relation to society. The former is a typical theoretical activity that is related to seeing or 
observing, whereas the latter is a practical activity that is related to acting or doing. 
Studying physics, unlike playing football, may be a less social co-operative activity than 
playing football. Nonetheless, we can hardly deny that studying physics is a social 
practice. In what senses, then, can we say that a practice must be, to use a MacIntyrean 
phrase, a 'socially established cooperative activity'? I shall back up this in terms of 
s. 11). 
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language uses, rule-governed activities and their connection with the real social life. 
Firstly, what makes a practice, e.g. studying physics, social lies in the uses of 
languages, since languages are inconceivable apart from social human beings. Languages 
themselves are embedded in social structures which go far beyond mere structures of 
language. Uses oflanguage rest fundamentally on conventions, customs and institutions 
and so on, since these are social constructs and results of human practices. Take an 
example of studying or doing physics. When we are studying physics, we use physical 
languages, such as speed, acceleration, gravitational force, electron beams, Archimedes' 
principle, etc. in order to understand physical phenomena. These languages do not belong 
to a private domain, but rather a public and social one in that they are products of people 
who engage in ongoing traditions of physics. 
The idea that uses oflanguage are social and public in nature is more clearly, and 
directly, revealed in Wittgenstein's 'private language argument'. He seems to argue that 
a private language is impossible by attacking its two different underpinnings: that I can 
learn privately the language of personal sensations, e.g. the conception of pain, and 
various mental states by attending to my personal feelings and associating them with 
words and processes of introspection; and that an isolated person, e.g. Crusoe, could 
conceivably invent or develop his own language(Rubinstein, 1981, pp.l55-7). 
Against the former argument, Wittgenstein argues that the idea of a private 
language should be understood as having the social and practical nature of a language. 
According to him, even the meaning of sensation words is established in a system of 
social and practical usages rather than in private mental events, because the concept of 
pain can be properly understood in terms of 'its particular function in our life' (Z, s. 532) 
and, thus, it is not known by associating an internal sensation with a word, but by 
participating in the various social practices with which it is connected. To have the 
concept of pain, therefore, we must be able to understand and participate in these various 
practices. That requires socialisation into the systems of practices and conventions that, 
in a given society, are built around the concept pain, since different cultures and 
education might lead to different conceptions ofpain(Z, s. 387). The essential connection 
between language and social practices shows, in tum, that we cannot learn the language 
of inner experience 'by private ostensive definition'(Rubinstein, op.cit., p.163). 
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Against the latter argument, Wittgenstein emphasises the 'rule-bound nature' of 
language and 'social character' of rules. Crusoe, like Adam in the garden of Eden did, 
might name plants, animals, and so on. But, unlike the first person Adam, if his usage of 
language is meaningful, Crusoe must observe conventional language rules which are 
already given rather than his own but artificial rules. Hence, in order to name something 
we must use a word consistently according to rules(PI, s. 199). As Wittgenstein puts it: 
Is what we call 'obeying a rule' something that it would be possible for only one man to 
do, and to do only once in his life? ... To obey a rule, to make a report, to give an order, 
to playa game of chess, are customs(uses, institutions) (PI, s. 199, italics in original). 
He clearly points out this point: "Obeying a rule' is itself a practice. And to think one 
was obeying a rule is not to obey a rule. Hence it is not possible to obey a rule 'privately'; 
otherwise thinking one was obeying a rule would be the same thing as obeying it'(PI, s. 
202). We can say, therefore, that to use a language implies that it is a public activity in 
that a language has certain rules, and anyone who participates in the games should 
understand the rules and obey the rules which direct the activity within the language-
games. From this point of view, we would not call Crusoe's utterances 'language' at all, 
ifhe did not obey conventional language rules, whether strict or not. This leads us to look 
at the social character of a rule-governed activity. 
Secondly, a practice is social in that it is a rule-governed or rule-following 
activity, as noted in the previous section. All practices, such as playing chess, drawing, 
painting, language-games, teaching, etc. are necessarily rule-governed activities, whether 
the rules are 'basic' ones that everybody who is engaging in the activity must observe or 
'strategic' rules that decide good or bad ways to perform an activity. Language-games, 
for example, may not follow any strict rules, nor have any strict meaning. Wittgenstein 
states: 
... Remember that in general we don't use language according to strict rules- it hasn't 
been taught us by means of strict rules, either. We, in our discussions on the other hand, 
constantly compare language with a calculus proceeding according to exact rules(BB, 
s.25). 
Many words in this sense ... don't have a strict meaning. But this is not a defect. To think 
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it is would be like saying that the light of my reading lamp is no real light at all because 
it has no sharp boundary(BB, s. 27). 
For Wittgenstein, a rule seems to be interpreted as the factor which constitutes a 
minimum ground for the game to be possible. In this respect, his language-games are 
neither strict nor static, but dynamic and flexible29 . It is clear, nevertheless, that they are 
rule-governed activities which are required for meaningful activities. 
However, perhaps most social practices have both basic rules and strategic rules, 
the rules which are derived from social customs and traditions. Hence, to say that some 
activities have rules that people who engage in these activities should obey presupposes 
that these activities are social, because rules are in principle made for collective life or 
human coexistence. We might generalise, therefore, that rule-following activity can be 
seen as the paradigm of human activity and it is necessarily the reflection of social 
phenomena in a broad sense. In this sense, Peters' proposition that 'man in society is a 
chess-player writ large' is quite right in showing that human activities have inevitably a 
social character(Peters, 1958, p. 7). In short, all human activities, whether explicitly or 
not, can be characterised as rule-governed activities and thus necessarily connected to 
their social life. 
So far I have argued that all practices are necessarily social on the grounds that 
they are rooted in uses of language and rule-governed activity. These grounds are 
indirectly related to society. Lastly, let me now consider the social nature of a practice in 
terms of its direct connection with the real world. To this end, it may be helpful to 
consider a sociological argument, because, unlike philosophers, most sociologists tend 
to underline the social nature of a practice in relation to the real social world. For 
example, Bourdieu sees social practices in terms of the dynamic relationship between 
habituses and current capitals as realised in a given field3o. To put it more concretely, 
29What is more, Wittgenstein says that the language-game is more or less 'unpredictable' like our life (Oe, 
p. 559). And also we need to recognise that rules are different from game to game. The rules of a ball game, 
for instance, differ from those of chess. Further, it might be, at least slightly, different within the same game 
according to temporal and spatial backgrounds. 
30 This ongoing project is apparent in his two major books, Outline of a Theory of Practice( 1977) and The 
Logic of Practice (1990). Henceforth, OP, LP respectively. Habitus among them plays a key role. But his 
account of habitus is not clear. The reason why lies mainly in Bourdieu's intention which is 'not in fact to 
define but rather to characterise the concept of habitus in a variety of ways in order to communicate a 
certain theoretical stance or posture, to designate a certain sociological disposition, a certain way of looking 
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one's capital is 'the product of the habitus, just as the specificity of a field is an 
objectified history that embodies the habitus of agents who have operated in that field. 
The habitus is self-reflexive in that it encounters itself both as embodied and objectified 
history'(Postone, et. AI., 1993, p.6). Habitus, therefore, is 'acquired through participation 
in the social practices that it perpetuates through the actions it generates; and in 
perpetuating these practices it thereby also perpetuates the objective conditions 
established through the existence of those practices', not acquired 'within' objective 
conditions (Schatzki, op. cit., p. 143). 
From this point of view, the social nature of a practice is better captured in 
sociological terms such as habitus, since the source of practices 'resides neither in 
consciousness nor in things but in the relationship between two stages of the social, that 
is, between the history objectified in things, in the form of institutions, and the history 
incarnated in bodies, in the form of that system of enduring dispositions'(LP, p. 
190).Viewing habitus from a sociological perspective means that just as the world is prior 
to my world, so society is prior to the individual, since the history of the individual is 
never anything other than a certain specification of the collective history of his group or 
class. Therefore,' each individual system of dispositions may be seen as a structural 
variant of all the other group or class habituses'(OP, p.86, italics in original). A fuller 
understanding of the concept of habitus is thus possible through a sociological approach, 
since habitus could vary from field to field and from society to society. 
In a similar vein, Giddens' theory of structuration also stresses the social aspect 
of practices on the one hand and tries to overcome dualism in terms of a 'duality of 
structure' on the other3l . For him, practices are part of the duality of structure in that they 
at the world' (Brubaker, 1993,p. 217). The characteristics of the notion of habitus can roughly be 
summarised thus: it is regarded as a modus operandi, a 'generative principle of regulated 
improvisations'(OP, p.78); a system of durable and transposable dispositions; a reproduction of collective 
history and objective social structure; a process of continual correction and revision; and having a social 
and practical nature. 
31Besides Bourdieu and Giddens, Foucault and Habermas also try to overcome the dualism between 
individual action and social structure. Foucault attempts to transcend the dualism 'by analysing a middle 
ground of social practices and how they express relations ofpower'(Layder, 1994, p.9). For him, the self 
is the product of a number of discourses, and practices and discourses are' expressions of power relations 
and reflect the practices and positions that are tied to them'(p.97). In both discourses and practices, we need 
to specifY a wider context and settings. On the other hand, Habermas attempts to understand the relationship 
between the life-world and system in terms of different kinds of social integration. For him, society should 
be understood not only from the perspective of individuals as actors in the everyday life-world, but from 
an external observer's perspective on the operation of the system(p.l95). According to him, life-world and 
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consist of both action and structure rather than of two separated and opposed phenomena. 
Practices form 'interlocking nexuses called 'systems". This duality of structure is united 
through social practices by seeing structure as not external to action but as internal to the 
flow of action which constitutes the practices in question. For Giddens, human beings 
create meaning and social reality within social settings, and therefore social forms such 
as institutions and systems32 have no existence apart from the activities they embody. 
Practices can never simply be 'the 'empty' expression of the social community, they are 
inseparable from the direct and active involvement of people'. Social practices thus 
reflect 'the ability of humans to modify the circumstances in which they find themselves, 
while simultaneously recreating the social conditions(practices, knowledge, resources) 
which they inherit from the past'(Layder, pp.133-4). From this point of view, we may say 
that Bourdieu's 'habitus' and Giddens' 'structure' do not differ in that they are the means 
through which people produce and reproduce the social circumstances in which they live, 
although Bourdieu sees social circumstances as having more conventional and objective 
meaning compared with Giddens' structuration theorl\Layder, pp.144). 
To sum up, for Bourdieu, all habituses and practices are necessarily social in that 
they are fundamentally social products to which one or a society belongs. Hence, there 
are no other practices apart from social practices and thus practices are inevitably social 
practices34. We must hastily add, however, that all habituses have historical natures35 . 
Indeed, for Bourdieu, social changes are linked with historical changes. Habituses come 
system are both analytic and real aspects of society. However, it does not follow that these refer to separate 
or unrelated aspects of society(p.202). For more details, see Layder, part 3 and 4. 
32 Although 'social systems' and' institutions', referring to the visible patterns of social relation, are mainly 
used in relation to reproduction of social activity, the function is slightly different. That is, the former refers 
to 'reproduced practices', whereas the latter refers to 'reproduced rules and resources'(Layder, p.140). 
However, I shall use the terms interchangebly. 
33Giddens' claim that structure can never be separated from human reasons and motivation enables us to 
insist on the above assertion, although Giddens seems to provide a balance between activity and 
structure(Layder, 1994, p. 212). This point, i.e. the view that social structure is anchored in human activity, 
is radically different from Foucault's position that structure is seen as 'floating in space'(ibid., p. 148). For 
more on Giddens' theory of structuration, see his(l984). 
34 Some could argue that scientific habitus is not like this. Indeed, according to Brubaker, the scientific 
habitus is quite different from other habituses 'in its reflexivity, in including a disposition to monitor its 
own productions and to grasp and to make explicit its own principles ofproduction'(p.225). Although we 
admit that a scientific habitus is not like other habituses, it is obvious that it, too, is a social product which 
is mainly made through the dialogues within the scientific circle. Some would also argue that there is a 
matter of degree; that is, some habituses are more social, other habituses are less social. However, this has 
little meaning in Bourdieu's sense, since all habituses are essentially social phenomena. 
35 For more details of this, see S. Turner(1994), pp.78-100. 
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and go in history. To put it another way, habitus has social elements and at the same time, 
historical elements. Social structures are products of historical practices and are 
constantly reproduced and transformed by historical practices(LP, pp. 53-54; OP, pp. 82-
83). This leads us to explore the third element, i.e. 'tradition' which offers temporal 
contexts, whereas 'society' provides spatial contexts. 
3. Tradition Dimension 
A good starting point for a tradition dimension of a social practice might be 
dealing with a mistaken assumption: that tradition is conservative or static by nature. 
Indeed, when we think of a 'tradition', we tend to think that tradition is associated with 
a certain kind of preservation and thus it is often regarded as 'static'. Particularly, this 
perspective has been adopted and reinforced by conservative thinkers such as Oakeshott. 
He rejects revisionism in the name of practical rationality(Taylor, I 994, p. 34). 
F or MacIntyre, however, traditions are not static, but rather dynamic. A living 
tradition is, according to him, 'an historically extended, socially embodied argument, and 
an argument precisely in part about the goods which constitute that tradition' (A V, p. 
222). Traditions change and develop over time; some decay and some emerge in response 
to changed circumstances. There is nothing inherently conservative about his conception 
of tradition. We can find this in his major writings36, in particular, WJWR and TRV. In 
36MacIntyre's triple works themselves show us the possibility of the transition of tradition through the 
transition of his own thought. In AV, MacIntyre's interpretative framework is the concept of 'narrative' 
which is underpinned by a human 'telos' and 'tradition' within practices. In WJWR, he develops the 
concept of 'narrative' in terms of that of 'tradition' in order to elaborate a theory of rationality and justice 
in terms of ethical argument and practical action. For him, justice and rationality are ineluctably tied to 
particular traditions of thought and social practice(T.S.Hibbs, p. 217; M.Kelly, 1989-90, p. 72). Obviously, 
in his historical discussion the links between ideals of justice and conceptions of practical reason are learned 
and often quite insightful. Although WJWR aimed at articulating the theses of AV, there is still a striking 
difference between the two works. In WJWR, MacIntyre has shifted his ultimate philosophical allegiance 
from Aristotle to Aquinas, i.e. in A V Aquinas was a 'marginal figure', whereas in WJWR Aquinas becomes 
the 'central figure'. In WJWR, the main focus is much more on 'tradition'(of rationality). In TRV, 
MacIntyre continues his defence of Aquinas. He does not substantially alter the claims ofWJWR. Rather, 
he does clarify and amplify his position in WJWR. Although he introduces three rival versions, i.e. 
'Rationalist approach ofEncyclopaedists', 'Nietzschean genealogical approach' and 'Thomist approach by 
Aeterni Patris', his real concern is to introduce Aquinas. Put more exactly, it is 'a renewal of the Thomist 
tradition, a tradition he believes is lost to modem liberal society, but a tradition which he partially and 
indirectly outlined in AV'(Coleman, p. 66). Indeed, in several places in TRV( and WJWR), he sets out 
elements of the Thomist view. Eventually, his ultimate task has been done 'in ways which contribute to the 
establishment of that view as a via media between the radical relativism of the genealogist and the universal 
rationalism of the encyclopaedist'(Haldane, p.1 04). 
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WJWR, MacIntyre tries to show that virtues such as practical rationality and justice can 
be modified, advanced and even abandoned from time to time within some particular 
traditions. He shows us this through examples from Aristotle's, Augustine's and 
Aquinas's conceptions of practical rationality and justice. Further, in TRV, he amplifies 
his argument. In TRV, MacIntyre presents three or four traditions. First, the 
Encyclopaedist tradition which claims 'timeless, universal, and objective truths' which 
are 'independent of time, place, and historical circumstances'(p.65); according to this 
tradition, 'no tradition is rational qua tradition'(p.117). The Genealogists' tradition 
which, in contrast to the Encyclopaedist tradition, claims provisional and relative truths; 
according to it, 'no tradition can be rational'(ibid.). And the Thomist tradition which 
emphasises its own history and tradition; tradition has its own rationality qua tradition. 
In addition, MacIntyre engages with what he calls 'liberalism' which, 'beginning as a 
repudiation of tradition in the name of abstract, universal principles of reason, turned 
itself into a politically embodied power, whose inability to bring its debates on the nature 
and context of those universal principles to a conclusion has had the unintended effect 
of transforming liberalism into a tradition'(WJWR, p.349). 
How is it possible for tradition to change and, at the same time, how can we keep 
the rationality of tradition? According to MacIntyre, the rationality of tradition is 
determined by its ability to resolve its moral crises. In order to reach a rational solution 
of any of its moral crises, it should satisfy certain kinds of procedural criteria. The criteria 
are introduced in terms of the notion of 'epistemological crisis', which is the 
philosophical concept underlying MacIntyre's account of the productive role of conflict 
in the stages of the development of a tradition's rationality37 (WJWR, p.361). Thus 
MacIntyre, like J. Habermas38, thinks that practical rationality is basically grounded in 
37 According to MacIntyre, three requirements ofthe development of tradition are as follows: firstly, this 
in some ways radically new and conceptually enriched scheme ... must furnish a solution to the problems 
which had previously proved intractable ... secondly, it must also provide an explanation of just what it was 
which rendered the tradition ... sterile or incoherent...and thirdly, these first two tasks must be carried out in 
a way which exhibits some fundamental continuity of the new conceptual and theoretical structures with 
the shared beliefs in terms of which tradition of enquiry had been defmed up to this point(WJWR, p. 362). 
38MacIntyre and Habermas have in common that they both not only reject Kantian universal practical 
rationality but also they admit that practical rationality is grounded in tradition. However, there is a 
difference between them in arguing that, for MacIntyre, practical rationality is 'tradition-bound'on the 
whole and is, therefore, defended by tradition whereas, for Habermas, practical rationality is 'tradition-
dependent'; however, it can be justified independently of tradition. In other words, practical rationality is 
tradition-dependent but its validity can, at the same time, transcend any local context(Habermas, 1987, pp. 
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a tradition. He argues that the rationality of a tradition develops in three stages: the first 
stage is that' in which the relevant beliefs, texts, and authorities[ of a tradition] have not 
yet been put in question', and they are thus able to provide a 'structure of normality' to 
which individual agents within the tradition can tum for guidance when they act; the 
second stage is that 'in which inadequacies of various types have been identified, but not 
yet remedies'; and the third stage is that 'in which response to those inadequacies has 
resulted in a set of reformulations, reevaluations, and new formulations and evaluations, 
designed to remedy inadequacies and overcome limitations'(WJWR, p. 355). For him, 
in short, the history of moral life and of moral enquiry 'are aspects of a single, albeit 
complex, history. And to be initiated into moral life is to be initiated into the tradition 
whose history is that complex history'(TRV, p.129). 
Regarding MacIntyre's dynamic change of a tradition, however, there may be at 
least two criticisms from the different perspectives. One is that it gives rise to the 
objection that his view is committed to a form of moral relativism. The other is that his 
historicism cannot be compatible with the Thomism which he rests on(Coleman, 1994, 
pp.65-90). With respect to the charge of relativism, MacIntyre attempts to show how the 
dynamic interaction of rival traditions may provide room for critical reflection on a 
tradition and the avoidance of relativism. He argues that within major cultural and social 
traditions we find some distinctive views of human nature, of the human good. And 
although these claims to truth are 'supported within different traditions by appeal to rival 
and often de facto incommensurable standards of rational justification, no such tradition 
is or can be relativistic either about the truth of its own assertions or about the 
truth'(1994, p.295). Horton and Mendus(1994) also share this point of view: 'although 
morality is itself tradition-dependent, and although traditions constitute the' given' of life, 
it is nevertheless the case that rational argument is possible not only within traditions but 
also between them'(p.12). 
Coleman is doubtful concerning the consistency between MacIntyre and Aquinas 
on the flexibility of tradition. According to her, the claim that practices have a history 
must be distinguished from the claim that the practices can be defined by the history of 
practices. That is, although Aristotle and Aquinas may recognise' a history of practices' , 
322-3; P.Dews,1986, p.206; M.Kelly, 1989-90, pp.73-83). 
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defining standards and goals is universal and absolute, not dependent on traditions or 
practices. From this point of view, Coleman argues that, when MacIntyre says that the 
standards are defined by practices, he is mistaken, since a definition is 'not culture bound 
nor is it temporal'. Furthermore, she claims that 'MacIntyre is not a Thomist when he 
says 'we cannot be initiated into practice', that is, into what men who are considered 
virtuous in a particular historical culture consider good practice, 'without accepting the 
authority of the best standards realized so far" (A V, p. 190; Coleman, p. 81). The issue 
of whether Coleman's critique is correct or not still remains39. I am not intending to solve 
it here, since it is a matter of debate and it is also not directly related to my purpose. 
So far I have argued that a tradition is never static. For a tradition to be 
meaningful, as McMylor has said, it 'must involve debate about what constitutes itself 
as a tradition'(p.160). Let us move on now to tradition as a dimension of a social practice. 
Whether or not we accept the details of MacIntyre's argument on tradition, it is more or 
less obvious that there is a historical dimension in a social practice. It can be easily 
ascertained in either the history of social practices themselves or the history of 
practitioners who engage in social practices. 
Let us begin with the fact that a social practice has a history. What MacIntyre 
calls social practices such as games, sciences, arts, politics etc. all have their own 
histories. Each social practice is sometimes changed and sometimes elaborated and 
developed by an ongoing tradition within the social practices. Good practices and bad 
practices are also determined by the accumulated traditions of the social practices. The 
recent strategies and skills of football, for instance, are quite different from the times 
when the first World Cup was held. Some good strategies at that time might not be 
relevant any longer these days. If we still stick to old strategies without considering an 
ongoing tradition ofthe football practices, presumably, it is impossible for any team to 
win the World Cup, even if the team has the best members. 
39 MacIntyre raises some sets of questions that Coleman seems to fail to perceive: 'The first set concerns 
apprenticeship to any tradition-constituted practice, including practices of enquiry: by what standards are 
apprentices to be guided and from whom are they to learn what those standards are and why? The second 
set of questions concerns the nature of rational justification and of that attainment of truth which constitutes 
the telos of rational enquiry: what is it to have achieved finality of understanding concerning this or that 
subject-matter and in what terms must this understanding be given expression? The third set of questions 
is about how answers given to the second set of questions are to be rationally defended against rival 
answers proposed from within the standpoint of some fundamentally different tradition'(1994, p.300). 
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Every social practice also requires a certain kind of relationship between those 
who participate in it. Hence, we may best identify a social practice through participating 
in the social practice or seeing a history of it which has been created by practitioners. For 
instance, think of the practice of portrait painting as mentioned earlier. Portrait painters, 
of course, may fully understand the practice by engaging in it. MacIntyre also can identify 
the practice of portrait painting, and find it meaningful, if he sees it in the light of the 
history of that practice. A good practitioner has been formed by a history of participation 
in the practice itself. 'To enter into a practice is to enter into a relationship not only with 
its contemporary practitioners, but also with those who have preceded us in the practice, 
particularly those whose achievements extended the reach of the practice to its present 
point'(AV, p.194). In a similar way, we can say that teaching can be seen as a social 
practice carried on by teachers in accordance with a social tradition, not simply as a 
transaction between otherwise isolated individuals, and thus we may best understand it 
in this light, because a tradition provides those who engage in a social practice not only 
with a way of seeing and doing which lays down how that practice is to be carried out but 
also with an overall purpose which tells participants what to do, and by providing the 
knowledge and skills it makes it possible for them to do it(Langford, 1978, p. 3; 
Langford, 1989, p.159). 
Why should a social practice be understood in terms of its tradition? MacIntyre 
himself suggests, in relation to practical rationality, the following four reasons: firstly, 
'doctrines, theses and arguments all have to be understood in terms of historical context'. 
In other words, rationality is a concept with a history. In this sense, it is thus more exact 
to say that we refer to rationalities rather than rationality and also to justices instead of 
justice, since there is a diversity of traditions of enquiry, with histories. Secondly, the 
concept of rational justification is essentially historical. To justify is to narrate how the 
argument has gone so far. Those who construct theories within such a tradition of enquiry 
and justification often provide those theories with a structure in terms of which certain 
theses have the status of first principles. Thirdly, the mode of rational justification is also 
different from tradition to tradition. Lastly, it is crucial, therefore, that 'the concept of 
tradition-constituted and tradition-constitutive rational enquiry cannot be elucidated apart 
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from its exemplifications'(WJWR, pp. 8-10). 
In summary, MacIntyre's conception of social practices is not static. Rather, those 
practices are transformed and enriched continually by the ongoing debate of the 
practitioners who engage in those social practices. In this sense, we can say thus that the 
concept of social practices involves a historical dimension, i.e. tradition. 
C. Reflections on the Conceptions of Social Practices 
What I have so far discussed in this Chapter is mainly what constitutes a social 
practice. According to MacIntyre, a social practice should meet five criteria: 1) A social 
practice refers to a coherent and complex form of socially established co-operative human 
activities. 2) A social practice concerns the promotion or achievement of internal goods. 
3) A social practice has standards of excellence that activities should achieve. 4) A social 
practice consists of rule-governed or rule-following activities, although the rule is not 
strict. 5) A social practice itself is improved through the ongoing debates of the 
practitioners who are engaged in the social practice, not static. This account can be best 
understood in terms of a tripartite dimension: 1) A social practice begins with a human 
activity and continues to engage in it. 2) A social practice is inherently social in that it is 
a product of society. And 3) a social practice is not static, but continually transformed and 
developed by its ongoing traditions. 
Given MacIntyre's account of a social practice and the triadic dimension of it, let 
me elaborate the conception of social practices by discussing some crucial issues and 
distinctions. The main issues that I deal with are: how can we understand the nature of 
social practices?; and is achieving internal goods satisfactory for understanding the 
conception of social practices? My response to the first question may clarify MacIntyre's 
understanding of social practices by contrasting Schatzki( 1996) with Turner(1994). My 
response to the second question may offer a supplementation to the notion of a practice 
by discussing Miller' s( 1994) distinction. Let me now discuss these related questions. 
With regard to the nature of a social practice, I have already, by exploring Ryle's 
and Wittgenstein's arguments, endorsed the point, which is implicit in Macintyre's 
account, that practices exist not in the minds of actors but in sets of actions or activities. 
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This does not mean that all people agree with this view. Turner(1994), for example, 
claims that practices are seen primarily as shared mental objects, such as tacit knowledge, 
presuppositions, dispositions, and so forth, with causal powers(pp. 58-9). For him, a 
practice is seen as a set of mental objects no matter whether it is conceived cognitively, 
as a kind of presupposition, or causally, as a kind of mental trace which disposes thought 
or action in a certain way40. People's different activities or performances within a shared 
society also can be explained in terms of different understandings, since understanding 
is a causally efficacious mental object underlying certain activity. The reason why he 
holds this position is that practices must be transmitted and their effective instruments 
are conceptions, information, sentences etc. which are largely associated with mental 
states. However, reducing practice to cognition or equating practice to knowing is not 
plausible in that mental objects cannot comprise all practices, but rather, they should be 
understood as part of practices. Moreover, this reduction tends to imply a category 
mistake in that practice and cognition or knowing belong to different dimensions. 
In contrast, Schatzki(1996) argues that (social) practices are basically defined as 
'sets of doings and sayings': 'the understandings expressed by doings and sayings are not 
internal states that cause these behaviours'(p. 109). Schatzki shares with Ryle and 
Wittgenstein the view that practices constitute mental objects, activities and worlds, not 
vice versa. Hence, understanding or intelligibility, whether world intelligibility, i.e. how 
the world makes sense, or action intelligibility, i.e. which actions make sense, is 
fundamentally articulated through the organisation of practices within social practices 
rather than by mind or intelligence. Intelligence is not separate from social practices, but 
links with it and, thus, should be conceived in terms of social practices(ibid., pp.lll-
125). This gives rise to further questions: what constitutes practices as a set of doings and 
sayings? What is the place of mental objects within practices? These questions may be 
important for both clarifying the conception of social practices and understanding 
education in terms of social practices. 
To tackle these questions, let us consider Schatzki's distinction between the 
'dispersed' practices and the 'integrative' practices. Before doing this, it might be helpful 
4°Practices as mental objects are largely divided into two categories: 'practices as causes' and 'practices 
as presuppositions'. For the details of this, see Tumer(1994), pp. 19-43. 
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to briefly sketch Schatzki' s overall conception of a social practice41 . He seems to have 
in mind practice as 'a temporally unfolding and spatially dispersed nexus of doings and 
sayings'. 'That the doings and sayings forming a practice constitute a nexus' presupposes 
that 'they are linked in certain ways'. The main linkages are: 1) 'understandings'; 2) 
'explicit rules' embracing principles, precepts, and instructions; and 3) 'teleoaffective 
structures' which consist of two components: the purpose-related elements, such as ends, 
purposes, projects, tasks; and the affective-related elements: beliefs, actions, emotions, 
moods(p.89). The distinction between dispersed practices and integrative practices 
depends by and large on which linkage is taken. Dispersed practices can be expressed like 
this: sets of doings and sayings of X-ing which are primarily linked by the understandings 
of X-ing; whilst integrative practices, as more inclusive than dispersed practices, are 
understood in terms not merely of understandings but of rules and teleoaffective 
structures. 
Let us start with dispersed practices. Dispersed practices are 'widely dispersed 
among different sectors of social life', such as describing, ordering, explaining, 
questioning, imagining, and the like. Dispersed practices primarily emphasise 
understandings as a linkage rather than the second and third forms of linkage(ibid., p. 91 ). 
Understandings involve three components: 'the ability to carry out acts of X-ing'; 'the 
ability to identify and attribute X-ings, in both one's own and other's case'; and 'the 
ability to prompt or respond to X-ings'(ibid.). Someone who holds this view tends to 
assume that understanding of X-ing presupposes the practice of X-ing and individual acts 
of X-ing, since understanding X-ing means to understand what is being expressed by the 
behaviours forming the practice of X-ing(ibid., pp.92-3). We can find a paradigmatic 
example in Oakeshott42. He states: 'a practice may be identified as a set of considerations, 
41He introduces three prominent notions of practice: as 'participating in learning how or improving one's 
ability to do something by repeatedly working at and carrying it out'; as 'a temporally unfolding and 
spatially dispersed nexus of doings and sayings'; and as 'performing an action or carrying out a practice 
of the second sort' (ibid, pp.89-90). 
42It is more or less obvious, in Oakeshott, that his concept of a practice is dependent on understanding, 
although it might be arguable whether his notion of a practice refers to 'a set of doings and sayings' or 
'mental objects'. What is a real problem for Schatzki seems to lie in thinking that Bourdieu and Giddens 
also belong to this category. Schatzki claims that for Bourdieu, and Giddens, the organisation of practices 
collapses into (practical) understanding so that they dismiss a teleoaffective structure 'independent of 
understanding as irrelevant to both the determination of action and the organization of practices'(p.149). 
However, he seems to be misinterpreting Bourdieu's notion of 'habitus'. Bourdieu's notion of habitus, as 
I explained in the section B ofthis Chapter, is interpreted both as a disposition and in a social and practical 
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manners, uses, observances, customs, standards, canons, maxims, principles, rules, and 
offices specifYing useful procedures or denoting obligations or duties which relate to 
human actions and utterances , (Oakeshott, 1975, p.55). For Oakeshott, a practice is a set 
of considerations that governs how people act. That is to say, it rules action not directly 
by specifYing particular actions to perform, but by offering understandings of action. He 
here tries to split practice from action. However, there is a problem in that the 
considerations that constitute practices cannot specifY substantial actions, since we may 
raise 'the question of at what level of description is what someone does a 'substantial' 
action'. Oakeshott's attempt to separate practice from action is 'thus rendered otiose by 
the fact that the nonpropositional elements of his practices ... generally determine the what 
of the action'. It is noteworthy, however, that 'Oakeshott's talk of 'using considerations' 
fails to do justice to the nonpropositional dimension of practice' (S chatzki , op. cit., p. 98). 
On the other hand, 'integrative practices', like dispersed practices, can be seen as 
'collections of linked doings and sayings'. But, unlike dispersed practices, they are more 
complicated and complex ones which can be 'found in and constitutive of particular 
domains of social life' , such as farming, teaching, business, religious practices and the 
like(ibid., p.98). Integrative practices are joined by: 'understandings' of X-ing and Y-ing, 
as emphasised in the dispersed practices of X-ing and Y-ing; 'explicit rules'; and 
'teleoaffective structures'(ibid., p. 99). (In this respect, the distinction between dispersed 
practices and integrative practices may rather refer to two different conceptions of the 
nature of practices rather than two different kinds of practices). However, this does not 
necessarily mean that an integrative practice must involve some particular understanding 
of dispersed practices, because without any particular explanation of farming, for 
instance, a farming practice is possible. Nonetheless, a farming practice includes some 
understanding of farming. We also should not think that this means that integrative 
practices are simply the lists or assemblages of dispersed practices, although integrative 
practices involve dispersed practices. For instance, the activities of describing, 
questioning and explaining( dispersed practices) may be part of religious practices and 
farming practices(integrative practices). But the sum of dispersed practices of a religion 
cannot be an integrative religious practice. It is also true that the same dispersed activities 
way. But Schatzki seems to have entirely interpreted habitus as a disposition instead of a social and practical 
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of religious practices, e.g. describing, questioning may be different from those of farming 
practices(ibid., pp. 103-4). 
In addition, what we should have in mind is that integrative practices presuppose 
'social entities', that is, phenomena of human coexistence(ibid., 104). It follows that the 
organisation of an integrative practice is, in Charles Taylor's phrase, 'out there in the 
practices themselves', as opposed to in here 'in the minds of the actors,43. That is, the 
array of understandings, rules, and teleoaffective structures that organise an integrative 
practice should be understood as 'out there', not as 'in the minds' of individual 
participants(ibid., 105). It is safer to say thus that 'a set of doings and sayings constitutes 
a practice only if its members express an array of understandings, rules, and structures' . 
From this perspective, I would prefer to speak of 'social practices' rather than 
'practices', or even 'a social practice' in an educational context on the following grounds: 
firstly, all practices are necessarily social; secondly, plural expressions such as 'teaching 
practices' connote not only the varied activities that make up teaching, but also the 
different forms teaching takes across social space and time. 
So far by exploring Schatzki's integrative practices I have addressed the point 
that social practices cannot be understood just cognitively; they involve rules and 
teleoaffective structures. (Schatzki's emphasis on integrative practices may go beyond 
Ryle's and Wittgenstein's argument). This may be important in an educational context, 
because education must be concerned with developing the whole person including his or 
her aims, understandings, rules and emotions, etc. So perhaps the social practices view 
of education has more to do with integrative practices. Is this sufficient for explaining 
social practices and further educational phenomena? This leads us to the second question. 
Is achieving internal goods satisfactory for understanding the conception of social 
practices? Miller seems to throw light on this issue by drawing a distinction between self-
contained practices and purposive practices. Before exploring his distinction, three points 
matter. 
43Taylor(l985) uses this phrase in expressing the relation oflanguage to social reality. He claims that 'the 
distinction between social reality and the language of description of that reality is an artificial one'(p.34). 
The meanings and possibilities marked by the terms of a public language are 'not just in the minds of the 
actors but are out there in the practices themselves'(p.36). For linguistic terms have meaning only in use, 
and use is a feature of ongoing practices. 
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may be worth noting. Firstly, his distinction is employed for the purpose of explaining 
the relation among virtues, practices and justice. Secondly, Schatzki's and Miller's 
distinctions may have different starting point and aims. Schatzki's idea of integrative 
practices focuses on the integration of components of social practices including 
teleoaffective structures as a reaction against understanding-centred dispersed practices, 
whereas Miller's idea of purposive practices focuses on social ends in relation to virtues 
because of dissatisfaction with the understanding of virtues as internal( or intrinsic) to 
practices. Lastly, perhaps Miller's distinction only applies within integrative practices, 
since it would be odd to talk of the goods, either internal or external, of such dispersed 
practices as describing and explaining. But this does not mean that an integrative practice 
must be purposive. Religion, for instance, may be self-contained rather than purposive. 
Hence, there seems no particular reason for expecting the two distinctions to coincide. 
According to Miller(1994), the evaluation of a self-contained practice 'consists 
entirely in the internal goods' and 'critical assessment can only be carried out from within 
the practice itself. In contrast, purposive practices 'exist to serve social ends beyond 
themselves' and 'are opened to critical assessment in the lights of the ends they are meant 
to serve'(Miller, pp.250-4, p. 262). This distinction may be clearer with some examples. 
The practice of chess appears to be self-contained in that excellence in chess is only 
evaluated within the context of the achievement of standards, rules, etc. of the game 
itself. This may be more or less apart from (external) social ends chess may serve. In 
contrast, the practices involved in the criminal justice system, e.g., the making of laws, 
the investigations by police, bringing people to trial, putting convicted criminals in 
prison, and so on, presumably serve ends of protecting peace and security; and, as Miller 
says, such practices can be assessed in terms of how well they serve those ends. 
Miller seems to maintain that a plausible practice-based account of justice is 
purposive rather than a matter of self-contained practices(p. 254). For him, purposive 
practices cannot properly be understood in isolation from social or external goods and 
thus the value of a practice should be evaluated at least in part in the light of social or 
external ends which the practice is meant to serve. How would this distinction challenge 
MacIntyre's account of a social practice? To see this, it is important to realise that a 
practice being social and a practice having social ends are not the same things. Chess, for 
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example, is certainly a social practice, but it may well be one that is not defined by 
reference to any social ends, that is, how well it serves some end outside itself. Miller's 
emphasis on social ends would go beyond MacIntyre's conception of a social practice 
which relies largely on its internal ends. Certainly, Miller's distinction challenges the 
significance ofthe social understanding of virtues, such as justice. For instance, in the 
UK the legal practice of allowing a defendant to chose to be tried by a jury has recently 
been questioned. The value of this practice might be evaluated by reference to (broader) 
social ends which the practices of the criminal justice system are meant to serve. From 
this respect, purposive practices should be addressed, as far as virtues are concerned. We 
should also admit that many practices have both internal goods and social ends. 
MacIntyre also would not deny this44. 
However, too much emphasis on social ends in an education context may result 
in the flourishing of external goods or instrumental values and thus not be free from 
corruption. Universities, for instance, should serve social ends at least partly by advising 
and researching on crucial social matters using their sophisticated knowledge and 
resources. Through these activities, some universities may have sufficient finances and 
top reputations. But universities may face a serious crisis and thus hardly escape from 
criticisms, if due to external ends they ignore academic research or teaching which may 
serve internal goods. In this respect, basically, I would still hold the goods of social 
practices as 'internal' to activities in which practitioners engage. But the term 'internal' 
should not be identified with the term 'intrinsic' in a Petersian sense. The term 'intrinsic' 
in a Petersian sense has a conceptual or logical force. Hence, for Peters, the phrase 
'intrinsic to education' refers to goods which are conceptually or logically related to 
education and thus the intrinsic value of education is regarded as universal and objective, 
irrespective of individual preferences or social demands. On the other hand, by 'education 
is internally related to social practices' I mean that education should be understood in 
terms of engagement in social practices to which one or a society belongs. Hence, the 
good of education as internally related to practices, unlike the good intrinsic to education, 
44He suggests three distinctive kinds of good: 'those internal to practices, those which are the goods of 
individual life and those which are the goods of community'. He says that to see virtues, such as justice, 
'in terms only of practices is incomplete'{l994, p. 284). 
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is necessarily connected to social goods or ends45 . From this point of view, the 'social 
ends beyond themselves', to which Miller refers, are precisely contrasted with 'intrinsic 
goods', rather than 'internal goods'. Seen in this way, Miller's suggestion of 'purposive' 
practices might be seen as stressing social ends of social practices, and so being in a way 
redundant. Hence, my sense of social practices may comprehend Miller's purposive 
practices, and thus goods internal to practices should be addressed. 
In Part II, so far I have discussed the conception of social practices. My 
conception of social practices, which may be an extended version of MacInytre' s, can be 
summarised as follows. 
Firstly, social practices are basically defined as human activities, which can be 
expressed as a set of seeings, sayings and doings rather than mental objects. 
Secondly, components of human activities, i.e. 'a set of seeings, sayings and 
doings' should be understood in a broad sense as, to use Schatzki's term, integrative 
practices, not narrow dispersed practices. That is, social practices involve not merely 
understandings but also rules and teleoaffective structures. 
Thirdly, social practices are related to the achievement of internal goods. By 
internal goods, I mean goods which can only be identified and should properly be 
achieved by 'engaging in the social practices in question' rather than 'intrinsic goods' in 
a Petersian sense. This presupposes that there are standards of excellence which one tries 
to achieve. We should not think, however, that standards of excellence are universal or 
transcendental. Rather, these may be determined by a society'S ongoing practices. 
Fourthly, social practices, needless to say, are social in nature. Social practices, 
as MacIntyre shows, are human activities which are more or less coherent and complex, 
co-operative, and socially established. Social practices are, thus, associated with rule-
governed activities, whether basic rules or strategic rules. 
Lastly, social practices have their own traditions which are characterised by 
internal debates. Social practices are continually changed, extended, developed and 
articulated through ongoing traditions of the social practices in which people are engaged. 
In short, social practices can be defined as 'socially constructed integrative human 
activities which are concerned with the achievement of internal goods and their standards, 
45For further arguments for this in an educational context, see Chapter 8. 
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and these activities are developed by ongoing traditions which are constituted by internal 
debates'. Is this conception of social practices sufficient? How sound is this concept of 
social practices in dealing with educational issues? How can, or should, we understand 
social practices in educational contexts? In what respects are social practices important 
in educational contexts? Can 'education as initiation into social practices' overcome the 
limitations of liberal education? These questions lead us to explore social practices in 
relation to educational issues. In the next Part, I shall tackle these issues. 
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Part III. Social Practices and Education 
In the last two Parts, what I have tried to do is largely two things: pointing out the 
limitations of liberal education both as the development of rationality and as the 
promotion of personal autonomy; and exploring the conception of social practices. 
In Part I, I have argued the weaknesses of liberal education. Liberal education as 
the development of rationality or the pursuit of knowledge for its own sake tends to stress 
theoretical knowledge and the intrinsic value of education. It is natural that practical 
knowledge and the extrinsic value of education are overlooked in liberal education. We, 
however, may rightly question why these are not regarded as valuable in education. I 
criticise, thus, the claims of liberal education in two ways: internal criticisms and external 
criticisms. In internal criticisms, I pointed out weaknesses of the underpinning 
assumptions of liberal education, i.e. the logical relationship between mind and 
knowledge, the forms of knowledge thesis and transcendental argument. In external 
criticisms, liberal education is inevitably challenged by external values, such as 
vocational education, which are socially demanded. 
On the other hand, liberal education as the promotion of personal autonomy is 
inclined to emphasise self-directed actions in education. The ultimate sources of self-
directed actions may be either one's rationality or one's desires. Whether autonomy 
derives from one's rationality or one's desires, it is more or less obvious that the value 
of autonomy is taken for granted within a liberal-democratic society. However, it must 
be noted that the value of autonomy is not guaranteed without justification, even if we 
live in a liberal-democratic society. Rather, we may rightly say that someone's values are 
dependent on the social values to which one belongs. In this sense, communitarian 
challenges are plausible. 
In the face of these limitations of liberal education, it is natural to seek an 
alternative conception of education, that is, education as 'initiation into social practices'. 
To this end, in Part II, I have spelt out the conception of social practices in two ways: by 
examining a conventional notion of practice, and by exploring MacIntyre's conception 
of a social practice. I have argued that the conventional usage of 'practice', which is used 
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as demarcated from theory, has little sense on the basis ofthe Greek notion of 'praxis', 
Ryle's 'knowing how' and Wittgenstein's 'language-game' theory, and of an educational 
perspective. This leads us into looking at the conception of social practices. 
The conception of social practices, according to MacIntyre, can be based on the 
following five criteria: i) coherent and complex forms of socially established cooperative 
human activities, ii) the achievement of internal goods, iii) standards of excellence, iv) 
obedience to rules, and v) the development or progression of the social activities. This 
definition of a social practice may have three dimensions, that is, activity, society and 
tradition. This definition may be elaborated by discussing other philosophers' arguments 
such as Miller's and Schatzki's. Through these processes, I have drawn the conception 
of social practices as follows. 1 ) Social practices are basically defined as human activities, 
which can be expressed as a set of seeings, sayings and doings rather than mental objects. 
2) Social practices should be understood as integrative, that is, they involve not merely 
understandings but also rules and teleoaffective structures. 3) Social practices are related 
to the achievement of internal goods in MacIntyre's sense, not in the Petersian sense. This 
presupposes that there are standards of excellence which one tries to achieve. 4) Social 
practices have a social nature, which, as MacIntyre shows, is more or less coherent and 
complex, cooperative, and socially established. Social practices are, thus, associated with 
rule-governed activities. 5) Social practices are continually changed, extended, deVeloped 
and articulated through the ongoing traditions of the social practices in which people 
engage. 
In this Part, what I want to try to do is to answer the three related questions: what 
exactly does 'education as initiation into social practices' mean and how can we draw the 
overall picture of it? (Chapter 6); how can we understand the thesis that education is 
initiation into social practices in teaching as education writ small? (Chapter 7); and why 
is 'education as initiation into social practices' important in comparison with liberal 
education? (Chapter 8). This series of questions, in tum, shows us the overall picture of 
'education as initiation into social practices' as an alternative to or at least a complement 
to liberal education. 
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Chapter 6. Education as Initiation into Social Practices 
The question at stake is what 'education as initiation into social practices' would 
be like. When we maintain that education should be initiating pupils into social practices, 
what is the overall picture of education we have in mind? On what points is this 
education different from liberal education? 
To this end, in section A, as a preliminary analysis for the understanding of 
education as initiation into social practices, I shall analyse the term 'initiation' and some 
possible positions which someone might adopt. In section B, I shall explore MacIntyre's, 
Hirst's and Langford's views on 'education as initiation into social practices'. Lastly, in 
section C, I shall compare the three writers' views and comment on those views. 
A. Preliminary Analysis of Education as Initiation into Social Practices 
How can we understand the phrase 'education as initiation into social practices'? 
Does this assume that there is a possibility of educating pupils in some other directions, 
for instance, initiation into forms of knowledge, without initiating them into social 
practices? Is 'initiation into forms of knowledge' really incompatible with 'initiation into 
social practices'? What is the difference between education as 'initiation into social 
practices' and 'initiation into forms of knowledge', and/or 'promotion of personal 
autonomy'? Is the conception of 'initiation' different from other conceptions, for 
instance, teaching, indoctrination, induction, inculcating, introducing, etc.? In order to 
answer this line of questions, above all, some terms that are included in the phrase 
'education as initiation into social practices', for example, 'initiation' and 'social 
practices' , need clarification. 
It might be helpful to consider the following questions: is there any difference 
between 'education as initiation into social practices' and 'education as inculcating social 
practices'?; and is 'education as initiation into social practices' different from 'education 
as social practices'? In the strict sense, however, the two questions are different in kind. 
The first question is linked with asking what the very meaning of the concept of 
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'initiation' is in this context, whereas the second question may be about the range of 
social practices. Let us consider these questions in more detail. 
1. A Conception of' Initiation' 
To get a clearer meaning of 'education as initiation into social practices', let us 
start with the term 'initiation'. The term 'initiation' can be diversely used in various 
contexts. It may be used as 'rites of passage' for becoming adult or obtaining social 
membership in a primitive society. It can also mean 'religious induction', such as a 
believer's baptism or confirmation, in a religious context. 
The term 'initiation' in an educational context may be used in a number of ways. 
Firstly, the term 'initiation' can be used in a narrow and neutral sense. This sense of 
'initiation' is often equated with 'social conformity' or 'socialisation' in a narrow sense 
but not a bad sense. Stenhouse(1975), for instance, would draw a sharp distinction 
between 'initiation' and other similar concepts such as 'training', 'instruction' and 
'induction'. In favour of the process model of education in general and the notion of 
'induction' in particular, he explained as follows: 'training' is mainly 'concerned with 
the acquisition of skills' involved in the performance of a specific task which Aristotle 
may call techne, such as making a canoe, whilst 'instruction' is 'concerned with the 
learning of information', such as retention of dates in history. 'Initiation' is concerned 
with promoting commitment and conformity to particular social norms and values, 
whereas 'induction' is concerned with introducing into the thought or knowledge systems 
of the culture which, unlike information, constitute structure or systems of thinking about 
ourselves and the world(p. 80). For Stenhouse, the first two processes, i.e. training and 
instruction, are not sufficient for explaining the educational process, although they 
constitute parts of educational activity. For him, the notion of 'initiation' is too narrow. 
By contrast, the notion of 'induction' includes all three conceptions. Moreover, 
according to Stenhouse, inducting students into the structures of knowledge is an 
educationally worthwhile activity in that this creates student's own thinking. It is natural, 
therefore, that he defined education as 'induction into knowledge'(p.82). 
It must be said, however, that Stenhouse's conceptions stated above seem to be 
134 
more or less artificial. His account of initiation, as we can see later, was too restricted. 
'Induction' and 'initiation' are often interchangeably used in an ordinary sense. It seems 
to me, there is nothing wrong in this usage. The notion of induction in other contexts, for 
example, in religious usage, is rather similar to his conception of initiation. One more 
point I want to make is that Stenhouse's notion of induction tends to stress knowledge 
and thinking capacity and, thus, it is still limited to the cognitive domain. However, in 
everyday usage induction may include affective and conative domains. My contention 
here, in turn, may be summarised as follows: the term 'initiation' tends to be used broadly 
in two senses; it can be both used interchangeably with induction and it can include the 
affective and conative domain as well as the cognitive domain. 
Secondly, in a negative and strong sense, the term 'initiation' may be identical 
with 'inculcation' or 'indoctrination'. In this sense, initiation has something to do with 
transmission of beliefs, knowledge, thinking and action in an 'inappropriate way' on the 
part of the learner. By an 'inappropriate way' I mean that something is intentionally 
transmitted to the pupils in a narrow and dogmatic way, regardless of the pupil's 
minimum critical reflection or voluntariness. If we use the term 'initiation' in this way, 
the phrase 'education as initiation into social practices' is nothing more than at best 
'socialisation' in a bad sense and at worst the schooling typical of 'totalitarianism' or, in 
another word, 'indoctrination'. This sense of 'initiation' may be an extreme version of 
Stenhouse's account of 'initiation' . 
Presumably, however, this view will face a strong objection from the liberals who 
emphasise personal autonomy. From their perspective, a strong sense or negative sense 
of 'initiation' implies that pupils do not choose, think, and act autonomously. I would 
agree that this strong sense of initiation can hardly be accepted in an educational context, 
at least within a liberal democratic society, since it may not allow a student's own 
understanding or criticality. When we see 'initiation' like this, education has a strong 
tendency to define the educational aim extrinsically and to neglect the leamer's 
autonomy. This use of the notion of 'initiation' would be hard to put on a sound footing. 
Of course, I do not use the term 'initiation' in this way. This may be called 
'indoctrination'! rather than 'education' or 'teaching'. 
!The distinction between education and indoctrination may be drawn in several ways: intention(purpose 
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Some would hold the view that education should be understood as socialisation 
or, at least, as a part of socialisation. Education, as Peters has pointed out, may be 
regarded as a form of 'socialisation', in so far as it implies 'initiation into public 
traditions which are articulated in language and forms of thought' (Peters, 1964, p.13). 
This sense of 'socialisation' may be inevitably allowed in education. In other words, to 
say that someone is 'socialised' presupposes that someone is already 'initiated'. In this 
sense, as Langford has said, the distinction between 'education' and 'socialisation' may 
be not so sharp as sometimes suggested2. We should admit, however, that education in 
this sense is too broad and general to allow the distinction between 'education' and 'other 
forms of socialisation' (Peters, op.cit., p. 13). Moreover, as we can see in a totalitarian 
society, socialisation in an extreme and negative sense, which can be described as 
'procuring absolute and blind obedience to a government's policy', cannot be justified, 
because education, at least in a formal sense, is not compatible with students simply 
remaining in the state of accommodation to a particular society or even to dominant 
social practices. Education, beyond that, involves improvements in social practices. In 
this sense, to say that education is no more than 'socialisation' or, worse, the kind of 
practice associated with 'totalitarianism' or 'authoritarianism', can never be regarded as 
a satisfactory definition of it. 
Thirdly, the term 'initiation', as we can see in Peters, tends to be used in a 
positive way, but still in a restricted way. Peters defines education as initiation into 
worthwhile activities. He has written the term 'initiation', because it compounds a variety 
of transactions. But it should be understood as confined to worthwhile activities and to 
certain methods. He explains: 
Terms like 'training' and 'instruction'- perhaps even 'teaching'- are too specific. 
Education can occur without these specific transactions and they can take place in ways 
which fail to satisfy all the criteria implied by 'education'. The term 'initiation' on the 
other hand, is general enough to cover these different types of transaction if it is also 
or aim), content and method. 1. Wilson addresses the content criterion among them, although he considers 
two possibilities, that is, what we teach(content) and how we teach(method), whereas R.M. Hare 
emphasises the teacher's intention. For the details about that, see Hare(l964, pp.47-70), Wilson(l964, 
pp.24-46) and also I. Snook( 1972). 
2According to Langford(1985), his argument for this is grounded in the fact that the common view that 
education, unlike socialisation, is a value-laden term is mistaken. For the details of it, see pp. 162-165. 
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stipulated that initiation must be into worth-while activities and modes of conduct(l964, 
p.34). 
For Peters, the term 'initiation' here is used in a much broader sense than 'training' or 
'instruction', or even teaching in general. But he wants to confine this term to worthwhile 
activities that are mainly characterised by the pursuit of theoretical understandings, such 
as distinctive forms of knowledge3. These worthwhile activities, according to him, can 
be called 'the holy ground' in that both the pupil and the teacher should be participating 
in and pursuing them. Teachers and learners are not differing in that they are both 
engaging in 'the shared experience of a common world'. They may be, to some degree, 
differing in that the 'teacher is more familiar with its contours and more skilled in 
handling the tools for laying bare its mysteries and appraising its nuances'(ibid., p.38). 
For Peters, thus, the notion of 'initiation' is not merely applied to an initial stage, as 
implied in its etymological meaning, but it can also be applied to further levels of 
engagement. In other words, 'initiation', unlike socialisation, does not remain at the state 
of the given social practices that one is inducted in. Beyond that, creating or developing 
social practices, as teachers mainly do, are involved. 
Peters' conception of 'initiation' for addressing 'the impersonal content and 
procedures which are enshrined in public traditions', however, seems to have a Janus-
faced character. On the one hand, 'initiation' is, unlike training andlor instruction, linked 
with, in a general sense, the 'body of knowledge and mode of conduct' in which we are 
engaging. We, thus, need to understand it not too narrowly. On the other hand, in so far 
as education is concerned, Peters, like rationalists, is inclined to use 'initiation' in a 
cognitive way by emphasising its relation to worthwhile activities, notably theoretical 
activities. However, it seems to me that, insofar as education is concerned, the objects of 
initiation should not be limited to the cognitive domain. They should also contain a 
variety of social practices involving the affective domain and skills, and so on. 
How, then, can we understand the notion of 'initiation'? I use the term 'initiation' 
3peters did not seem to be defining education in so restricted a way, as far as his inaugural lecture 
'Education as Initiation' (1 964) was concerned, since he saw education as initiating learners not only 'more 
deeply into distinctive forms of knowledge such as science, history, mathematics, religious and aesthetic 
appreciation' but also 'into the practical types of knowledge involved in moral, prudential, and technical 
forms of thought and action'(p. 35). 
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III a 'positive and broad sense'. This can be best understood in comparison with Peters. 
Firstly, like Peters, I assume that there are social practices in which both teacher and 
learner are, or should be, engaged, although I may not think that these are entirely a 
matter of 'impersonal content'. Social practices that we are engaging in are, it seems to 
me, 'common grounds' in that we participate in certain common practices; however, 
social practices as a common ground can be, and should be, 'developed' by people who 
engage in them and by ongoing traditions within social practices rather than being 
conserved as 'a holy ground'. In this sense, dominant and/or desirable social practices 
would be different from society to society rather than universal and absolute. Social 
practices that should be pursued in education, thus, may be different according to 
societies, cultures and their traditions. 
Secondly, like Peters, I believe that the notion of 'initiation' should be understood 
in a broad way. I also share with Peters in insisting that initiation is linked with 
worthwhile activities and modes of conduct. However, I do not agree with Peters' claims 
that worthwhile activities are mainly theoretical and intellectual ones. My conception of 
initiation is much broader than Peters' in that I do not confine it to theoretical activities. 
It may include practical activities, virtues, dispositions, emotions, and so on. My view of 
it is rather that worthwhile activities may differ in accordance with social traditions. In 
some societies, for instance, theoretical activities may be crucial in education, whilst in 
other societies theoretical activities are less important. Some societies address virtues, 
whereas other societies emphasise skills, and so on. My conception of initiation is, in the 
end, that it should not be understood in a too restricted way, whether cognitive or 
affective, or whatever. 
Lastly, like Peters, my notion of 'initiation' is linked with transmitting in a 
minimally understandable and morally acceptable way, not in a dogmatic and an 
undesirable way. I have written 'minimally', because, in fact, the term' initiation' could 
also be used of a process which is not intelligible to the learner and which may be 
immoral. Think, for example, of initiation into the Mafia society. This kind of initiation 
may involve an immoral process. There may be nothing wrong in this usage of the word. 
In an educational context, however, it can hardly be accepted and, thus, I would be 
inclined to use it in a slightly restricted way. In this respect, brainwashing, conditioning, 
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etc. will be ruled out from education in that these do not allow the leamer's minimum 
understanding, willingness and voluntariness. Of course, the distinctions between moral 
way and immoral way, between ways which involve the leamer's understanding and ways 
which do not, may be less obvious in practical situations than in our thinking about them. 
We might say, nevertheless, that it is more or less obvious that 'initiation' is different 
from 'inculcation' or at least 'indoctrination'. 
2. Initiation into Social Practices 
Let me move on now to a more central point. How can we understand education 
as initiation into social practices? Before directly tackling this, a reminder of the concept 
of social practices that I have sketched out in Part II may be helpful. This can be 
characterised in the following five points. Social practices i) are defined as human 
activities; ii) involve understandings, rules and teleoaffective structures; iii) are 
concerned with the achievement of internal goods; iv) have a social character; v) have 
their own traditions and may be changed or developed by their ongoing traditions. This 
conception of social practices, in short, is the engagement in human activities, including 
diverse aspects of life, which are social in nature and flexible according to ongoing 
traditions. 
When we define social practices as I described above, what does 'education as 
initiation into social practices' mean? Is this different from 'education as a social 
practice'? If so, to what extent? Let us consider, firstly, 'education as a social practice'. 
This phrase can be differently interpreted depending on how someone sees the relation 
between education and social practices. In fact, it may be used in weaker or stronger 
senses: a) The phrase may be seen as presupposing that education is made up of social 
practices. b) More strongly, beyond the assertion that education is made up of social 
practices, the phrase may be seen as implying that education should be the outcome of 
social practices, or even that education is nothing more than a by-product of social 
practices. Whether we take interpretation a) or b) of education as social practices, the 
main point of the phrase 'education as a social practice' lies in describing educational 
phenomena as social practices, rather than prescribing them. From the perspective of 
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'education as social practices', therefore, education is a social practice among a whole 
range of social practices, not a separate social practice at all. 
On the other hand, the idea of 'education as initiation into social practices' may 
be taken as affirming the stronger sense of 'education as social practices' that I 
mentioned above. What is more, this view may include practical prescriptions for 
education on the basis of social practices. In other words, it would be taken for granted 
that education is growing out of social practices. Furthermore, there is a concern with 
educational prescriptions, that is, with how we should select important social practices 
and how we can effectively initiate pupils into adequate and pervasive social practices. 
Whether we speak of 'education as initiation into social practices' or 'education as social 
practices', it must be acknowledged that a plausible education can be defined as initiating 
people into wide ranges of current social practices, although there is a difference in the 
strength of definitions between them. 
The phrase 'education as initiation into social practices' can be understood in two 
senses: a 'formal'(descriptive) and 'substantial'(prescriptive) sense. In aformal sense, 
this phrase means that all education, liberal education or whatever, is regarded as a social 
practice in a descriptive sense and in this sense it may be a crucial social practice, 
because many other social practices depend on it. People who subscribe to 'education as 
social practices', such as most sociologists and many political philosophers, tend to take 
this position. This sense of education can provide a better description of educational 
phenomena through seeing them in terms of social practices, but it may not bring about 
fundamental changes in current educational theory and practice- such as, the concept of 
education, the content of education, teaching method, and so forth. 
In contrast, in a substantial sense, the phrase 'education as initiation into social 
practices' involves two levels: one is that education should be not only derived from 
one's or a society's current pervasive social practices, but should also result in developing 
social practices. The other level is that this understanding of education should lead to 
more specific concrete prescriptions, such as changes in educational perspectives, in 
organising the curriculum and in teaching process, in terms of social practices. Hence, 
in education as initiation into social practices in a substantial sense, which goes beyond 
education as social practices at the surface or slogan level, educational practices, such as 
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the selection of the content of the curriculum and the teaching process, should be based 
on social practices at the substantial level. Hence, when I use the phrase 'education as 
initiation into social practices', I use it a prescriptive or substantial sense. In this regard, 
MacIntyre, Hirst and Langford provide us with the central features of 'education as 
initiation into social practices'. It is natural, therefore, to explore their views of 
'education as initiation into social practices' in order to get a fuller understanding of it. 
B. Three Views on Education as Initiation into Social Practices 
MacIntyre, Langford and Hirst share the idea that education, however we define 
it, is fundamentally seen as 'initiation into social practices'. However, the details of this 
may be of slightly different form and, at the same time, their theories are complementary. 
To put this bluntly, MacIntyre makes explicit what constitutes social practices, whereas 
Hirst and Langford stress why education as initiation into social practices is important. 
In this section, therefore, what I want to do is to discuss their conception of social 
practices in relation to education in more detail. This may shed light on what 'education 
as initiation into social practices' means. 
1. MacIntyre's View 
Let us begin with MacIntyre's social practices thesis in relation to education. To 
grasp his view on education as social practices is not so easy for two reasons: because he 
does not say much about this; and because, even if he mentions social practices, he does 
not concern himself directly with 'education for the good life', but rather with 'the good 
life itself (White and White, 1986, p.159). This, however, does not make it impossible 
to construe MacIntyre's education in terms of social practices. We rather say that 
MacIntyre clearly thinks of education as an engagement in social practices. Indeed, his 
main works may be interpreted in this way. 
F or MacIntyre, I would say that the theme of an 'educated public', which is well 
expressed in his 'The Idea of an Educated Public '(henceforth, EP), plays a crucial role 
in understanding his overall educational scheme, in that his main educational idea is 
141 
embedded in the idea of an 'educated public'. Indeed, EP links with AV, WJWR and 
TRV in constituting a project about education. In other words, his educational concern 
was immanent within AV and, through EP, gradually enlarged and elaborated in his later 
writings, particularly TRV. It could be roughly outlined thus: in AV, he seems to be 
concerned with what the nature of educational theory, if it is to enable us to overcome 
incommensurability, should be. His prescription seems to be that education should 
fundamentally be realising social practices. In EP, he argues that the individual or 
autonomous thinking which is emphasised by the liberals is possible only in the context 
of a certain kind of community and, accordingly, the aim of education is related to 
bringing up an educated public through initiating pupils into social practices. In WJWR, 
he exemplifies the educated public in terms of social practices of justice and rationality, 
which he explores within historical traditions. In TRV, he applies the notion of an 
'educated public' to the university. He provides an extremely interesting and detailed 
account both of the nature of education as initiation into the educated public and of how 
that educated public of which one then becomes a member helps the individual to 
discover and promote social unity. We can say, therefore, that 'education should be 
regarded as a preparation for, and an ongoing participation in', the educated public in 
MacIntyre's sense(Wain, 1994, p.150). 
In order to understand MacIntyre's 'education as initiation into social practices' 
properly, we must explore social practices in relation to his 'educated public' thesis. 
Before doing this, we need a brief sketch of his conception of social practices in relation 
to a good life. For MacIntyre, without engaging in social practices, we cannot imagine 
a good life, although engagement in social practices does not guarantee an achievement 
ofa good life. For good lives, social practices need to include certain elements, such as 
virtues. Let us consider this in more detail. 
F or MacIntyre, social practices may be regarded as the most basic element, or at 
least a constitutive part, of human well-being. For him, the notion of social practices, as 
we have seen in Part II, is related to activities which are pursued for their internal goods 
rather than external goods. What should be addressed here is that goods internal to a 
practice, by definition, are connected with engaging in that particular practice and, thus, 
internal goods should be produced by engaging in the social practice in question. If 
142 
someone tries to earn money by playing chess, this may be an external good. This may 
not be constitutive of a good life, even though he or she may be regarded as living a good 
life. Of course, we can think of other cases. One may achieve prestige, power and wealth 
through engaging in some particular kind of practice, without external intention. In this 
case, prestige, power and wealth may be a part of the good life. However, even in this 
case, these goods should not be allowed to dominate internal goods. Rather, these goods 
should be 'subordinate in importance to internal goods'(White and White, p. 154). 
In order for someone to be leading a good life in a proper sense, it is necessary 
that goods internal to social practices should be realised in harmony with one's life as a 
whole, in the way that MacIntyre calls 'the narrative unity of a human life', and also with 
traditions that are historically and socially extended forms of the narrative unity of human 
lives. Without an overriding telos of a whole human life that is conceived as a unity, 
individually or socially, our social practices remain partial and incomplete. These should 
be 'enriched and supplemented by being connected with the notions of the good of a 
whole human life and of an ongoing tradition'(AV, P.275). In the educational context, 
therefore, this shows us that for living a good life it is necessary not only to maintain 
coherence of various practices within one's life, but also to be acquainted with other 
practices outside one's own life. 
Lastly, and more importantly, to maintain the good life, social practices should 
be controlled, or modified, by virtues such as justice, courage, temperance, etc., since all 
social practices are not always desirable for everyone or every society. In order to sustain 
social practices in an educational context, certain virtues may be needed and these 
virtues, if not always, might be exercised and acquired in the course of social 
practices(AV, p. 187). To initiate students into social practices, in the end, involves at 
least partly the possession of the virtues, and these virtues are reciprocally acquired and 
sustained by ongoing traditions of social practices. Indeed, one of the striking features in 
the MacIntyrean conception of social practices seems to lie in the way it addresses 
virtues. In this sense, for MacIntyre, the conception of social practices tends to be linked 
to the moral good and, thus, in his conception of social practices, evil practices may be 
absurd. 
What I have argued so far is that social practices are linked with human 
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flourishing through the achievement of internal goods, the unified whole human life, and 
ongoing traditions of social practices. These practices, of course, involve virtues. Let us 
make some possible comments on MacIntyre's theory of social practices from the 
educational point of view. First of all, when we define education as initiation into social 
practices, as we have shown, this implies at least that the educational aim cannot entirely 
be decided by individuals' desire-satisfaction or autonomy. Rather, it seems that 
individuals are recognised as objects who should be initiated into ongoing social practices 
rather than subjects4. In this sense, current dominant social practices, or practitioners as 
agents for initiating students into those social practices, are more important than the 
students who are initiated into those social practices in education. 
Secondly, social practices should not be confused with institutions. Institutions 
have a lanus-faced character. On the one hand, institutions function as media for 
sustaining social practices. Indeed, just as for maintaining and developing medical 
practices hospitals are needed as their institutions, so educational practices are also 
sustained through educational institutions, which are initiating students into social 
practices. On the other hand, institutions may function as constraints on social practices. 
Institutions, in fact, are concerned with external goods as well as internal goods. For 
instance, hospitals are not only concerned with the attainment of internal goods such as 
the development of medical practices, but also with the acquisition of external goods such 
as money and status. Schools as a main agent of social practices are also concerned with 
initiating pupils into substantive social practices and, at the same time, are concerned 
with pursuing external success and prestige. Indeed, social practices can be vulnerable 
to institutions. In order to resist the corrupting power of institutions, therefore, the virtues 
such as justice, courage etc. are required. Without these virtues, as MacIntyre has pointed 
out, there is no way to escape corrupting institutions(AV, p. 194). 
Thirdly, for MacIntyre, the virtues play an important role in education. However, 
this explanation is not sufficient for deciding the specific content of education. It is one 
thing to say that social practices are related to obtaining internal goods including virtues. 
It is quite another to say that these social practices are educationally important. Take 
MacIntyre's own example of chess. According to him, chess is a typical social practice, 
4 This may be too a strong claim about the social practices view. I shall say more this is relevant to it in 
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which meets the criteria of a social practice. But this may not be regarded as an 
educationally valuable one, although it may be important for the particular people who 
are engaged in it, since it may be nothing more than a game or a pastime rather than being 
related to human flourishing(J. Elliott, 1991, p.l47). What is more, when we consider the 
fact that students are engaged in several practices, such as academic subjects, social 
activities, communication skills, etc., and other practices outside the school, which social 
practices should be taught in educational institutions cannot be clearly answered only by 
MacIntyre's account of virtues. As far as curriculum is concerned, therefore, we may say 
that MacIntyre's position is still not obvious. That is, the question of whether teachers 
have to initiate pupils into all kinds of social practices or initiate them into some 
important social practices still remains unsettled. If MacIntyre's position takes the former 
line, then certainly it would be impossible for teachers to teach all kinds of social 
practices in school. If he takes the latter, we would ask him how could we judge between 
more important social practices and less. Regarding this question, he seems to keep silent. 
Instead, he suggests that the 'overall system of thought and practice' which he favours 
'requires both a different kind of a curricular ordering of the disciplines from that divisive 
and fragmenting partitioning which contemporary academia imposes and the 
development of morally committed modes of dialectical enquiry'(TRV, p. 220). 
Let me move on to a more central point, namely, what counts as 'education as 
initiation into social practices' in MacIntyre's sense? His conception of 'education as 
initiation into social practices' seems to be linked with the 'educated public' thesis. His 
'educated public' thesis can be seen in relation to 'the lost public', which has been caused 
by the liberal tradition in general and the Enlightenment in particular. The argument for 
this runs as follows: the crisis of modem education can be found in the disappearance of 
the educated public. The loss of the educated public is due, at least partly, to the failure 
of the Enlightenment project that stresses individual values. The way out of crisis lies in 
restoring such a public. Presumably, it does this through initiating pupils into substantive 
social practices within a particular society and tradition(Wain, 1994, p. 151). 
Following this logic, the idea of education as initiation into social practices in 
MacIntyre's sense seems to be linked with bringing about the educated public. This can 
Chapter 8. 
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be seen in the case of the educated public of the Scottish Enlightenment that he presents 
us as a typical case. According to MacIntyre, the educated public, as shown in the 
Scottish Enlightenment, has the following three characteristics. Firstly, there must be 'a 
tolerably large body of individuals' who are educated into 'both the habit and the 
opportunity of active rational debate'. To put it another way, an educated public needs 
not only to understand the significance of different issues for their shared social 
experience but also to recognise each other as constituting a public. According to this 
criterion, for instance, neither 'a group of specialists' whose controversies are, as a rule, 
restricted to their peers, nor 'a passive mass public' who provide an audience for the 
debate, can be counted as an educated public. Secondly, there must be 'shared assent, 
both to the standards by appeal to which the success or failure of any particular thesis or 
argument is to be judged, and to the form of rational justification from which those 
standards derive their authority'. Hence, the debates of an educated public are to be 
contrasted both with sceptics and dogmatists who destroy the possibility of an educated 
public. Thirdly, there must be 'some large degree of shared background beliefs and 
attitudes', provided by some shared common body oftexts, 'texts which are accorded a 
canonical status within that particular community'. The possession of such a shared body 
of texts is 'only possible when there is also an established tradition of interpretative 
understanding of how such texts are to be read and construed'. Therefore, mass mindless 
people who lack 'both canonical texts and a tradition of interpretative understanding' are 
not an educated public(EP, pp.18-9, my italics). 
How, then, can we bring up such an educated public? Is this possible in modem 
society? For MacIntyre, it is only where there is an educated public that two other central 
aims of all modem educational systems can be compatibly pursued: 'to fit the young 
person for some particular role and occupation in the social system' and to teach 'young 
persons how to think for themselves, how to acquire independence of mind, how to be 
enlightened'(EP, p.16). Unfortunately, according to MacIntyre, to fit children for their 
social role and occupation and, simultaneously, to teach them to think for themselves are 
not possible under a modem (liberal) education system, even though every teacher faces 
the tasks in the classroom and tries to integrate them. He states: 
... we should have instead to conclude first that a certain kind of failure is inherent in 
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modem educational systems, a kind of failure that no type of educational reform can be 
expected to remedy, and secondly that in respect ofthese two aims teachers confront not 
a both/and, but an either/or. Either they can continue to pursue the aim of fitting their 
pupils for the type and level of social role and occupation prescribed in their society for 
the products of that part of educational system in which they are at work, or they can 
continue to pursue the aim of enabling their pupils to think for themselves, but they 
cannot coherently pursue both aims(EP, p.34). 
He goes on to say that 'the possibility of thinking for oneself only opens up in the context 
of a certain kind of community'; however, that kind of community is no longer available 
in modern liberal society(EP, p. 34). Even if it were possible, under this circumstance, 
the educated public would be lost, or at best be replaced by a set of specialised persons 
or publics. Therefore, to use Feinberg's phrases, under current circumstances, we should 
inevitably choose one of two ways: either' grab hold of a particular community and make 
it comparable to the public', or 'grasp a particular conception of the good and insist that 
such a conception is foundational for the development of a public'(Feinberg, 1991, p.21). 
However, is it really impossible to pursue both communitarian virtues and liberal 
virtues in a liberal-plural society? Did the educated public really disappear? I would think 
not. As Feinberg has rightly pointed out, MacIntyre seems to have misunderstood the 
relation of 'public' to 'plurality' through defining the conceptions of 'public' and 
'plurality' in a restricted, and improper, way. The concept of 'plurality' does not 
necessarily deny 'the possibility of a public'. A public also does not necessarily require 
that 'all share the same belief system'. Rather, it inevitably involves 'a certain amount 
of plurality and a willingness to grapple with questions of right and wrong within the 
context of others with different beliefs'. MacIntyre seems to have the mistaken idea that 
'publics can exist only where general beliefs and legitimation structures are widely 
shared'(ibid., p.22). I share with Feinberg in insisting that 'the educated public' needs 
to be interpreted more broadly so that it should include 'the possibility of any intelligent, 
wider public that is capable of rationally considering the merit of different collective 
alternatives'(ibid., p.19). Moreover, in an educated public, according to Feinberg, there 
are some possibilities such as 'the willingness to continue the discussion even in the 
context of fundamental differences about what should be done, or the ability to explore 
an issue from the point of view of a wider community'(ibid, 24). 
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If Feinberg is right (and also I am) in the view of an educated public that I have 
outlined above, MacIntyre's concluding comment, i.e. we must choose either aiming at 
fitting children for the social demands of a particular community ar aiming at enabling 
children to think for themselves, not both/and, would be wrong, since the two aims in 
education are not necessarily incompatible. In WJWR and TRV, in fact, MacIntyre seems 
to modify his position more satisfactorily. In WJWR, he insists that the rational person 
is always grounded in a tradition while engaging 'both in the ongoing arguments within 
that tradition and in the argumentative debates and conflicts of that tradition of enquiry 
with one or more of its rivals'(WJWR, p.394). And in TRV, an educated public is 'a 
group which not only shares fundamental assumptions on the basis of which it is able to 
articulate disagreements and organize debates, which reads to a significant degree the 
same texts, draws upon the same figures of speech, and shares standards of victory and 
defeat in intellectual debate, but which does so in and through institutionalised means, 
clubs and societies, periodicals and more formal educational institutions'(TRV, pp.2l6-
7). MacIntyre suggests that an educated public 'could lie in reconceptualising the 
universities as cultural and intellectual/aei for contemporary educated publics but within 
the pragmatic reality of an irremediably pluralistic world'. This may require 'different 
educated publics growing around different universities that represent the different 
contesting moralities and cultures within that world'(Wain, 1995, p.1l5). 
Under liberal-plural societies, therefore, to have a single educated public such as 
MacIntyre is proposing may not be possible, but it may be possible to have different 
overlapping educated publics. In this modified MacIntyrean sense, we can still insist that 
an educated public in a broad sense can be produced in any society, whether a liberal-
plural society or tradition-directed society. In this case, the educated public may have a 
more or less different form according to social traditions. In this respect, there is no 
reason why an educated public cannot exist in a liberal society. Rather, what I would 
insist is that, whether the educated public can be defined in terms of communal values 
or intellectual ones, or whatever, it should be produced by engaging in current social 
practices. In this sense, Habermas' (1989) assertion that the educated public should be 
generated from contemporary condition and life-world rather than from the past seems 
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to be plausible5. 
2. Hirst's View 
Let me now move on to Hirst's view of 'education as initiation into social practices'. 
His central tenets run as follows 6: liberal education is related to the development of 'a 
rationally autonomous individual' as the foundation for the good life and, thus, this 
education tends to address the initiation of individuals into theoretical disciplines which 
are often represented by forms of knowledge such as science, social sciences, humanities, 
arts and religion, and so on. However, for Hirst, this understanding of human nature, the 
relationship of individuals in society and the place of reason in human life does not offer 
a satisfactory explanation of educational phenomena in that it undermines human beings 
as social beings, the practical experience of the world and practical knowledge and 
rationality, which are basically demanded for the fulfillment of our lives. Therefore, we 
need to establish education in terms of social practices, which addresses social practices 
and practical knowledge and rationality rather than theoretical reason and rationality in 
education. Seen in this way, education for a good life can be realised by initiating into 
'social practices in which we can individually find a fulfilling life' rather than abstracted 
and detached theoretical knowledge(1998, p. 19). In short, Hirst's assertion is that we 
should shift 'from seeing education as primarily concerned with knowledge to seeing it 
as primarily concerned with social practices'(1993a, p.184). 
What, then, does 'seeing education as primarily concerned with social practices' 
mean? How can we understand his conception of 'education as initiation into social 
practices'? Does this mean simply underlying social practices of everyday life, instead 
of the pursuit of rationality? It may be helpful to consider the following series of 
questions: why did he abandon his earlier liberal conception of education? What are the 
differences between his liberal education and 'education as initiation into social 
practices'? Is his change radical? Let us consider these in tum. 
The reasons why he changes his educational idea from initiation into 'forms of 
5 By the same token, Mendus' criticism against MacIntyre, i.e. 'nostalgia for the past' or 'the myth of the 
Fall' also seems to be sound on the same ground. For the details of this, see her(1992), pp. 179-181. 
6 My expositions of Hirst's later argument here rely mainly on his (1993a) and (1998). 
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knowledge' to initiation into 'social practices' are, it seems to me, threefold: the 
importance of social practices in education and of the good life which is based on them; 
the priority of practice over theory; and the necessity of a stronger type of justification. 
Let me briefly tease out them in tum. 
The first reason is related to the dissatisfaction with two versions of liberal education 
and their conceptions of the good life in terms of social practices. Liberal educators who 
hold education as the pursuit of rationality tend to think that the good life is linked with 
exercising rationality or reason which is regarded as intrinsically worthwhile. They too 
emphasise the cognitive aspect of human nature so that they ignore other aspects of it, 
such as feelings, emotions, skills, and the like. What is more, their education is often 
detached from the practices of the real world. On the other hand, liberal educators who 
see education as the promotion of personal autonomy are inclined to hold that the good 
life is to live an autonomous life in accordance with one's reason or desires. This view 
often undermines the social nature of the individual by excessively stressing personal 
autonomous choice. However, for Hirst, a good life is linked to maximising the 
satisfaction of human desires, individually or socially, through engaging in social 
practices. Hence, education is fundamentally a matter of engaging in social practices 
rather than either the development of rational mind which is isolated both from society 
and other aspects of human nature, or the promotion of self-directness. 
The second reason is the significance of practical reason as a medium for pursuing 
a good life. For Hirst, theoretical knowledge and reason in an educational context is no 
longer seen as the logical foundation of all kinds of knowledge and reason. He illustrates 
this: 
The main error in my position was seeing theoretical knowledge as the logical 
foundation for the development of sound practical knowledge and rational personal 
development. Education in theoretical forms of knowledge was seen as ultimately 
fundamental to everything else in education( 1993a, p.197). 
Hirst now sees practical knowledge and reason as necessary for pursuing the good life 
which incorporates social practices for two reasons: a negative reason and a positive 
reason. The negative reason is that theoretical knowledge and reason are not appropriate, 
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because they are 'doubly abstracted from practice': first 'in seeking only cognitive 
satisfactions, and then 'in seeking within those the specific satisfaction of achieving 
propositional truths'(1999a, p.111). The positive reason is that practical knowledge and 
reason are not only logically prior to theoretical knowledge and reason, but also are 
fundamental, and thus the logical foundation for theoretical knowledge and reason, 
because theoretical knowledge is theoretically loaded with practical knowledge and 
reasoning, which are directly connected with social practices. 
Traditional rationalists, however, would argue that practical knowledge is not 
logically, but perhaps empirically prior to theoretical knowledge. This presupposes a 
distinction between 'logical priority' and 'temporal priority'. Following their logic, in a 
logical sense, theoretical knowledge is prior to practical knowledge in that the latter is 
impossible to imagine without the former, although practical knowledge is prior to 
theoretical knowledge in terms of time. However, this claim may be dubious, as I have 
pointed out in Chapter 4, because surely we can imagine practical knowledge without 
theoretical knowledge, and often have it. For instance, knowing how to ride a bicycle 
without understanding theoretically how it is done. Aquinas seems back up Hirst's logic 
on an epistemological or ontological ground. According to him, the notion of 'actual 
existence' is more basic than that of 'logical existence'. 'Whenever we say that 
something exists in the sense of 'is true' or 'is the case'?, or that there is something that 
belongs to the kind we are talking about, there is a prior sense of being which is implied 
which is akin to 'is there or alive"(Coleman, 1994, p.69). Hence, for Aquinas, the natural 
law is not only one of 'the primary objects of practical enquiry' but 'the presupposition 
of any effective practical enquiry'(WJWR, p.l80). From this perspective, 'actuality is 
prior to capability[possibility]'(Coleman, op. cit., p. 69). To put this another way within 
our context, practice or practical knowledge is prior to theory or theoretical/logical 
knowledge. If we follow Aquinas' interpretation, in the end, practices are prior to the 
theoretical discourses both epistemologically (and ontologically) and perhaps logically. 
The last reason is related to the first two reasons. If the first two grounds are accepted 
? According to Aquinas, the true is a match between thing and intellect(De Veritate, Q.I a.I response). 
However, we need to note that there is a difference between the way things exist and the way we as humans 
come to know them. 
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as sound, it is natural to rest Hirst's justification of education in terms of social practices 
on these. Actually, he seems to adopt the practical way of justification which grounds the 
engagement in theoretical activities in human givens, instead of the transcendental 
argument which relies on circular logic, because he no longer sees the developed forms 
of rational enquiry as having justification independently of their role in reflection on 
other practices. Indeed, the practical type of justification offers a stronger justification 
in that not only are social practices fundamental but also it can tell us which theoretical 
pursuits are worth engaging in. 
What were the limitations of liberal education for Hirst in terms of 'education as 
initiation into social practices'? He was mistaken in seeing theoretical knowledge as the 
one and only type of knowledge that is properly significant in determining both the ends 
and means of rational practice and thus of the good life(1993a, p.193). He recognises, of 
course, that theoretical knowledge, as we can see in philosophical practices, is important 
in the social development of the practices of critical reflection that the good life requires. 
He, however, disagrees with the claim that theoretical knowledge itself is a necessary 
condition for the individual's conduct of the good life(ibid., p.196). Theoretical 
knowledge in education cannot be, as he mistakenly thought, the logical foundation of 
all kinds of knowledge and, thus, fundamental to everything else in education. Rather, 
education should be directly concerned with a variety of 'practices needed by all for a 
good life in our contemporary context' (1998, p. 19). 
Then, did he not think of the pursuit of rationality as relating to practices, and social 
ones at that? We would think that Hirst's liberal education could be seen as an initiation 
into social practices in that his liberal education involved practices of rational discourse 
and forms of knowledge can be regarded as socially constructed. In this respect, Hirst's 
main change may be that he no longer holds the view that only the practices of rational 
pursuit can be justified as having foundational importance8. Rational discourses are only 
one kind of social practices, which we may call 'second order practices'. Although the 
importance of this kind of social practice relies on ongoing traditions to which some 
people belong, this is not Hirst's first concern. Nor does his primary concern lie in 
8This may be one possible (mild) interpretation, although Hirst himself would deny it. This interpretation 
addresses the continuity of his liberal education and social practices-based education. By contrast, a strong 
interpretation may emphasise the differences between them. 
152 
investigating the nature of an educated person. Rather, education should be the result of 
being initiated into social practices. What is more, education should bring about the 
development of social practices through initiating students into certain substantive social 
practices. In this respect, I would say that Hirst's focus is on the content of education, that 
is, on social practices into which students should be initiated rather than on an educated 
person or public. 
On the other hand, if we take another type of liberal education, that is, the promotion 
of personal autonomy, this type of liberal education also would not be satisfactory in 
terms of social practices, since society cannot be simply seen as a collection of 
individuals who pursue the satisfaction of their personal desires, preferences, wants and 
so on. Rather, in a fundamental sense, persons should be necessarily seen as 'social 
constructions' and further one's good life cannot be free from existing social practices 
and traditions. We can say, therefore, that one's good life is necessarily connected to the 
engagement 'in the socially constructed rational practice of engaging in specific rational 
practices for the satisfaction of wants. And such a pursuit necessarily includes the 
promotion of rational practices as social institutions '(l993a, p.194). Whether rationality 
or autonomy, we might conclude that liberal education cannot satisfy the demands of 
social practices. 
So far I have tried to explore Hirst's conception of 'education as initiation into social 
practices'. The striking features of this may be drawn out as follows: firstly, his 
conception of education is linked with one's good life and one's good life is derived from 
engaging in socially constructed rational practices. Secondly, related, his account of 
'education as initiation into social practices' tends to emphasise practical rationality or 
reasoning as a fundamental element, although he abandoned the centrality of theoretical 
reasoning. It is tempting to see this as leading to another form of intellectual education, 
although this may be controversial9. In this sense, Hirst's view may open up the following 
9This may depend on how to interpret the crucial terms 'rational practices' and 'practical rationality or 
reason'. Ifwe follow ordinary usages ofthese terms, this interpretation may be plausible, because he surely 
emphasises these terms. However, when we focus on 'the satisfaction of desires', and 'practical reason' is 
seen as just operation or actualisation of satisfactions in the course of engaging in social practices, then it 
might not be quite correct to see this education as intellectual. In fact, Hirst's most current position seems 
to take the latter view. His most recent overall picture of education, which is based on correspondence with 
him, runs something like this: education is to live a good life through initiating people into rationally 
developed social practices. A good life is bringing about the maximisation of the overall desire satisfaction 
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question: what is the difference between education that stresses practical rationality and 
that which stresses theoretical rationality? Hirst's account of 'education as initiation into 
social practices' is less clear than he thought. 
Let us tum now to the issue of composing educational content in terms of social 
practices. To begin with, what does Hirst mean by 'initiation into a complex of specific, 
substantive social practices with all the knowledge, attitudes, feelings, virtues, skills, 
dispositions and relationships that involves'(1993a, p.197)? This presupposes that there 
are a variety of social practices which are composed of complex webs including 
knowledge, feelings, virtues etc.; however, substantive social practices may differ 
according to social and cultural contexts, since social practices are characterised by 
human activities which people engage in and which have been socially constructed and 
developed. 
Hirst, like MacIntyre, did not give concrete guidelines as to how we can construct a 
school curriculum in terms of social practices, although he provides us with some 
possible social practices in education. The social practices in education, according to 
Hirst, may include at least the following three kinds: 'varied basic practices' which are 
'necessary for any individual to be rationally viable in their given everyday physical, 
personal and social contexts'; 'wider range of optional practices' which are 'available 
for the construction of each individual rational life' ; developed or second order practices 
which are constituted of critical reflection on the first two categories. This 'can be 
modified by personal rational judgement and new practices can be pursued as judged best 
in the self-direction oflife in detail and overall'(ibid., p.196). 
Although he suggests some possible social practices that may be required in 
education, however, he does not give the details of that. For Hirst, thus, some specific 
issues about education- for instance, whether all education is necessarily required to be 
in the long run of the people engaged in the social practices. In order to maximise the overall desire 
satisfaction, practical reason which leads to a better or rational way of satisfying desires is required. If my 
summary is correct, we may say that his current position is closer to a utilitarian position than his recent 
papers(1993a; 1998). In the 1993a paper, he tried to dialectically integrate the rationalist approach which 
pays too little attention to what is given in human desires and capacities, and the utilitarian approach which 
pays too little attention to the fact that the rational capacities, and the desire to use them, are themselves 
'givens'. It seems that that paper put more emphasis on the rationalistic character rather than utilitarian 
elements, but his most current position seems to put more emphasis on utilitarian elements. My 
interpretation of his view is given only limited support in his papers(1993a; 1998). His most current position 
can be found in his paper( 1999b) which is in press. 
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an initiation into all kinds of social practices; whether some social practices such as basic 
practices are compulsory and other practices, such as optional practices and second order 
practices, are optional within education; whether all societies have the same content 
within a particular social practice- are still unresolved. What is more, in order to get a 
fuller understanding of education as initiation into social practices, a list of further 
questions need to be answered: what are the criteria for constructing the curriculum at the 
school level? Which social practices are valuable in an educational context and, thus, 
should be taught in school? Should basic practices be included in the school curriculum? 
In the case of optional practices, which optional practices can we choose? 
Hirst, however, does not deal with the details of these questions. He suggests that a 
curriculum can be organised in terms of significant practices( 1993a, p. 197). But how can 
we decide this? He may think that the question of which social practices are important 
and which social practices should be involved in education in general and school 
curriculum in particular may be determined by social traditions to which a society 
belongs. For instance, in a Korean educational context, sex education among the varied 
basic social practices is, in reality, less important than in Britain, because Korea, like 
many other Asian countries, has a 'shy' culture10 so that many people are inclined to 
leave sexual matters in mystery rather than to speak out on them. Vocational preparation 
among optional practices in Korea may also be underplayed, whereas second order social 
practices may be addressed more than other social practices such as basic social practices 
and optional practices, due to the pedantic orientation of Oriental elitism, which is called 
'Y ang-Ban culture' . Perhaps, Korean education may be a typical case in which the focus 
has been on second order practices such as theoretical knowledge, and, thus, education 
in Korea has tended to be understood by, more or less, being isolated from pervasive 
social practices. This phenomenon was, like a rationalist education, the weakness of 
Korean education. 
Hirst might think that the list of questions that I have raised are sociological 
questions, so that the issue of which social practices are important, in its nature, should 
be determined by social consensus or social traditions rather than by a philosophical 
10 I use a 'shy' culture for describing the general character of a certain culture. From the moral point of 
view, it would be replaced by the 'shame' culture that is often contrasted to the 'guilt' culture. See D. 
Tombs(l995). 
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argument. This may be right. Nevertheless, the issue of which social practices are 
important may be difficult to reach agreement on within a society, since the importance 
of some social practices is more or less clear, but some social practices are not obvious 
at all. What is more, even if we reach agreement as to which social practices are 
important, the issue of whether we should teach those social practices in the classroom 
is still open, since it is one thing to say that sexual practices, for instance, may be 
important basic practices; however, it is quite another to say that these sexual practices 
should be a component of the school curriculum and should be taught in the classroom. 
In summary, for Hirst, what is obvious is his overall principle about the way 
education should be grounded, that is, all educational practices, from organising 
educational systems to teaching, 'can be rationally developed only in critically reflective 
experiment in practice itself (1998, p. 19). In other words, educational practices should 
be grounded in social practices and such education requires practical reason, which is a 
capacity of critical reflection on the substantive practices in which one 
participates(1993a, p. 197). What is still not clear, however, is what it means specifically 
when we say that education should be an initiation into fundamental social practices. 
3. Langford's View 
Lastly, let me turn now to what Langford counts as education as initiation into social 
practices. His conception of education as initiation into social practices is best understood 
writ small in terms of teaching. In other words, the meaning of education as initiation into 
social practices can be concretely revealed in the light of teaching practices, since 
teaching is aiming at bringing about education. Before exploring this, let me think about 
his overall picture of education as initiation into social practices. To this end, above all, 
it is necessary to discuss the relationship among education, persons and society in terms 
of social practices. 
For Langford, put crudely, the relation among them may be characterised as internal. 
His argument goes as follows 11. Persons as members of society are necessarily social and, 
thus, their actions are understood in terms of social reflection, not simply in abstraction 
II This argument here relies on his 1985, pp.159-92; 1989, pp. 21-34. 
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from social reality. Social practices are carried on by their practitioners 'only within the 
broader context provided by a society'(1989, p. 22). We can say, therefore, that just as 
the relation of a society to its members is internal, so the relation of a social practice to 
its practitioners is, too. Engaging in social practices is possible only through practitioners. 
Practitioners, however, are themselves not social practices, but a part of social practices. 
Metaphorically speaking, the relationship between practitioners and social practices is 
similar to the relationship between an engine and a car. The importance of an engine is 
revealed and specified within a car as a whole, not vice versa. Similarly, the role and 
importance of practitioners cannot be fully understood unless through social practices as 
a whole to which practitioners belong. However, unlike an engine, practitioners have the 
capacity to see and enact social practices, they are not simply passive beings. 
On the other hand, education is connected to learning to become a person in the 
society to which one belongs, i.e. a member of society. To become educated is, in short, 
'to become a member of society and also to have learnt what it is to be and live as a 
member of that society'(1985, p.181). This implies that there are persons who are 
required in a particular society and thus education should be bringing about members of 
that society. Like Langford, when we see education in this way, there is an intimate 
relationship between education and society. According to him, education can be defined 
in terms of an instrument for performing social functions, whether 'perpetuating the 
society of which it is a part' or 'preparing individuals for a place in the society'. Seen in 
this way, major aims of education can be found in two social functions: it aims at looking 
backward to the past of the society to which it belongs, that is, it is 'a social practice 
carried on in accordance with a tradition and therefore looks to the past for its content and 
values'; and it aims at looking 'forward both to the lives which the persons becoming 
educated will live and to the future of the society in which they will live them' (1985, 
pp.184-85). Furthermore, when we see education in this way, the following question, i.e. 
'what kind of education is important for the developing social practices?' may be more 
fundamental than 'which social practices are important for individuals?' 
Seen in this way, one's good life seems to be entirely reliant on whether, through 
education, one learns and accepts social contents and values concerning how to live one's 
life as a member of society. If someone accepts social values that are reflected by current 
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social practices in a particular society and, thus, he or she lives as a good member of 
society, he or she would be called 'an educated person'. To become an educated person 
is to live a good life. A good life involves accepting social values among one's values, 
and it is only possible through initiating pupils into current social practices. This seems 
to presuppose that social values are valuable, and these values are given or taken for 
granted. Hence, one's good life can be achieved through being initiated into current social 
practices and by accepting social values that are embedded in social practices. 
The relationship among education, persons and society, in turn, lies in the following 
logic: to become educated is to become persons. To become persons means to become 
members of society. Education, in the end, can be properly defined in terms of social 
functions. When we see education in this way, however, we face some immediate 
questions. Is it right that education is entirely defined in terms of perpetuating a particular 
society? What then are the differences between education and socialisation? Indeed, as 
I mentioned, Langford is inclined to undermine the distinction between education and 
socialisation, although he does not deny it entirely. In this respect, we might say that his 
conception of education is tending excessively to address its social function. 
Let me think now of Langford's conception of education as initiation into social 
practices. Education, according to him, is defined as becoming persons who are expected 
to playa role as members of society. Whether or not this is correct, it is at least obvious 
that 'education is essentially concerned with people as people'(1985, p.72). What are the 
characteristics of educated people which he has in mind, when he says that education is 
concerned with people as people? How is this possible? 
It is convenient to compare Langford's educated people with Peters' educated person 
and MacIntyre's educated public. To begin with, let us consider Peters' educated person 
and Langford's educated people. These conceptions have in common that they stress the 
role of human beings in education rather than contents of education, and that the kind of 
persons concerned become possible through initiating pupils into cultural heritage or 
social practices. However, there are some differences. Firstly, Peters' conception of the 
educated person is concerned with individuals who have cognitive perspectives, whereas 
for Langford, becoming educated persons is associated with becoming members of 
society. Secondly, Peters' educated person is someone who is committed to the pursuit 
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of intrinsic value rather than extrinsic, whereas Langford's educated persons do not 
necessarily exclude external values including social values. Rather, for Langford, external 
values which are necessary for society are often regarded as important ones. Langford and 
MacIntyre also have similarities in the following ways: they both address the educated 
group, the educated public or becoming educated persons, instead of the educated 
individual; the educated public and educated people are intimately connected to values 
of a particular society; and these persons are only possible through initiation into current 
social practices which are carried on in accordance with ongoing traditions. However, 
unlike MacIntyre, Langford's educated persons do not necessarily possess certain virtues, 
although social practices themselves may assume certain underlying values. 
What Langford means by 'education as initiation into social practices' can be more 
explicitly revealed by examining this in the light of the practices of school teaching in 
which we may see education writ small, since the overall purpose of school teaching is 
the bringing about of education or educating people12. School teaching as a social 
practice, presumably, shows us a paradigmatic example of educational practices. But 
there is also a danger of restricting the boundary of social practices. When we take school 
teaching practices rather than educational practices, teaching can be defined as 'a social 
practice carried on by teachers in accordance with a social tradition'(1985, p.159). 
If we take school teaching as a social practice, teachers' role as agents or 
practitioners is important, since to understand social practices is to see them as their 
practitioners see them (1989, p. 30). Indeed, how social practices are carried on at the 
particular time in a particular society depends on teachers' understanding of the overall 
purpose of those practices at that time in a particular society. The issue of how teachers 
understand current social practices is, therefore, a key to education that is understood as 
initiating children into these social practices. To say that teachers know the overall 
purpose of teaching presupposes that not only are they aware of current social practices 
which enter into education, but also they are ready to be committed to that purpose. To 
say that teachers understand current social practices that are pervasive and substantive in 
education means that they know ways of seeing and doing provided by ongoing social 
12Downie et. al.(1975) also seem to discuss school teaching as a social practice, although they did not use 
the terminology of practice. Like Langford, they also seem to be saying that school teaching as a social 
practice is bringing about educated people. 
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traditions. 
In order to understand teachers' role in terms of social practices, therefore, it is 
necessary to understand teachers' role in relation to social traditions. Social traditions, 
on the one hand, provide teachers with a source of substantive social practices that 
students should be initiated into and, thus, with an overall purpose of teaching. On the 
other hand, social traditions may be changed by teachers' accumulating reflections on 
their teaching practices in which they have engaged and, thus, their overall purpose of 
teaching and even the conception of their overall purpose itself also could be modified. 
Hence, teachers are required to playa double role, that is, both to be sensitive to and 
reflective on the ongoing traditions of social practices. If teachers are not sensitive to the 
ongoing tradition of social practices, education in general and teaching in particular may 
be divorced from the real world's demands. If teachers ignore reflections on social 
practices as a whole, education may turn into the instrument for perpetuating a particular 
society or, at best, it would be 'socialisation'. In this sense, we might say that a good 
teacher should strike a balance between sensitiveness and reflectivity regarding the 
ongoing traditions of social practices to which he or she belongs. 
For Langford, like MacIntyre and Hirst, it is obvious that education can be, or 
indeed should be, defined as initiating students into social practices. Unlike MacIntyre 
and Hirst, Langford understands the conception of education in the light of the 
conception of teaching that is defined as 'a social practice carried on by teachers in 
accordance with a social tradition'. This may be throwing light on the issues of which 
social practices are important and of who determines these. According to 
Langford( 1989), social practices can be divided by the overall purpose for which they are 
undertaken into two kinds: 'theoretical' practices that are concerned with 'the acquisition 
of knowledge' such as biology; and 'practical' practices that are concerned with 'bringing 
about change' such as engineering. Perhaps, as Langford has recognised, many social 
practices may be 'both theoretical and practical' in that knowledge may be sought not 
merely 'for its own sake', but 'for the sake ofthe use'(p.32). For Langford, the issues of 
which social practices students should be initiated into and of how to select these 
practices rely entirely on teachers who, as practitioners of social practices, know both the 
ongoing traditions of social practices to which they belong and how to achieve their 
160 
purposes. In other words, whether we are thinking of practical practices or theoretical 
practices, or whatever, the question of what kind of social practices are valuable is to be 
decided by teachers who have a shared overall purpose in accordance with the ongoing 
traditions of social practices in which they have engaged. 
However, we should not understand Langford's conception of practices to be a 
more or less individualistic one because it addresses the teachers' role. For him, as I have 
indicated, what we should have in mind is that the teachers' role here is their role as 
practitioners of social practices and their role as practitioners lies mainly in initiating 
students into substantive social practices rather than creating or interpreting their own 
social practices, although this is, partly or implicitly, built into their role. From this point 
of view, although we admit that there is more or less progress, the following issues may 
be still problematic at the school education level: who is to decide, and how, when there 
is disagreement about the overall purpose of teaching as helping others to become 
educated or disagreement about what counts as becoming educated between teachers, 
between educational traditions, between geographical domains, between small societies 
or ethnic groups, etc. within a larger society? How are substantive social practices to be 
selected that entail educational values and, at the same time, are useful for becoming 
educated, when we encounter many different social practices carried on in a society and 
even encounter differences of scope within the same practices? 
C. Discussion of Education as Initiation into Social Practices 
In the previous section, I have tried to show what MacIntyre, Hirst and Langford 
mean by 'education as initiation into social practice'. To put this crudely, they have in 
common that education can be best understood in terms of social practices and, further, 
education should be defined as initiating pupils into social practices. However, their 
emphasis on that is slightly different from each other. The overall picture and comparison 
of their views may be drawn as <Figure 2>. 
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~ MacIntyre Hirst Langford Items 
Concepts of Virtue-oriented Patterns of activity Social activities guided 
Social practices Internal goods people engage in for by perspectives provided 
Traditions the good life by traditions 
Good lives Harmony with the Engaging in the To live as good members 
narrative unity of socially constructed of society who have 
a human life, tradition rational practices for social values 
and virtues the satisfaction of wants 
Educational aims Person-oriented Content-oriented Person-oriented 
Educated public Practical reasoning Educated persons(people) 
for the engagement 
in substantive practices 
Contents of Wide(not confined) Basic Theoretical 
Education Optional Practical 
Second order 
Principles of Ongoing social Practical reasoning Practitioners who have 
Selection traditions overall purposes provided 
by tradition 
Striking features Internal goods and Practical reason Practitioners and social 
virtues traditions 
Overall forms of Social + individual Intellectual (rational), Social 
Education Individual 
<Figure 2> Comparisons of three views of 'education as initiation into social practices' 
Let me explain the detail of each item briefly. Firstly, as we can see in <Figure 
2>, MacIntyre, Hirst and Langford have slightly different conceptions of social practices. 
Whilst MacIntyre's account of social practices is explicitly related to the internal goods 
and the virtues, Hirst's and Langford's accounts of social practices are not necessarily 
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connected with the virtues or goods and, thus, are not confined to these. We may say, 
however, that Hirst and Langford also deal with virtues as elements of the complex 
package that practices are, or their account of social practices is, at least implicitly or 
contingently, related to social practices. We might say, in principle, that Hirst's and 
Langford's conceptions of social practices are broader than MacIntyre's in that their 
conceptions are not necessarily confined to the virtues or goods; however, in reality, the 
degree of conceptual difference is not so obvious, since we are unlikely to find that there 
are cases of social practice in Hirst's or Langford's sense which do not involve goods in 
MacIntyre's sense. Moreover, when we think of education in terms of social practices, 
we should admit that their views are very similar, because social practices into which 
people are initiated in education, presumably, should be valuable from the educational 
point of view. In this sense, we can say that social practices are assuming certain values, 
insofar as education is concerned. Hence, it is not surprising at all that their conceptions 
of social practices in an educational context do not appear so different. 
Secondly, MacIntyre, Hirst and Langford have in common that all of them assume 
a certain kind of 'being educated' or 'educatedness' in relation to the good life; however, 
they have different views of the good life and being educated. MacIntyre's good life is 
directly connected with his account of social practices. That is, if someone is not only 
concerned with the achievement of internal goods, but also to live in harmony with his 
or her life as a whole and with traditions, which are socially and historically extended 
forms of the narrative unity of human lives, this is the good life. For MacIntyre, hence, 
it is natural that his educational aim is to create the educated public who have 
commitment to achieving internal goods throughout their whole lives and, further, who 
are to live in harmony with the social values provided by ongoing traditions of social 
practices. Langford's educational aim, like MacIntyre's, lies in bringing about educated 
persons or people rather than an educated individual. Like MacIntyre, that people become 
good members of society is an aim which can be only achieved by initiating students into 
social practices provided by social traditions. However, unlike MacIntyre, Langford's 
good life is inclined to underline communal elements. For Langford, the good life is 
often equated with living as a member of society and, therefore, education is, to some 
degree, regarded as socialisation. On the other hand, unlike MacIntyre and Langford, 
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Hirst emphasises the fact that education should involve initiation into substantive social 
practices that may constitute the good life, rather than a certain type of person. The good 
life depends on how to develop the practical rationality or reasoning, which is necessary 
for engagement in socially constructed rational practices. This may be different at every 
stage of history and society(1993a, p. 195). 
Thirdly, from the perspective of educational content, paradoxically, MacIntyre 
does not have any suggestion as to which social practices can be included!3. He may think 
that any social practices can be educational contents, if they are associated with internal 
goods and the virtues and if they are in harmony with one's whole life and social 
traditions. In this respect, he may see no need for categorising or restricting contents of 
education in terms of social practices. In this sense, insofar as educational content is 
concerned, we could say that his position is not clear. In contrast, Hirst and Langford 
provide us with a minimum clue as to which social practices can possibly be contents of 
education. For Langford, educational contents may involve 'theoretical' and 'practical' 
practices. The issue of which social practices can be included may be decided by overall 
purposes within a society. However, it must be said that this categorisation of Langford' s 
is for classifying social practices rather than for organising educational contents. From 
this point of view, his contribution on educational content is still not clear. Hirst, unlike 
Langford, is concerned with the composition of educational content. Having this 
intention, he divides social practices into three kinds, i.e. basic, optional and second order 
practices. Following Hirst's suggestion, education is likely to involve varied basic 
practices, a wide range of optional practices and second order practices, although the 
issue of which practices should be included may be different depending on social 
traditions. 
Regarding principles for which social practices people should be initiated into in 
education, MacIntyre seems to rely entirely on ongoing traditions mediated by internal 
debate within a society. This could be controlled by virtues. But as far as education is 
concerned, virtues, in fact, do not seem to be a powerful principle for the selection of 
educational contents, although they play a crucial role in the conception of social 
13His examples of social practices, of course, can be categorised in the following ways: games(chess, 
football), productive activities(farming , architecture), intellectual activities(science, history), artistic 
pursuits(painting, music) and politics(creating political community). It is worth noting, however, that 
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practices. For Hirst, practical rationality or reason, which is a capacity to judge whether 
practices are valuable for the good life, may be regarded as a fundamental principle. The 
decision of which practices are important depends on practical reason, individually or 
collectively. For Langford, the selection of social practices depends, eventually, on 
practitioners who have an overall purpose provided by traditions through participating 
in social practices to which they belong. To sum up, they all agree with the overall 
principle that which social practices should be considered must rest on ongoing social 
traditions in which someone is engaged. But, specific principles, to some degree, may be 
different from each other, such as practical reason, practitioners' overall purpose, etc. 
Lastly, let me outline some striking features of the three writers' theories and their 
overall picture of the social practices thesis in terms of education. In MacIntyre's account 
of social practices, his most striking feature lies in his addressing the achievement of 
internal goods and its relation to the virtues. This gives social practices protection against 
corruption on the one hand, and on the other makes possible their continual development. 
From this point of view, education, explicitly or implicitly, underlies moral goods. 
Indeed, when we see education in terms of social practices, we would say that education 
must start from initiating students into significant social practices and, further, must 
move on to developing social practices. MacIntyre's account of social practices provides 
us with the underpinning structure of this through pursuing the internal goods and 
referring to the virtues, and, further, through heeding ongoing traditions of social 
practices in which someone is engaged. What must not be confused are internal goods 
which are related to the engagement in the social practices in question and intrinsic goods 
that are more or less isolated from current social practices. Hence, what he might address 
in education is initiation into current social practices and ongoing traditions of social 
practices, not a transcendental good. 
Like MacIntyre, Hirst assumes that education is linked to the good life and that 
it should grow out of social practices. To put this another way, the good life, individual 
or social, can be achieved by engaging in socially constructed rational practices and, thus, 
the role of education lies in developing the capacities, through which one is able to 
choose the most defensible practices and to reflect critically on various social practices 
Maclnytre does not seem to see these in relation to educational contents. 
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in the light of one's desires and idea of the good life. To do this, the most important 
factor is to develop practical knowledge and practical rationality or reason. For Hirst, 
practical rationality that is based on practical knowledge is the most important element 
in selecting what is the 'most defensible for present immediate wants and for the future 
development of the good life'(1993, p.195). This seems to result in another form of 
rationalistic education, although Hirst would deny it, which is different from the type of 
liberal education that emphasises theoretical knowledge and theoretical rationality which 
I have criticised in Part 1. Hirst is still inclined to address the individual's knowledge, 
reason, criticality, rationality, etc. in education. What has really changed for him is that 
he stresses practical knowledge, practical reason, practical criticality, practical rationality 
instead of theoretical knowledge, theoretical reason, theoretical criticality, theoretical 
rationality, and so on. Namely, all he has changed is the object or purpose for which 
knowledge, reason, etc. are used. From this point of view, we may rightly raise the 
question: at what point is education that is based on theoretical knowledge and reason 
distinguished from that which is based on practical knowledge and reason? There may 
be a logically drawn distinction between these two views of education, but, in reality, the 
two forms of education may not be so different. Presumably, both views of education, at 
least to some extent, result in a rationalistic or an intellectual form of education. 
Langford, unlike Hirst, has emphasised socialisation as an educational function. 
Indeed, for him, education is often equated with socialisation. His logic goes as follows: 
to be educated is to become a person. To become persons is to become members of 
society. To be members of society is to live as practitioners who are to assimilate social 
values as their own values and, thus, to acquire social ways of seeing and doing. To have 
social ways of seeing and doing is to know perspectives provided by ongoing social 
traditions. In order to know social perspectives, persons have to be initiated into ongoing 
social practices. Langford may be right in saying that education cannot be, properly or 
fully, understood detached from social phenomena and function. However, his claim goes 
farther than this. That is, it seems to me that he tends excessively to address social roles 
of education. Education cannot be fully understood apart from society, but education 
surely goes far beyond a simple socialisation. Ironically, one surprising thing in 
Langford's position is, it seems to me, that he puts forward education as socialisation in 
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the light of school teaching as education writ small, although if we are thinking only of 
school education there is a risk that the boundaries of socialisation will be unduly 
restricted. However, this is hardly surprising, if we have in mind that school teaching is 
one of the effective, and influential, institutions of socialisation. This may be explained 
as follows. The issue of whether socialisation is successful or unsuccessful depends 
largely on how teachers as practitioners and agents of social practices play their role, if 
we see education as initiating pupils into social practices. Teachers are people who have 
overall purposes provided by traditions of social practices, and their main role is to lead 
their pupils to see and live social perspectives by initiating them into social practices. In 
this way, socialisation may proceed effectively and given social values can be 
reproduced. This interpretation of Langford's view of education in terms of social 
practices may be an extreme one. However, it is more or less obvious that his education 
overemphasises social functions. In this respect, we need to explore school education in 
general and teaching in particular in a balanced way in terms of social practices. This may 
show us the overall picture of 'education as initiation into social practices' in a fuller 
sense. In the next Chapter, I shall deal with this in more detail. 
Before doing this, let me briefly put forward my view of education as initiation 
into social practices. This may be summarised as follows. Firstly, education as initiation 
into social practices is basically to be understood, beyond pointing out the fact that 
education is a social practice, as saying that education as a whole should be reflecting 
ongoing traditions of social practices at some substantial level. I have written 'at some 
substantial level', because education as initiation into social practices should be 
understood as a substantial principle and practice; however, to what degree we should 
reflect substantive social practices may be different from society to society. This implies 
that education is constituted by overlapping sets of social practices and that pervasive 
social practices and educational contents could be different according to society and 
tradition. Secondly, given a basic standpoint that education as initiation into social 
practices should be understood in a substantial sense, my overall picture of social 
practices-based education is as follows. I am inclined to assume, like other writers, that 
education is related to the good life in some sense. The good life here is not merely 
confined to the pursuit of individual goods, but it should be harmonious with social 
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goods. In this respect, I would rather say that education is a matter of bringing about a 
good life which is characterised as the flourishing of society as a whole including the 
development of social practices and the promotion of personal well-being. Hence, an 
educational aim may be to bring up educated publics who are devoted to the flourishing 
of society as a whole by engaging in ongoing traditions of social practices. We might 
conclude, thus, that education is a complex social activity which through initiating 
students into current pervasive social practices aims at bringing up educated publics who 
will bring about the flourishing of society as a whole. 
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Chapter 7. Teaching as a Social Practice 
In the previous Chapter, I have drawn the overall picture of 'education as initiation 
into social practices'. This may be summarised as follows: education should reflect 
substantive social practices at a substantial level in accordance with ongoing traditions 
of social practices to which a person or a society belongs, although there are differences 
of degree according to societies and traditions. From this point of view, education, in 
tum, aims at bringing up educated publics who are committed to the flourishing society 
as a whole including social practices and individual goods through initiating learners into 
substantive social practices. 
In this Chapter what I want to do is to explore the following question: when we see 
education as initiation into social practices, what would school education be like? This 
question implies a sequence of questions as follows: what is teaching as a social practice? 
How can we organise curriculum? How to select social practices as contents of 
education? How to teach social practices? (What are the roles of the teacher?) In short, 
the main task of this Chapter is applying 'education as initiation into social practices' to 
the practice of school education at a specific level. 
Before tackling these questions, it is worth noting why we start with teaching as a 
social practice rather than other social practices in order to make explicit education as 
initiation into social practices. There are three reasons for this. The first reason lies in the 
importance of formal education. Education, of course, is not limited to formal education, 
it may include informal education. In particular, when we see education as initiation into 
social practices, informal education may be important, since social practices are regularly 
encountered outside school. For this reason, some would prefer to define education as 
bringing up or upbringing in a broad sense. This broader definition, however, may tell us 
nothing about the distinction between education and non-education. Whether or not we 
accept this, it is more or less obvious that formal education is everyone's concern. 
Without consideration of school education, education as initiation into social practices 
may remain at a slogan level. Therefore, the issue of what school education would look 
like when we maintain that education should be an initiation into social practices is 
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central. Secondly, 'education as initiation into social practices' can be made clearer in the 
light of 'teaching as a social practice'. As we saw in Chapter 6, although I tried to make 
clear what 'education as initiation into social practices' is, this is still not apparent partly 
due to the vagueness ofthe conception of 'education' and 'social practices', and partly 
due to the broadness and complexity of education. In contrast, teaching as a social 
practice is more or less clear compared with education, because the concept of teaching 
is relatively uncomplicated and teaching as a social practice is taken for granted. Thus, 
it may be helpful to consider what 'teaching as a social practice' means so as to get a 
fuller understanding of the thesis of education as initiation as social practices. Thirdly, 
as related to the second reason, 'teaching as a social practice' can specify what 'education 
as initiation into social practices' is through providing a concrete context. Indeed, an 
abstract meaning of 'education as initiation into social practices' may be made more 
specific and revealed with a clearer meaning, when it is applied to teaching as its concrete 
field. 
A. The Nature of Teaching as a Social Practice 
When we consider 'teaching as a social practice' in relation to 'education as 
initiation into social practices', the following issues may come up: how can we 
understand teaching as a social practice? How can we distinguish teaching as a social 
practice from other practices? What is the uniqueness of teaching as a social practice? 
In what ways does this throw light on the understanding of education as initiation into 
social practices? 
To begin by asking the question 'is teaching a social practice?' may be a good starting 
point, since the other questions I raised above are dependent on this question. Is teaching 
a social practice? If so, what kind of social practice is it? To tackle this, let us briefly 
sketch the concept of teaching. 
1. What is Teaching? 
When we consider the concept of teaching, we often associate it with the concept of 
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learning as its counterpart concept. We find this in Hirst's account of teaching. His 
account of teaching is always assuming specific teaching activities. He asked: 'how are 
specific teaching activities to be distinguished from all other specific activities?' 'Why 
exactly is opening a window or sharpening a pencil not teaching?'(Hirst, 1974, p.102). 
According to him, this depends on how a person sees the activity, i.e. one's purpose. He 
puts it: 
The intention of all teaching activities is that of bringing about learning ... lt involves the 
claim that the concept of teaching is in fact totally unintelligible without a grasp ofthe 
concept of learning. It asserts that there is no such thing as teaching without the intention 
to bring about learning and that therefore one cannot characterise teaching independently 
of characterising learning. Until therefore we know what learning is, it is impossible for 
us to know what teaching is. The one concept is totally dependent on the other. Because 
of the tightest conceptual connection then, the characterisation and raison d'etre of 
teaching rests on that of learning ... Of course pupils may learn many things when a 
teacher is not in fact teaching. That is another matter ... I wish to maintain therefore that 
the notion of teaching is totally dependent for its characterisation on the concept of 
learning and that this has important practical consequences for how teachers see their job 
and therefore for what they do in the classroom(Hirst, 1974, pp. 105-6). 
Hirst's arguments on teachingl4, as we can see from the passages quoted above, can be 
summarised in two claims: one is that the most crucial factor in teaching is the intention 
of teaching, which is to bring about learning. The other is the claim, closely linked to the 
first, that there is a logical relationship between teaching and learning. Let me briefly 
examine these in tum. 
His first claim that the purpose of teaching is to bring about learning seems to be 
obvious, regardless of whether teaching activity is successful in bringing about learning 
or not. He seems to recognise that, from the premise that teaching must be directed 
towards the goal of learning, it does not follow that it always results in the intended 
learning. The causes of the failure or underachievement of the intended learning may 
14Hirst defines teaching as 'the activity of a person, A(teacher), the intention of which is to bring about 
an activity(iearning), by a person, B(the pupil), the intention of which is to achieve some end-state(e.g. 
knowing, appreciating) whose object is X( e.g. a belief, attitude, skill)' (ibid., p.l 08). 
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involve other factors, such as the teacher's teaching method, students' intention, students' 
ability and so on. The fact that teaching is a goal-oriented activity is identified in 
Langford and Pearson. For Langford, as we have seen so far, teaching is an activity for 
bringing about learning. Pearson(1989) also insists that a teacher's intention to bring 
about learning is a necessary condition for a teaching activity. Teachers as a profession 
do intend the students to learn something, although teachers in a classroom are not always 
intending to bring about some learning, that is, teachers in a classroom are not always 
doing teaching activities. We should also admit that it is not true that only teachers can 
teach. A day-care centre worker may engage in teaching activities(p. 66). 
Notwithstanding, if we are to call something teaching, all teaching activity should 
involve, explicitly or at least implicitly, the intention of bringing about learning. 
On the other hand, Hirst's second claim that teaching is logically connected with 
learning might be arguable. Hirst seems to assume that the counterpart concept of 
teaching is learning and that there is a conceptual relationship between them. Pearson, 
by contrast, argues that 'teaching is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for 
learning', because 'teaching is not a necessary condition for learning' in that 'learning can 
take place without teaching' or professional teachers and teaching is also 'not a sufficient 
condition for learning' in that 'teaching does not imply learning'. Teaching can occur 
without learning, just as learning can also occur without intentional teaching(Pearson, 
1989, p.79). However, Pearson may confuse two different claims about a logical 
connection between teaching and learning: a) 'if teaching takes place, this logically 
implies that learning takes place, and b) 'we cannot understand the meaning of teaching 
without understanding the meaning oflearning'. If Hirst's claim is a), this may be false. 
But Hirst's claim is b) rather then a) and, thus, Hirst's assertion may be true even though 
a) is false. 
Is, then, Hirst's understanding of the relation between teaching and learning 
satisfactory in terms of social practices? Of course, Hirst's assertion shows a logical truth 
about teaching and learning; however, he does not furnish us with an understanding of 
teaching as a social practice in which teachers engage. By contrast, being dissatisfied with 
Hirst's conceptual analysis of teaching and learning, some would suggest a causal or 
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factual relationship between them 15. Seen in this way, teaching can be a causal, perhaps 
an effective, factor in learning. In particular, when we imagine school teaching or 
professional teaching, the relationship between teaching and learning may firmly be 
revealed, because a teacher's role as a professional is characterised as intending to bring 
about learning. However, we should not think that teaching is always bringing about 
successful learning, because teaching is a polymorphous activity and thus for effective 
or successful teaching other factors are needed. 
What we should not ignore is that, whether we take a logical or causal relationship, 
there is a possibility of unsatisfactory results in terms of social practices. The 
(over)emphasis on a logical relationship in school education might be inadequate in 
seeing the vivid dynamic relationship that can emerge between teaching and learning 
activity. On the contrary, the emphasis on a causal or factual relation may be apt to 
overlook the intimacy of the relationship between teaching and learning. How to 
overcome this dilemma? 
One of the best ways may be to see teaching as a social practice in which teachers are 
engaging. Teachers' activities here, of course, involve teachers' intention in that teachers 
have their overall purposes in accordance with ongoing traditions to which they belong. 
This intention, on the one hand, fits with pupils' own desires or interests in that the 
teachers' intention is not divorced from the real world in which they live. On the other 
hand, the teachers' intention can meet social demands in that teachers' overall purposes 
are reflections of current social practices and social traditions. This leads us to see 
teaching as a social practice. 
2. Is Teaching a Social Practice? 
Let me move on now to the issue of whether teaching is a social practice and if so, 
what kind of social practice it is. In fact, implicitly or explicitly, I have regarded teaching 
15It is necessary to make clear that a causal relation is different in kind from logical relation. We can say 
that 'X is a causal condition ofY if it is necessary or sufficient for occurrence ofY', i.e. X is empirically 
necessary to bring about Y; in contrast, 'X is a logical condition of Y if a thing's being X is logically 
necessary or sufficient for its being describable as Y', i.e. X is conceptually related to Y(Downie et. 
aI., 1974, p.74). 
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as a social practice. But is all teaching a social practice? This may not be so. An isolated 
instance of teaching can be called a teaching activity, but this does not yet make it a 
social practice, just as not all (social) activities constitute social practices. Isolated 
instances of teaching themselves are, to use MacIntyre's terms, more like bricklaying than 
like architecture. When we see teaching as a social practice, teaching means professional 
teaching, school teaching or university teaching. In this sense, our question can be 
modified into 'is teaching as a profession a social practice?' The brief sketch of this 
question seems to be helpful in understanding the nature of teaching as a social practice 
more clearly. If teaching is a social practice, as I suggested in Chapter 5, it must meet the 
following four conditions l6: i) a coherent and complex form of socially established co-
operative human activities, ii) a wider understanding of rules and teleoaffective 
structures, iii)achievement of internal goods and standards of excellence iv) development 
of a particular practice in accordance with ongoing traditions. Is teaching a coherent and 
complex form of socially established co-operative human activity? Is teaching a social 
activity which is based on a broad understanding of rules and teleoaffective structures? 
Does teaching promote the achievement of internal goods? Does teaching have its own 
developed traditions? 17 
To begin with, let us think of whether teaching is 'a coherent and complex form 
of socially established cooperative human activities'. This condition involves at least 
three elements: complex human activities, coherent human activities and socially 
established human activities. Accordingly, if some human activities are to be considered 
social practices, the activities should be not very simple ones, like kicking, but more or 
less complicated ones, like playing football, although there are still differences of degree. 
The activities should have not merely a complex form but also coherence within them. 
Furthermore, the activities as practices should be socially established by cooperation. 
Does teaching, then, satisfy these conditions? Teaching, at least school teaching, 
obviously meets these conditions, because school teaching is not only a complicated 
social activity which is grounded in the relationship between teachers and pupils, but it 
161 am here following the five criteria which I listed on pages 129 and 132. But for the convenience of the 
argument, I have here compressed 'human activities' (i) and 'social nature'(iv) to a single criterion, i.e. 
'social human activities' (i). 
17Pearson(l989) also examines teaching as a social practice in terms ofintemal goods, standards and rules 
of teaching. For the details, see pp. 88-93. 
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is also a socially well-developed activity systematised through long periods. It, therefore, 
cannot be fully understood in isolation from the background of educational institutions 
in which it occurs. Indeed, teaching is mainly established and developed by cooperation 
and ongoing internal debates within practitioners in a social practice of teaching. Hence, 
to engage in teaching activity is to become a participant as a practitioner in a public 
activity that is shared by other practitioners. These are necessary, not contingent, features 
of teaching as a profession. Teaching is, therefore, essentially a social practice. Teachers 
as agents of social practices (like chess players though the demands on them are more 
complicated than those on chess players) engage in a wide range of social activities in the 
course of pursuing their practice and their ways of seeing and doing are derived from 
traditions deeply embedded in the institutional settings in which teachers work. This 
entails that teachers change and improve their practice reflecting critically on the 
traditions of thought shaping their own practical experience(Langford, 1985, p.12). 
Secondly, related to the first point, teaching activities certainly involve some kind 
of understandings, rules and teleoaffective structures which Schatzki calls 'integrative' 
practices. Teaching activities as a profession presuppose that teachers as practitioners or 
agents have some understanding of students, institutions, educational aims, subjects, 
teaching methods, etc., and that teachers do teach in accordance with these 
understandings. Indeed, in an educational context, wider ranges of understandings 
regarding teaching and its related knowledge are necessarily required. According to 
Pearson(1989, pp. 93ft), they involve causal knowledge, normative knowledge, 
experiential knowledge, subject matter knowledge and general knowledge. Presumably, 
practical reasoning based on this knowledge is very important, since teaching is a 
complex social practice. It is important for the teacher to recognise, above all, that 
teaching should stand firmly on the integrative understanding of the social practice of 
teaching. 
All transmission activities are not necessarily composed of teaching activities. 
Teaching as a social practice may be a kind of rule-following activity; however, it is quite 
different from that of playing chess in that what is constitutive of teaching is mainly the 
intention of teaching rather than the rules of teaching. In this respect, we would say that 
the rules of teaching are by and large, if not totally, using Pearson's term, 'strategic' 
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rather than 'basic'(p.93). We might say, therefore, that, in the practice of teaching, the 
successful achievement of learning on the part of students must be important. 
Furthermore, strategies for this may also be crucial, since education in general and 
teaching in particular are connected with moral good; however, there may be 
controversial issues involved in what is to be accepted as the standards and what counts 
as appropriate strategic rules for teaching. Some strategies for that may be accepted, 
others are rejected(ibid.). To conclude, the fact that teaching is a rule-following activity 
is more or less clear; however, to specify the specific rules is not easy, because of their 
strategic nature. 
Thirdly, the fact that teaching is necessarily concerned with the achievement of 
internal goods is clear. It is also not difficult to identify external goods of teaching, such 
as money, status, prestige, and the like, because they can be achieved without engaging 
in the practice of teaching. What is really difficult is to identify what exactly the internal 
goods of teaching are. Are there any internal goods of teaching which can only be 
achieved by engaging in that practice? We can think of some possibilities. One could 
think of the intention and result of bringing about learning. However, what teachers 
intend in bringing about learning might be various, such as knowledge or skill, critical 
thinking, autonomy, serving God, and so on. But the intention to bring about learning 
may not be the internal good, since having this intention seems too easy to be an internal 
good which teachers can be striving to achieve. Furthermore, learning itself cannot be the 
internal good, since the learning is external to the teaching. One could think of excellence 
of teaching as the internal good of teaching. Presumably, to teach well- for instance, a 
teacher's clear, precise and logical teaching- may be to achieve internal goods of 
teaching. This teaching, generally speaking, would be better than illogical teaching. But 
it does not follow that logical teaching always brings good outcomes and thus is 
appropriate to all learners, since outcomes and appropriateness might be different 
according to learners' dispositions and ages. This shows us why what constitutes an 
excellence of teaching is so complex and controversial. To sum up, what is clear is that 
the internal goods of teaching should be identified, specified and achieved by 
participating in the practice of teaching. However, their specifications are less clear. They 
may be by and large dependent on ongoing social traditions to which one belongs and 
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thus they will vary according to social traditions in a broad sense. 
Lastly, one ofthe striking features of a social practice might be progression in the 
social practice itself. This is the requirement of the development and articulation, 
through ongoing traditions, of the 'practice itself, of 'understanding' of the practice and 
of the 'situation' in which the practice takes place(Carr and Kemmis, 1986, p. 165). This 
condition might not be a necessary or conceptual requirement of teaching as a social 
practice in a strict sense, because some teachers may not try to improve their practice, 
although teachers ought to be always concerned with the improvement of their own 
practice. Nevertheless, it is quite clear that the possibility of improvement is inherent in 
the practice, even if individual practitioners are not trying to improve. Indeed, many of 
the things which teachers do consist of a part of practices, and the practices are more or 
less elaborated and improved through ongoing traditions of practices in which they 
engage. 
In this case, of course, we can ask: how do standards of improvement relate to 
standards of excellence? As far as teaching is concerned, we may say that the standards 
of improvement are not so strict and straightforward, but rather flexible and open-ended 
in that the standards might be different depending on judgements made about teachers' 
achievement and who makes the jUdgements. The standards might appear differently 
from the teacher's and leamer's perspective. Let us think of a case: a student obtained 
historical perspectives, but failed to gain good scores at the university-entrance 
examination. In this case, from the teachers' perspective, the teaching of history is 
successful, because the reason for teaching is for students to acquire the historical 
viewpoint. In contrast, from the student's point of view, he or she may not satisfied with 
the results. Take another example. When certain teaching activities bring a good result 
in some students, but not in other students, how can we judge whether these teaching 
activities are successful or not? It may be controversial. On the other hand, the criteria 
of judgements might also vary from one society to another society, from certain periods 
to other periods within a society. For instance, for fundamentalist Muslims, their 
standards, presumably, are strictly limited religious matters whereas for the British 
standards will be very flexible. Within Britain, the standards will be quite different 
between the Victorian Ages and the current pluralist society. Hence, in short, the 
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standards of excellence and progress in the practice of teaching are not static, but rather 
they may undergo change over time and should be established through ongoing debates 
between practitioners who engage in the practice of teaching. 
So far I have argued why teaching is a social practice. Our conclusion is that 
teaching can be considered as a social practice involving dynamic interactions between 
pupils and teachers, although details of it involve many complex and controversial 
arguments. What is more, as Langford insists, we could say that 'teaching is best 
understood as a social practice carried on by teachers in accordance with a tradition and, 
therefore, that specific teaching activities owe much of their character to their place in 
such a practice' (Langford, 1985, p, 136). Although I have tried to show that teaching as 
a profession is basically a social practice, it still needs to be considered what teaching as 
a social practice means, how it can be distinguished from other practices and why it is 
important in an educational context. 
3. Understanding Teaching as a Social Practice. 
In order to get a fuller understanding of teaching as a social practice, it is helpful 
to begin with Langford's account of a social practice, that is, teaching as a social practice 
can be understood as an activity engaged in by teachers in accordance with a tradition. 
As I pointed out in Chapter 6, his account of teaching as a social practice shows the 
overall picture of teaching as a social practice, although he overemphasised social factors. 
In order to understand his account of teaching as a social practice, it is necessary to 
explain the crucial terms 'engaged in', 'teachers' and 'tradition' and their relationships. 
Indeed, these terms show us what is meant by teaching as a social practice and their 
relationship within it. 
It is necessary to address, above all, that teaching as a social practice is also, like 
other practices, a specific social activity 'engaged in' by practitioners, mainly teachers. 
In other words, insofar as teaching is a social practice, teaching must be focused on 
specific social practices themselves in which teachers engage rather than other social 
practices from which teachers are disengaged. This may have implications for the content 
of education. Indeed, the question of which social practices students should be initiated 
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into should come from social practices in which teachers have engaged18. Therefore, the 
criteria of whether a practice is successful or not are generated in the practice itself and, 
further, the development and the elaboration of social practices also rely largely on 
ongoing traditions of social practices in which teachers engage. 
The second element I shall consider, as it is closely related to the first, is tradition. 
Teaching has its own history and tradition that is constituted by the accumulating social 
practices in which teachers engage. This tradition provides not only directions for what 
to do and how to do it at a particular time as well as in the future by providing the way 
of seeing and doing, but also criteria for what social practices are successful through 
showing accumulated and articulated traditions of social practices. In this respect, 
teaching is inevitably confined within the broader context provided by the society and its 
tradition to which teachers belong. However, as pointed out in Chapter 5, we should not 
make the mistake of thinking that traditions are static, since the practice of teaching, as 
we can see in the case of teaching science with its paradigm shifts, has changed or 
developed. 
The third important point in the understanding of teaching as a social practice 
might be the teacher who is a practitioner and agent of teaching as a social practice. It is 
difficult for children to understand social practices properly in school without 
practitioners' perspectives, which practitioners see by interpreting ongoing traditions of 
social practices, since social practices themselves do not have 'bodies' or 
'organisms' (Langford, 1989, p.22, p.30). This, however, needs to be cautiously 
interpreted. Langford holds the view that social practices reflect and decide the character 
of teachers as their practitioners, not vice versa(ibid., p. 26). From this point of view, the 
role of teachers lies in seeking the overall purpose of teaching from ongoing traditions 
of social practices and in initiating pupils into social practices in accordance with the 
overall purpose. 
In the light of the above arguments, the relation of teaching as a social practice 
to practitioners(teachers), and to traditions of social practices here is internal. This can 
18This could also have implications for what kind of people are teachers. In an academic curriculum, it is 
necessary that, for instance, teachers of history should be people who have engaged in doing history. But 
this does not deny the fact that there are many social practices, which may be important in education, which 
many teachers may not have engaged in. As a matter of fact, not all teachers of environmental education 
are engaged in environmental action. 
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be explained as follows: teaching as a social practice is carried on by teachers as 
practitioners. What teachers as practitioners do is to initiate students into current 
pervasive social practices in accordance with the overall purpose of teaching. And the 
overall purpose of teaching and the content of teaching are provided by ongoing traditions 
of social practices. 
In a similar way, Hirst(l990, pp. 80ff) characterises the nature of teaching as a 
social practice as follows: firstly, teachers engage in the social practices; secondly, what 
teachers teach is dominant and successful practices; thirdly, successful practices are 
generated and developed in practice itself no matter what subject and area we are 
concerned with; and lastly, criteria of successful practices 'must necessarily be developed 
in this process and knowledge and control of human and social affairs are of the essence 
of successful social practices'(p. 81). Like Langford, Hirst assumes that teaching is a 
result of the ongoing social practices in which teachers engage. Beyond Langford, he 
indicates which social practices students should be initiated into. According to him, they 
are 'successful' social practices. They are always generated and developed within social 
practices themselves and justified by traditions of social practices. The choice of 
successful social practices depends heavily on teachers' judgement or, on some 
occasions, this may be clearly revealed by social traditions. 
When we see teaching as a social practice rather than in other ways, some strong 
points may be found: it can be faithful to the concept of teaching itself; it may be a 
possible way of bridging the theory/practice divide. First of all, as I have mentioned 
above, the social practice of teaching that may best be identified by participating in the 
activity is internally related to the concept of teaching. Teachers' activities, social 
practices and the contents of teaching are interrelated, so that it can be possible to provide 
a well-balanced education that contains a logical coherence among teaching, social 
traditions, educational contents and teachers and, at the same time, shows the dynamic 
relation which can occur among them. What is more, it is possible to escape the fallacies 
both of the rationalist approach and of the emotivist or relativist approach by grounding 
education on engagement in social practices themselves, not on universal reason nor 
individual feelings. 
Secondly, teaching as a social practice might provide an important clue as to how 
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we are to envisage the relationship between theory and practice. The debate between 
theory and practice in education 'comes down to the nature of teaching as a social 
practice' (Pearson, 1989, p.127). That is, the issue of how theory and practice are related 
in education can be seen as how the teacher initiates pupils into current pervasive social 
practices. Teaching as a social practice contributes to our understanding of the relation 
of theory to practice by showing us that education should start from a consideration of 
current social practices in which teachers engage, and by suggesting which social 
practices pupils should be initiated into. I shall be saying more about how the social 
practices view bears on the theory/practice divide in Chapter 8. 
So far, I have tried to show that teaching as a social practice should be understood 
in terms of the internal relation among social practices as contents of education, teachers 
as practitioners, and ongoing traditions of social practices as sources of criteria for 
internal goods and standards of excellence of teaching and of conceptions of the overall 
purpose of teaching. It should be acknowledged, however, that the nature of teaching as 
a social practice is not always clear. Of course, teaching as a social practice is clearly 
distinguished from other social practices, such as medicine, architecture, science, logic, 
etc., in terms of the overall purpose of practitioners who engage in the specific social 
practice. For instance, the overall purpose of teaching is to bring about learning, whereas 
that of medicine is to bring about healing or curing ill creatures and architecture aims at 
designing buildings, science at understanding scientific phenomena, and so on. 
The following two cases need to be approached carefully. Some would regard 
indoctrination, conditioning, preaching etc. as teaching or part of teaching in a broad 
sense. At first glance, these activities in a broad sense could be called teaching in that 
they are interpreted as bringing about learning something. But in a strict sense, these 
activities are distinguished from teaching in terms of their overall purposes. For instance, 
teaching is geared to 'tum children into adults', whereas indoctrination is geared to make 
them 'into perpetual children'(Hare, 1964, p.69). Conditioning aims at shaping one's 
particular behaviour or belief. Preaching is interested in belief in certain religious 
doctrines. Think about other examples outside school teaching, such as teaching someone 
to drive, teaching swimming, and so on. These examples can be regarded as social 
practices in that these are more or less complex social activities, with their own internal 
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goods, standards of excellence, rules, etc. However, we can hardly say that these practices 
are other instances of the same practice of teaching. They may be quite different social 
practices, since the practitioners, their internal goods and overall purposes, their traditions 
of social practices, etc. are fairly different, although we sometimes use 'teaching' of 
them. 
The following examples apparently show us how far teaching as a social practice 
is not clear. Let us take three cases: a hospital nurse and a nursery nurse; a nursery nurse 
and a nursery teacher; and a nursery teacher and a university teacher. For the first case, 
they have common that they both must be engaged in nursing as a social practice for the 
purpose of caring for clients. Their tasks, nevertheless, might be quite different. Indeed, 
a hospital nurse's task, presumably, may be to do typical work as a nurse, like injection, 
measuring pressure of blood and so on, whereas a nursery nurse's routine is to help 
children to play, like a teacher. For the second case, unlike the first case, the role of a 
nursery teacher and that of a nursery nurse are similar, although they have a different job 
and intend to engage in different social practices. Perhaps, the nurse's internal goal is to 
care for children who are ill, mentally or physically, whereas the teacher's main task is 
to teach the whole person. In a nursery school, the nurse's role is not entirely different 
from that of an assistant teacher. In the last case, a university teacher and a nursery 
teacher might engage in quite different practices, although they have teaching in 
common. The teacher in the university will provide students with critical thinking 
through lectures and discussions, whereas a nursery teacher's role is mainly playing with 
pupils. In this case, we may raise the following questions: is it possible to engage in 
different practices within the same practice, if the field of practice is different? In a 
nursery nurse and a hospital nurse and a nursery teacher and a university teacher, are their 
practices different practices or different parts of the same practice? Is it possible to 
engage in the same practice within different practices, if the field of practice is similar? 
How can we distinguish a nurse's role from a teacher's role in the nursery? This line of 
questions shows us that teaching as a social practice in the concrete context, like other 
practices, is less obvious than we might think. 
Secondly, some difficulties ofteaching as a social practice can also arise, when 
we teachers initiate children into successful or crucial social practices, since teachers 
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have different views as to what social practices are successful or crucial. Some teachers 
would think that what should be taught to students is rationality whereas other teachers 
would think that what teachers teach to students is social co-operation, though they are 
both engaged in the practice of teaching. This disagreement might often emerge under 
present conditions in which educational traditions have radically changed, since social 
practices are not static but ongoing and debatable within traditions, and, further, many 
different practices are carried on at the various times and places. Under this situation, to 
grasp the most defensible social practices into which students should be initiated may be 
controversial. There is inevitably the possibility that different teachers might be jUdging 
different practices to be successful out of those which are currently available in this area. 
This is one factor for making it difficult for us to understand teaching as a social practice. 
This difficulty may also arise when we tackle curriculum issues that I shall deal with in 
the next section. Before doing this, let me briefly make clear the relation of teaching to 
education. 
4. Teaching and Education 
The relationship between teaching and education is not simple, since their relation 
might be differently interpreted depending on how we define the notions of 'teaching' 
and 'education'. All kinds of teaching, as I have mentioned, are not necessarily 
constitutive of teaching as a social practice, and are not necessarily bringing about 
educated people. Education can also be defined in various ways. This, sometimes, refers 
to formal education or school education, sometimes it refers to informal education and, 
sometimes, it refers to formal and informal education all together. Their relationship also 
may be different according to different writers. Peters and Hirst(1970) seems to assume 
that teaching is not logically related to education, although learning is so(p.77). For 
Langford, the connection between teaching and education seems to be not a logical but 
contingent relation in that the questions 'what is teaching' and 'what is education' can 
be treated as separated questions. Is there any strong relationship between teaching and 
education? Formal education and teaching as a profession may be the case where there 
IS. 
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F onnal education and teaching as a profession are internally related. The logic for 
this runs as follows: schools are central institutions devised for the students' education. 
Teachers are professionals who are sent to the school for educating students. What 
professional teachers do within the institutions is to teach students in order to bring about 
educated people. This logic, however, might face some objections. Some aims of 
teachers might not be directly related to education19. Moreover, teachers do sometimes 
fail in bringing about educational achievement; however, at least in tenns ofthe overall 
purpose, that is chiefly bringing about learning which is connected with education, where 
the contents of learning are composed of social practices, we can say that teaching is 
logically related to education, regardless of the results of the teaching activity. Indeed, 
teaching is only a genuine profession to the extent that teachers are, according to 
Langford, able to make the educational quality of teaching their central professional 
concern(l985, p.18). 
We may say that teaching as a profession can be regarded as part of school 
education and, further, a typical case of school education. Put another way, teaching as 
a social practice is part of educational practices and, further, a typical educational 
practice. In this respect, we may get a clearer picture of education as social practices by 
exploring the practice of teaching as a profession, although there is always the possibility 
of a danger that education as social practices might unjustly be limited to school 
education. If we do not make this fallacy, to explore teaching as a social practice is 
helpful for grasping the specified picture of 'education as initiation into social practice'. 
In the next section, I shall tackle some curriculum issues and the teaching process which 
are central parts of teaching. 
B. Selecting Curriculum Content and Teaching Process 
In the previous section, I have sketched the overall nature of teaching as a social 
19 According to Downie, et. aI., teacher's aims are divided into five kinds: 'personal aims', e.g. opportunity 
for playing badminton; 'ancillary aims', e.g. encouraging his pupils to take an interest in their personal 
appearance; 'intrinsic aims', e.g. cultivating the mind; 'extrinsic aims', e.g. fitting pupils for employment; 
and 'complementary aims', e.g. learning chess. What this analysis of the aims of teaching as an occupation 
shows is, for present purposes, that all activities of teachers as professionals are not always directly related 
to education(1974, pp. 4-7). 
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practice. When we consider teaching as a social practice at a concrete level, it may 
include the following aspects: aims of education, selection of the content of curriculum2o, 
and the process of teaching. I have discussed in Chapter 6, to some extent, the aims of 
education in terms of social practices. All that I am concerned with here is the issues of 
selecting curriculum content and teaching process. Indeed, selecting curriculum content 
and curriculum development and teaching are not two distinct processes. Rather, the 
former is an essential part, and natural process, of teaching activity. In this section, 
therefore, I shall focus on how to select curriculum content and what the teaching process 
might be like, when we organise the curriculum in terms of social practices. What kind 
of contents will be included? What is the best way of organising the content of 
education? Which social practices are important, so that pupils need to be initiated into 
them? What are the differences between a subjects-based curriculum and a social 
practices-based curriculum in terms of (the selection of) the content of curriculum and 
teaching process? 
1. Insufficiency of the Cognitive Domain as the Content of Curriculum 
Let us start by discussing the scope of the content of education in schools. When 
we consider the content of education in schools, we are inclined to confine it to the 
cognitive domain, that is, knowledge as the basis of classroom practices. This tendency 
has been profoundly influenced by the Peters-Hirstian conception of liberal education, 
regardless of whether their intention was so. Indeed, Peters' emphasis on cognitive 
criteria of the conception of education, i.e. knowledge, understanding and cognitive 
perspective, and Hirst's emphasis on forms of knowledge tempted us to think of the 
cognitive domain as the educational content. Their theory seemed to end up as an unjustly 
narrowed interpretation of Wittgenstein' s 'language-games'. 
Wittgenstein's idea oflanguage-games seems to be interpreted in two ways: in 
a literal-narrow way and in a broad way. The narrow sense of language-games in 
education, used by some liberal educators, tends to stress certain theoretical or rational 
2°1 mainly use the term 'selecting or organising (the) curriculum (content)' at school or classroom level, 
rather than at an educational policy level. I am not directly concerned with the political issues of who 
organises the curriculum and who decides the curriculum content. 
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practices. To put this another way, liberal educators who take the narrow sense of 
language-games are often concerned with how to teach a language-game in a purely 
linguistic sense or, at best, how to understand disciplines, which are reflected in several 
forms of language-games. The Peters-Hirstian earlier view that stressed, at least 
implicitly, the understanding of the forms of knowledge or disciplines as language-games 
may be an example. Their logic seems to run as follows: education is connected to the 
understanding of forms of life. Understanding forms of life is possible through forms of 
knowledge or disciplines as several distinctive forms of language-game. Therefore, 
education is inevitably linked with the understanding of forms of knowledge or 
disciplines. 
This may be called into question: can forms of life be reduced to the forms of 
knowledge or disciplines? Forms oflife certainly involve several forms of knowledge 
or disciplines which, so far as language is concerned, are embodied in particular 
language-games. However, forms of life go far beyond even such a liberal sense of 
language-games. We may say thus that language-games in a literal or narrow sense lead 
us to the narrow sense of education as initiating students into several given forms of 
knowledge or disciplines. The aims of this education may lie in a better understanding 
of several given subjects and thus the content of education is inevitably restricted to the 
cognitive domain that can mainly be expressed in (propositional) knowledge. In this 
respect, we may rightly raise the question: is there any good reason for limiting the 
content of education to the cognitive domains? Why not skills, actions, emotions, and so 
on? This question leads us to take a broad sense of language-games. 
Language-games in a broad sense are seen as a reflection of forms oflife21 . For 
present purposes, this could be expressed as a constituent part of social practices. In this 
sense, as I have taken it in section B of Chapter 5, the claim that education is a kind of 
language-game means that education should primarily be understood in terms of forms 
oflife or social practices, rather than forms of knowledge or disciplines. This may at least 
in terms of the scope of content be a quite different picture from that in which education 
is seen as an understanding of forms of knowledge. Seen in this way, education is not 
limited to the theoretical knowledge or practices that are mainly expressed in the several 
21 Wittgenstein says: 'to imagine language is to imagine a fonn oflife'(PI, s., 19). 
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forms of sUbjects. Of course, to some degree, school subjects might be useful in revealing 
glimpses of our life, but they may inevitably have some limitations in the fuller 
understanding of forms of life as a whole, since real life is not always packaged by (the 
language of) subjects and, thus, we cannot fully grasp real life as a whole through 
understanding given subjects. For instance, think of the ten subjects of the National 
Curriculum (three core subjects: English, mathematics, science; seven foundation 
subjects: history, geography, art, music, physical education, technology and, at secondary 
level, a modem foreign language). We never think that these subjects involve whole 
forms of the human world, or even that they reflect current social practices of our society. 
In this respect, initiating students into forms of knowledge or subjects may not enable 
them to understand the real world as a whole, or even to cope with real-world problems. 
How can we escape this difficulty? 
One might think that Gardner's multiple intelligence theory may enable us to 
construct a broader content of education through including many other kinds of 
intelligent human activities, which are neglected in conventional intelligence tests. 
According to him, human intelligences are composed of seven (or eight) kinds of 
multiple intelligences, i.e. linguistic intelligence, musical intelligence, logical-
mathematical intelligence, spatial intelligence, bodily-kinesthetic intelligence, 
interpersonal intelligence, intrapersonal intelligence and possibly naturalist and spiritual 
intelligence(Gardner, 1993, part two). Gardner here extends the scope of the cognitive 
domain so that it includes these other intelligencies such as bodily- kinesthetic, personal 
and spiritual intelligence. This may suggest that the scope and content of curriculum 
should be extended in terms of (a broad sense of) human abilities. However, Gardner still 
does not consider other domains22, that is, he does not give a clear answer as to why 
human beings should be understood and evaluated in terms of intelligence rather than 
values, emotions, skills, etc. From this perspective, we may say that Gardner's theory, 
like the Peters-Hirstian, is rooted in a similar intellectual ground. 
In contrast to the intellectual tendency in education, someone might think of the 
content of education as action. Action research may be an example. Action research, 
22D. Goleman(l995) suggests that 'emotional maturity' may be more important than 'intelligence' in 
predicting one's performance. For a fuller discussion of Gardner's mUltiple intelligences from a critical 
stance, see White(l998a). One interesting point is the fact that he criticises multiple intelligence theory and 
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unlike liberal education, sees education as 'a process which centrally engages 
practitioners in improving aspects of educational practice'. This process 'becomes a 
prescription for action'. It thus is natural that action research is concerned with utilising 
a school based curriculum(Grundy, 1987, p. 50). This action research may contribute to 
educational theory as a whole in that it offers an internal relationship among conceptions 
of education, practitioner and educational practice. However, action research in 
educational practice too often emphasises 'practice' itself rather than 'education' or 
'educational practice', so that there might be a danger oflosing balance(Walsh, 1993, p. 
45). There is also a risk of confining too narrowly the sense of social practices in relation 
to educational content and teaching process, by focussing on specific teaching activity 
and the teacher's role rather than education as a whole. 
It must be said that both these two extreme positions, whether education as 
initiating students into forms of knowledge or as action research, may be flawed at least 
in seeing education as confined to school education, regardless of whether they stress 
knowledge or action. When we see education as 'initiation into social practices', school 
education is certainly important. It is also, however, necessary to consider life-long 
education in general and education outside school in particular, since the initiation of 
people into social practices can occur throughout the whole of working life and beyond 
that. 
What contents, then, can be possibly involved in social practices-based 
education? Of course, theoretical practices, like a variety of knowledge, can be included. 
Other kinds of human social practices, involving for instance affective domain and 
conative domain may also be included. Contents of education in terms of social practices 
include a variety of aspects of human life, such as thinking, creativity, feelings, emotions, 
passions, actions, dispositions, habits and so on, not restricted to the cognitive or (purely) 
linguistic domain. To put this in Bourdieu's way, 'all habituses' which are products of 
social practices may be contents of education, although he is interested in understanding 
social phenomena from the perspective of social practices rather than passing on good 
social practices or a particular kind of social practice23 . 
Hirst's forms ofknow\edge theory on the same lines. 
23Th is may also be Bourdieu's (and perhaps most sociologists') limitation. He may give a plausible 
description that all education (including academic or liberal education) is inevitably some kinds of social 
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So far I have argued that the content of education should not be limited to the 
cognitive domain. Rather, it includes teleoaffective structures such as virtues, emotions, 
dispositions, habituses and actions. What then does this mean? If we include these 
elements in education, is this sufficient for the content of education? It is more or less 
clear that the content of education should include not only the cognitive domain, but also 
affective and conative domains, and that' a mere list' of the aspects of human life, like 
a cafeteria menu, may be not enough for the content of education. Rather, the content of 
education in terms of social practices must be integrated into forms of life in general and 
aspects of experience in particular. Think of how we select academic or vocational 
subjects, for instance. We can hardly think that the content of education should consist 
of either academic or vocational subjects. This may be not enough. Rather, curricula 
should be designed to eliminate the gap between academic and vocational, since the two 
concepts are deeply melted into our social life. That is to say, various human aspects in 
education should be an integral part of the whole educational process. 
2. Some Limits of White's Compulsory Thesis 
Just as the assertion that the content of education is not confined to the cognitive 
domain but should be integrated into social practices as a whole seems more or less 
obvious, so does the assertion that the content of education, in whatever ways, should 
inevitably be selective, if it is impossible to initiate pupils into all social practices. Chess, 
for example, may not be included as a major content of the school curriculum. At best, 
it may be included as an extra-curricular activity in school education, although it must be 
a social practice. (In this regard, MacIntyre's chess example would be a disaster in terms 
of the content of curriculum.) Why cannot chess be a major subject, whereas mathematics 
is so? Is there any possibility of excluding mathematics from the school curriculum? 
Which social practices are important, so that people should be initiated into them in 
school? How to (and who) decides them? 
To tackle these problems, to examine White's distinction between Category I and 
practices, irrespective of whether the practitioners conceive this or not. This explanation, however, did not 
give certain positive guidance to school education. Our concerns that should be proposed in school 
education - how to organise social practices as the content of education? Which social practices people 
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II activities may be helpful, because this distinction seems to provide a useful 
philosophical argument for determining the content of the school curriculum at least in 
two ways. Firstly, it suggests one possible way of deciding which items are more (or less) 
important within education and thus which items should be selected in curriculum 
contents. Secondly, the idea of engagement in activities, which is his criterion for 
drawing the distinction, is especially relevant when we are considering social practices, 
although these two approaches are quite different. 
Before examining White's distinction, it is worth noting two points. The first 
point is that one of his contributions in relation to the content of education seems to lie 
in using 'activity-words', although he does not seem to recognise seriously the 
importance of this term. This implies that the content of education can be determined in 
terms of engaging in activities and, thus, that educational activities can (or should) be 
defined in terms of social practices, regardless of whether he recognises this or not. This 
may bring about a substantive change in teaching practice. For instance, so-called 
academic subjects or theoretical subjects, such as mathematics and science, can be seen 
as something teachers and pupils do, not as a lump of information that teachers inculcate 
into pupils' memory. This, in the end, helps to bridge the gap between studying 
mathematics and doing mathematics, between studying science and doing science, and 
so on. 
The second point is that White's distinction and a social practice-based 
curriculum may be different in terms of their starting point. White seems to have an 
assumption that education is concerned with a personal flourishing life. For White, 
personal or individual flourishing life is fundamental, although he does not deny that 
society is a necessary condition for it and also the activities which individuals choose will 
be by and large cooperative ones(1990). In contrast, in a social practices-based 
curriculum, the educational concern may lie in a flourishing society or often in 
flourishing social practices themselves. But it should not be interpreted that an individual 
or personal flourishing life is regarded as a vehicle for improving society or social 
practices. All I want to say is that a flourishing society goes far beyond personal well-
being. In other words, although personal well-being partly constitutes a flourishing 
should be initiated into? etc.- go beyond Bourdieu's thinking. 
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society, a flourishing society is more than the sum of personal well-being. The difference 
in assumptions inevitably leads to a difference in the content of the curriculum (and 
perhaps in the process of teaching). For White, in a flourishing life, certain activities are 
more essential than other activities. Hence, the questions of what constitutes the good life 
and, thus, which activities are most important educationally are fundamental in 
determining the content of curriculum. In contrast, the primary concern of a social 
practices-based curriculum lies in exploring what counts as substantive social practices, 
which are given by ongoing traditions of social practices and how we teach them. 
Let me tum now to White's distinction. According to him( 1973), the activities 
that one can engage in as part of educational activities can be divided into two categories: 
that in which 'no understanding of what it is to want X is logically possible without 
engaging in X'(Category I); and that in which 'some understanding of what it is to want 
X is logically possible without engaging in X'(Category II)24. Some examples for 
Category I are: communication in general, engaging in pure mathematics, engaging in the 
(exact) physical sciences, appreciating works of art, and philosophising. In Category II, 
the following examples are included: speaking a foreign language, cricket (or other 
organised games), cookery, and painting pictures (or writing poetry, or composing or 
performing music)(pp.25 ff, my italics). 
White's claim can be summarised thus: Category I activities of which 'no 
understanding of what it is to want them is logically possible without actual engagement' 
seem to be given definite priority in the school curriculum over the Category II activities 
of which 'some understanding of what it is to want them is logically possible without 
engaging in them'. On what grounds are Category I activities more important than 
Category II activities? His claim seems to be grounded in the following logic: children 
should engage in all possible kinds of activities during school life. But, in fact, this is 
impossible. Thus, it is necessary to select some crucial activities. Probably, the best way 
of selecting activities is for children to engage in certain activities that are unintelligible 
without such engagement. Category I activities are the cases. Consequently, students 
must be compelled to engage in Category I activities(1973, pp.37-8, pp.69ft). 
Is this logic sound? A line of immediate questions may arise: 1) can we make a 
24 It seems to be quite unclear what exactly 'what it is to want x' means, that is, whether 'what it is to want 
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sharp distinction between Category I and Category II activities in terms of engagement?; 
2) if we accept this distinction, is there any good reason why the activities of which 'no 
understanding of what it is to want them is logically possible without actual engagement' 
should be given a definite priority in the school curriculum over those of which some 
understanding is possible without such engagement?; and 3) even if we admit the priority 
of Category I activities, can this be a sound reason for claiming that the curriculum 
should be compulsory? Let me consider these issues in tum. 
White's distinction itself contains some controversial issues. I am not sure that 
Category I and Category II can be clearly distinguished in terms of engagement. Can 
Category II activities really be understood without engaging in those activities? Think of 
my own experience of a cricket game. Before I came to the UK, I had never come across 
a cricket game. I watched several cricket matches on TV here. I tried to understand the 
terms, rules, etc. of a cricket game. I still do not know how one team can win, how one 
can get scores, why in some cases a hitter runs and in other cases not, in which case a 
hitter is out, etc, etc. In this case, I may rightly raise the question: how is it possible to 
understand this game without engaging in this activity? White might respond in two 
ways: a negative and positive response. The negative response might be stressing the 
phrases 'some understanding' or 'to some extent', that is, Category II activities can be 
understood, to some extent, without engaging in them. However, I still would respond to 
that: can we properly say that, in my case, I have some understanding of the game of 
cricket? I would think not. The positive response might be the claim that one could fully 
understand without playing cricket, such as by reading a book about cricket. If this is his 
response, his conception of engagement would be too narrow in that playing cricket is 
identified with engaging in cricket. It seems to me that engaging in cricket is more than 
simply playing cricket. However, I do not contend that cricket belongs to Category I 
rather than Category II activities on the ground that it might be impossible to understand 
without actual engagement in it. It may be a matter of complexity of games rather than 
of different categories. What I want to point out is that the distinction between Category 
I activities and Category II activities in terms of engagement is much less clear than it 
appears. 
x' can be identified with 'what it is to understand x'. 
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We can raise a more fundamental question as to why White's distinction and thus 
his education put so much weight on understanding itself rather than other elements. For 
White, the distinction between Category I and Category II activities in turn can be 
reduced to a matter of understanding. That is, it is a matter of whether understanding is 
possible without engagement, not vice versa. In contrast, on the social practices view, 
understanding is by no means the main focus for the distinction nor for education, but 
rather engagement itself. From the perspective of social practices, understanding becomes 
a sort of by-product of the engagement, instead of the engagement being a means to 
understanding. Hence, what is important is the particular activities in which people 
engage, although to this should be added other elements for selecting the content of 
curriculum. Certainly, we cannot imagine that there is curriculum content in which 
nobody is engaged. This element is a necessary condition, although it is not a sufficient 
condition. 
Let me consider now the second question: whether the activities of which 
'understanding of them is logically impossible without actual engagement' are to be 
given definite priority in the school curriculum over 'those of which some understanding 
is possible without such engagement'. Why are Category I activities more important than 
Category II activities in the school curriculum? White's answer to this question seems 
to run like this: there is no way to understand Category I activities without engaging in 
them. If we do not intend for students to engage in Category I activities at school, in fact, 
students may not have the opportunity to engage in them and thus may not be able to 
understand them, whereas Category II activities, at least to some extent, can be 
understood without engagement with them and, further, even if they are not to be taught 
at school, (most of) these activities can also be experienced outside school. Therefore, 
Category I activities should be given priority over Category II. We, however, still can ask 
why the priority in the school curriculum should be given to Category I activities. Is this 
condition that the activities cannot be understood without engagement sufficient for 
giving them priority in organising the school curriculum? Is there any good reason for 
excluding some activities that do not belong to Category I, such as history, human 
science, etc.? 
White would say that his intention is that Category I activities should be included 
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in the school curriculum, but not that Category II activities are excluded. Furthermore, 
he would admit that some Category II activities are very important in the school 
curriculum, but for other reasons. For instance, history may be very important, although 
it does not belong to Category I activity, because it provides us with a civic requirement 
for being a good citizen. If these are his claims, the question of the priority of Category 
I activities is still unresolved and his justification for Category I activities is partial or 
weakened. Indeed, his overall justification of certain activities has to do with autonomous 
choice of intrinsically valuable activities, and his justification for Category I activities can 
be fully understood within this context, as far as The Compulsory Curriculum is 
concerned. This logic is something like this: if we choose certain activities from the 
extensive range of options in the school curriculum, in order to choose or reject these 
activities you should have sufficient understanding of them. Category I activities cannot 
be understood at all without engagement in the activities. Therefore, people ought to have 
the experience of engaging in Category I activities, because it is the only way of 
understanding them. It seems to me that the plausibility of this argument relies on the first 
argument; that is, White's claim that Category I activities should be given definite 
priority over Category II activities in the school curriculum would be plausible, if at all, 
if his claim that Category I activities can only be understood through engaging in them 
is correct. But the claim of whether Category I activities really cannot be understood at 
all without engaging in them is not clear. 
What is the real problem with White's argument for the priority of the curriculum 
content is rather that in White's argument the question of what is educationally most 
important is separated from the question of which activities are most important in 
themselves. If x is an activity which cannot be understood without engaging in it, then 
on White's argument x should be in the curriculum, regardless of whether x is an 
important activity in itself. However, even if we hold up the distinction, and even granted 
that this distinction applies to activities and thus practices, we still cannot directly apply 
it to the issues of which social practices should be given priority within the curriculum. 
This may be explained in the following way. Of course, as I said earlier, engagement in 
activities is important for pupils to come to have understanding of a wide range of social 
practices. But this is not yet an argument for initiating pupils into all those practices. If 
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there are some practices which people cannot understand at all, unless they are initiated 
into the practices, that may be a reason for initiating pupils into them, but not a sufficient 
reason. Although people cannot understand certain social practices without engaging 
them, there is no reason for selecting these practices, if they are not salient in a society 
or if they are trivial, or morally objectionable. Hence, for the social practices view, if a 
practice is important for a flourishing society, it is important that there are people 
engaging in it. 
The third question is closely linked with the second question. Even if we admit 
that Category I activities are more significant than other activities, we can hardly accept 
that Category I activities should constitute compulsory subjects. For, I pointed out earlier, 
the value of Category I activities is not obvious and, moreover, the issue of whether a 
compulsory curriculum is needed is also controversial. Hence, if White suggested that 
Category I activities can (or should) constitute a compulsory curriculum, then his view 
would be flawed. In a strict sense, it is one thing that Category I activities are important 
and it is quite another that Category I activities should be compulsory subjects. 
So far I have argued that White's argument for the distinction might provide a 
possible way for selecting the content of curriculum25, but his argument does not exactly 
fit the social practices view, even if we apply his principles of selection to social 
practices26 . The main reason, as I noted earlier, may be derived from fundamental 
differences in terms of starting points between White's liberal view and the social 
practices view. For White, for autonomous choice of activities, priority should be given 
to understanding as an aim in itself. That is, no judgement of importance comes into the 
25 Although he uses 'activity-words', his overall argument is not so different from the Peters-Hirstian earlier 
argument in that their claims ended in supporting liberal education and its subjects. Indeed, as White 
himself may admit, his Category I activities are similar to Hirst's forms of knowledge in terms of contents 
and ways of justification. Category I activities considerably overlap with forms of knowledge, although 
communication is not a form of knowledge, and history, human science, moral and religious knowledge, 
among the forms of knowledge are also not Category I activities. White's way of justification that is based 
on engagement is also partly similar to Hirst's justification that rests On intrinsic value. That is, White's 
answer for why Category I activities are important in the school curriculum is that Category I activities, 
negatively, cannot be understood without engaging in them and, positively, they are connected with 
autonomous choice of intrinsically valuable activities. Similarly, Hirst's answer for why forms of 
knowledge are important is that they are intrinsically worthwhile. They both do not present any further 
(forceful) reaSOns for their ways of justification. 
26This might be thus: a practice is a strong candidate for inclusion in the curriculum if i) it is important in 
the society, ii) there is no objection of, say, a moral or political kind to it and iii) it is impossible for people 
to understand it without being initiated into it. 
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argument, other than the subjective judgement made by each individual when one 
understands the activity. In contrast, the importance of a social practice is not something 
that can be left to individuals to decide for themselves. Nor is understanding an end in 
itself, but it is rather linked with bringing about a flourishing society through engaging 
in current crucial practices and in this sense understanding is nothing more than a by-
product of such engagement. Our upshot may be that White's argument as it stands is not 
satisfactory in determining the content of curriculum27. How, then, to determine 
significant social practices into which students should be initiated? 
3. Towards a Social Practices-Based Curriculum 
An alternative approach to the selection of curriculum may lie in selecting the 
content of curriculum on the basis of social practices, rather than of forms of knowledge 
and understandings, or even modes of activities. The organisation of curriculum that is 
based on social practices is entirely different from that of curriculum that is based on 
forms of knowledge and understanding, as far as the ground and process of the selection 
of curriculum are concerned. 
In terms of the criterion of the selection, a social practices-based curriculum, to 
a large degree, rests on the social practices of everyday life, whereas a knowledge and 
understanding-based curriculum, more or less, relies on traditionally established 
disciplines under the name of intrinsic value(s). 
On the other hand, in terms of the process of organising the curriculum, a 
knowledge-based curriculum tends to address subjects as the core of forms of knowledge. 
An organiser of a knowledge-based curriculum may be mainly concerned with how we 
27White and O'Hear(l991) have more satisfactorily modified the content of curriculum from the 
perspective of personal well-being as citizens of a liberal democratic society. This may be outlined as 
follows: 1) personal qualities: personal concerns, social involvement and concern for others, and critical 
and reflective awareness. 2)three areas of knowledge and understanding: personal, social, scientific and 
technological. 3) experiences of the arts(all the arts, the appreciation of the built environment and natural 
beauty). 4) four areas of practical competencies: communication and numeracy; physical movement, health 
and safety; social interaction; planning and organisation(pp. 11-16). This content is more like the later 
Hirst's categorisation. From this perspective, we may ask what are the differences between the good life-
based curriculum and social practices-based curriculum. This may depend on how to understand the relation 
of the good life to social practices, that is, depend on whether the good life encompasses social practices 
and social practices imply the good (life). See next sub-section. 
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can categorise forms of knowledge into several foundation subjects. This seems to 
presuppose a line of underlying assumptions: if we have a fuller understanding of forms 
of knowledge, then skills, emotions, attitudes, etc., which are related to particular forms 
of knowledge, may be brought out; if we can get those characteristics, then we would live 
a flourishing life; and, therefore, if pupils are initiated into forms of knowledge, they 
would live good lives. These assumptions, however, may be defective in that 
understanding knowledge does not guarantee living the good life. Indeed, many 
knowledgeable people are not always living a happy life. In contrast, a social practices-
based curriculum may have to do with practical activities of everyday social life, such as 
shopping, eating, health care, travelling, etc. Hence, someone who supports a social 
practices-based curriculum, presumably, may start by looking at a variety of current 
pervasive social practices in which many people (including him or herself) engage. 
Through engaging in these social practices, one can achieve knowledge, skills, attitudes, 
etc., which are related to these social practices. Then, one may be mapping or theorising 
these social practices systematically through reflection on social practices. In this respect, 
basic social practices themselves are more fundamental than subjects in organising the 
curriculum in that subjects or theoretical activities are secondary elements of human 
lives, rather than primary ones. 
When we organise the curriculum in this way, which social practices can children 
be initiated into? This may be different according to the traditions of social practices to 
which someone belongs, since different societies may have different forms of life and 
thus involve different social practices. According to Hirst(1993b), basic social practices, 
into which pupils should be initiated, are roughly divided into the following six main 
areas: 
1) Social practices concerned with coping with the physical world (e.g., motor 
skills, food, health, safety, domestic and environmental circumstances). 
2) Communication social practices (e.g., reading, writing, conversing, numeracy 
and information technology). 
3) Social practices involved in the relationships of personal andfamily life. 
4) Wider social practices (e.g., local, national and world relationships and 
institutions, work, leisure, economic matters and law). 
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5) Social practices of art and design (e.g., literature, music, dance, painting, 
sculpture and architecture). 
6) Social practices concerned with religious belieft and fundamental values(pp. 
35-36, italics in original). 
Let me put forward some observations on Hirst's category of basic social 
practices. At first glance, his classification of the basic social practices seems to 
encompass the everyday practices which contemporary ordinary English people may 
experience. However, many instances of this classification of social practices may often 
overlap. To take some examples: food, safety, domestic circumstances, etc. are important 
in keeping good relationships in personal and family life as well as in coping with the 
physical world. Communication may play a crucial role in any social practices, 
particularly, family life, wider relationships and religious life. Art and design may be 
related to leisure, and so on. 
Secondly, in fact, the overall content of the six main areas is, to some degree, 
overlapping with White's Category I and II activities and even the ten foundation subjects 
of the National Curriculum28, although the principle ofthe selection of the curriculum is 
entirely different. Most of White's Category I and II activities including communication 
and appreciating art may also belong to basic social practices. Many basic social practices 
may involve the foundation subjects including technology, art, music, and so on. Of 
course, a social practices-based curriculum and knowledge-based curriculum can 
coincidentally overlap. The real difference between them seems to lie in their answer as 
to why these practices or subjects should be selected. In fact, one of the problems of the 
1988 Education Reform Act is that it does not give a (sufficient) reason why these 
subjects are important, if the acquisition ofknow1edge and understanding is addressed. 
Indeed, in a knowledge-based curriculum, as shown in the Peters-Hirstian theory, the 
value of subjects is often taken for granted under the name of intrinsic value(s). In this 
curriculum, thus, the traditional subjects are accepted without any doubt. By contrast, in 
28 Surprisingly, the basic common curriculum of Korea (year three to year ten, i.e. the first year of high 
school) is, to large degree, consistent with the ten foundation subjects in the UK. The ten compulsory 
subjects of Korea National Curriculum: moral education, Korean language, mathematics, social studies, 
science, physical education, music, fme arts, practical arts(technology and home economics) and English, 
see 1996 Education Reform in PCER report(l997). 
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a social practices-based curriculum, the issue of why certain social practices are 
important in school seems to be determined in the light of their significance for current 
human living in a society. In other words, certain social practices can be selected for the 
school curriculum, if and only if these practices penetrate our everyday life and are also 
influential for contributing to the good society and life, although there is room for 
different understandings of what counts as the good society and life. Why, as I have 
shown in note 27, White's and Q'Hear's structure of content is fairly similar to Hirst's 
later classification can be explained in terms of their sharing current social practices in 
philosophy of education. In this sense, we may say that White's and Q'Hear's structure 
of the content can be understood as a kind of plea that British education should be based 
on the promotion of the human flourishing of citizens of liberal democracy, which is one 
of the current substantive social practices in the UK29. 
Lastly, these basic social practices can take at least slightly different forms 
according to the spatial and temporal conditions to which someone belongs. Presumably, 
pervasive basic social practices of Britain in the 1990s are quite different from those of 
Britain in the 1940s and from those of contemporary Korea, since forms of life may differ 
in their temporal and spatial conditions. These differences may be found in Education 
Acts (1944 Education Act, 1988 Education Reform Act) and thus in the construction of 
curriculum. Then, some would raise a question: how can we understand the similarity 
except for moral education between the ten foundation subjects in England and the ten 
compulsory subjects in Korea? This may be explained in two ways: partly because of 
westemisation (and/or globalisation) of Korean education and thus the sharing of 
educational contexts. And partly because Korean (and/or English) curriculum content 
does not rely on its own educational practices3o. Whether or not we accept either reason, 
nevertheless, we may admit that Korean education is different from other countries' 
29This claim of White's can be explicitly found in his 'New Aims for a New National Curriculum'(1998b). 
In this paper, he argues that the aims and content of education are rooted in democratic values and thus they 
should be determined by democratic procedures. In addition, English peoples' attitudes are also surprisingly 
consistent with Hirst's and White's in that they regard literacy, numeracy, communication, social or 
information technology skills, etc. as important social practices. For details of this, see QCAlMORl(1998) 
and QCA(1998). 
30G. Haydon(l997) seems to share the latter reason. According to him, the aim (and thus the content) of 
curriculum is dependent on 'a context of tradition and existing institutions'; however, the National 
Curriculum offered nothing new, because it is grounded in 'what, in practice, has become a canon of 
subjects which is recognised across most of the world(pp.16-7). 
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education. Think of the place of moral education, for instance. Unlike western countries, 
in Korean educational history over thousands of years, moral education as a 
(independent) subject plays always a key role among other subjects, while it has also been 
thought that all subjects should incorporate moral education. Furthermore, schools have 
been taking the central role in moral education(PCER Report, 1997, p.78). This shows 
us that social practices can be different according to temporal and societal conditions, 
although the differences are often undermined. 
How can we determine the content of the curriculum? Is there any principle for 
that? In a strict sense, in the social practices view, there may be no principle of the kind 
which rationalists hold for selecting curriculum content. If there is a principle, curriculum 
content should be selected on the basis of current pervasive social practices. Indeed, 
social practices themselves and their traditions can offer a plausible basis for determining 
the content of curriculum. In what way, then, can (traditions of) social practices 
themselves be a persuasive basis for determining the content of curriculum? 
Firstly, social practices suggest that, whatever the contents of the curriculum are, 
the words we use to label the items in the curriculum should be words naming activities 
rather than disciplines or bodies or knowledge. This means that the content of the 
curriculum must be determined by reflection on (traditions of) social practices in which 
one(society) engages rather than by certain kinds of predetermined knowledge or subjects 
which are more or less divorced from social reality. By doing this, we can close the gap 
between propositional knowledge and performative knowledge, between studying 
subjects and doing subjects. 
Secondly, (traditions of) social practices as a basis for determining the content of 
the curriculum are directed towards the good life and good society, since social practices 
are intimately linked with the achievement of internal goods and are also connected with 
virtues. Hence, successful social practices that are selected for the curriculum may be 
judged by their moral and social values. In this sense, as Hirst has pointed out, moral and 
social values may be 'at the very centre of what constitutes a successful practice'(1990, 
p. 81). Eventually, education can be seen as initiating students into a complex of 
successful and substantial social practices; these social practices constitute a flourishing 
life that is fundamental to education(Hirst, 1993a, p. 197). 
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Thirdly, (traditions of) social practices can meet the demands of the real world, 
because social practices are fundamentally grounded in everyday life, not the logical or 
hypothetical world. The activities of everyday life, such as shopping, mass-media, 
vocation, reading novels, etc. reflect vivid real (forms of) human lives. These activities 
which are socially constructed may be important in everyday life and, thus, could be 
constitutive of the content of education. Of course, I do not claim that all concerns of 
everyday life should be included in the content of the curriculum. My assertion is rather 
that, if something is involved in the content of the curriculum, it must be grounded in our 
real life and thus selected due to the importance of our practical life. 
Fourthly, (traditions of) social practices are, as I have shown in section B of 
Chapter 5, not static, but dynamic. This may be so in two senses: one is that the tradition 
of a social practice itself can be changed or developed by internal ongoing debates, the 
other is that changes and developments of social practices in one area may affect social 
practices in other areas. In many cases, to identify social practices is not so easy, due to 
ongoing debates within them. Think of the nature of education, for example. The main 
stream of the (theoretical) practices of education in western countries, roughly speaking, 
has shifted from (in 1960-70s), liberal education as the pursuit of rationality to (in 1970-
80s) liberal education as the promotion of personal autonomy and personal well-being, 
and to (in 1990s) education as initiation into social practices. (These trends may be 
influenced by sociology or social philosophy, this may also bring changes in other areas). 
This shows that social practices may be subjected to constant criticism and thus can be 
changeable. Some would think that current British philosophy of education practice is 
linked with human flourishing, rather than social practices. These debates themselves 
also constitute important social practices. 
Lastly, (traditions of) social practices as a basis for determining the content of the 
curriculum can provide a stronger justification than the transcendental argument that 
relies on forms of knowledge, or justification relying on engagement, or even justification 
resting on personal well-being within a liberal democratic society. For, these 
justifications are not grounded in the real world or limited to certain societies, whereas 
the justification of social practices is grounded in the real world that consists in practical, 
social, political and moral practices. From this perspective, Hirst's assertion that 'the idea 
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that curriculum might be organised in terms of significant social practices is thus not 
merely a contingent matter. Such organisation, rather than attention to forms of 
knowledge, becomes a necessary demand' is quite right(ibid., p.197). 
The question of how a social practices-based curriculum content is determined 
which I suggested above may be clearer with an example. Think of environmental 
education. Which practices should pupils be initiated into or discouraged from engaging 
in? (Indeed, curriculum content may involve not only initiating pupils into desirable 
practices, but also discouraging pupils from practices which have undesirable 
consequences.) Take 'the school run' as an example. Many parents drive their children 
to and from school in every weekday morning and afternoon. It is estimated that in 
certain areas at certain times of day about one-third of all traffic consists of cars doing the 
school run. This leads to traffic-jams and results in wasting of fuels, oil pollution, and so 
on. The British government has recently called for measures to reduce this, and some 
schools are trying to encourage children to walk to school. Indeed, new practices are 
growing up around this idea, e.g. children walking to school in a group, the clearing of 
footpaths for children to walk along, etc. This example shows why certain social practices 
are important and thus pupils should be initiated into theme or discouraged from 
undesirable practices). 
So far I have discussed a broad category of social practices in relation to the 
content of education, and traditions of social practices as the basis for selecting 
curriculum content. However, I do not intend here either to judge whether Hirst's 
categorisation is sound, or to discuss whether certain social practices should be included 
(or excluded) at a concrete level, since the issue of which social practices are basic or 
substantial can be contestable. Instead, in the following sub-section, I shall pick out some 
basic social practices which seem to be seen as substantial in this society and consider 
their teaching process in school education. This may provide us with some implications 
for social practices-based teaching. 
4. The Content of Curriculum and Teaching Process 
Before considering the teaching process of a social practices-based curriculum, 
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in order to avoid unnecessary misunderstanding, let me note two points. Firstly, as hinted 
above, I do not propose a social practices-based curriculum as a ground for a compulsory 
curriculum. Of course, as I have argued so far, I am more or less sceptical of the view that 
forms of knowledge, Category I activities, personal autonomy, participation in democracy 
and even personal well-being can provide us with incontrovertible grounds for the 
compulsory curriculum. From this, some would be tempted to think that I am suggesting 
that a social practices-based curriculum is the only ground for a compulsory curriculum. 
This might be true, if and only if a compulsory curriculum is necessary. However, I am 
not sure whether a compulsory or common curriculum for a whole society is necessary 
from the perspective of social practices, since to initiate pupils into social practices is 
possible in school education, as well as outside school and, furthermore, different 
teachers in different schools would try out different things. Hence, my concern does not 
lie in arguing that a compulsory or common curriculum is necessary and, furthermore, 
claiming that a social practices-based curriculum should be compulsory. Rather, my real 
assertion is that, if the selection of content is inevitable, (selection of) the content of 
curriculum should be based on current pervasive social practices, regardless of whether 
a compulsory or cornmon curriculum is necessary and of whether a social practices-based 
curriculum can be compulsory. 
The second point that I want to note is that a social practices-based curriculum is 
not contentless, although I have not spelled out a detailed mapping of its curriculum 
content. Someone who is accustomed to a knowledge or subjects-based curriculum would 
have dissatisfaction with a social practices-based curriculum in terms of the content and 
its arrangement, because this curriculum, unlike a subjects-based curriculum, may appear 
as neither logical nor coherent. In some sense, a social practices-based curriculum may 
have this character. Nevertheless, we may say that a social practices-based curriculum 
does have certain contents. What is a striking feature of a social practices-based 
curriculum, unlike a subjects-based curriculum, is that educational contents and their 
contexts are never taken for granted. 
Of course, a social practices-based curriculum might involve certain subjects that 
are emphasised in traditional curricula, such as mathematics, science, history, art, etc. But 
the reason why these subjects should be included in the curriculum may be quite different 
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between a subjects-based and social practices-based curriculum. In a subjects-based 
curriculum, there seems to be no good reason as to why mathematics, science, history, 
art, etc. are important and thus should be included in the curriculum. People who hold a 
subjects-based curriculum would claim that mathematics is important for developing 
mathematical thinking, science for understanding of scientific phenomena, history for 
historical outlook, art for aesthetic perspective, and so on. In fact, as I have pointed out, 
their criteria for the selection of curriculum seem to be not clear, although subjects-based 
curriculum organisers would say that these subjects are intrinsically worthwhile. But 
again why are these subjects intrinsically valuable? Why should these subjects have 
canonical authority? 
In contrast, a social practices-based curriculum is quite different from a subjects-
based curriculum in several ways. Firstly, in a social practices-based curriculum, unlike 
a subjects-based curriculum, certain subjects, such as mathematics, science, history, art, 
etc., are not taken for granted. There is no reason why these subjects should be included 
in the content of the curriculum in every society at every time. Some particular subjects 
may not be included in the curriculum in some societies at certain periods. For instance, 
in the Middle Age of Korea, art, music, business subjects and even some scientific 
subjects, such as astronomy, were excluded or at least not encouraged in the curriculum 
for the elite. 
Secondly, and more importantly, even if the above subjects, such as mathematics, 
science, history, art, etc., are selected for the curriculum, the reason for the selection, as 
I have indicated, lies not in the significance of knowledge for its own sake or of its 
canonical status, but in the necessity or importance of these subjects for everyday life and 
for a flourishing society. For instance, mathematics is very useful in handling data, 
planning the budget of home economy, such as shopping, income, etc., and so on, science 
may be important for understanding and improving the physical world, history for 
reflecting on the history of human (flourishing) lives, art for appreciating paintings at an 
art gallery and producing paintings, and so on. Some would claim that these reasons for 
a social practices-based curriculum are purely extrinsic. But, it seems to me, to engage 
in these activities is not purely instrumental, but rather is an essential part of maintaining 
a flourishing society. 
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So far, I have argued that traditional subjects, from the perspective of a social 
practices-based curriculum, are not necessarily taken for granted, and that they can be 
selected if and only if they are substantive social practices in everyday life and significant 
for a flourishing society. In this sense, we might say that essential and substantive cross-
curricular themes, their related subjects and skills3 ! are more important than the ten 
subjects in terms of a social practices-based curriculum. The reason is that these are 
'useful, relevant and worthwhile' for pupils' everyday life in the real world: 'useful' 
because pupils can easily use knowledge and skills to make decisions or to solve 
problems occurring in everyday life; 'relevant' because these themes are closely related 
to their (flourishing) life, whether individually or socially; and 'worthwhile' because 
these encourage them 'to look around them, to understand the responsibilities that human 
beings have in looking after the planet and to recognize that human actions have 
consequences'(Radnor, 1994, pp. 26-7). Indeed, pupils can easily find these themes and 
skills as part of everyday life in the classroom, family and community, and these 
comprise crucial aspects of our real world. From this perspective, as Hirst has pointed 
out, we may say that consideration of cross-curricular themes and skills in the National 
Curriculum is at least some recognition of 'the value of education in social practices of 
great variety'(1993b, p.37). Hence, we may say that cross-curricular themes make 
possible a deeper understanding of current social practices and the real world than the ten 
subjects, although these themes are, in fact, not a legal requirement of school education 
at all. 
To turn now to the more central point. How can we describe the teaching process 
from the perspective of a social practices-based curriculum? This issue is important, 
because teaching process shows us general features of a social practices-based 
curriculum. I do not contend here that there is necessarily a major and clear-cut difference 
between the processes appropriate to a subjects-based and appropriate to a social 
practices-based curriculum. (Teaching process is a 'symptom' rather than a 'criterion' for 
31According to the NCC document(l990), five cross-curricular themes are: health care, environment, 
citizenship, economic and industrial understanding, and careers education and guidance. Related subjects 
are: rural studies, environmental studies, social studies, humanities, drama, business studies, active tutorial 
work, careers, health education, political studies, peace studies, industrial studies, industrial experience, 
European studies, economics and computer science. And cross-curricular skills: communication, numeracy, 
study, problem-solving, personal and social, and information technology. 
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curriculum). Given this premise, it might be useful to show general features of the 
teaching process of a social practices-based curriculum by comparing it with that of a 
subjects-based curriculum. Firstly, an aim of social practices-based teaching lies in 
contributing to a flourishing society and social practices by actual engagement in them, 
whereas an aim of subjects-based teaching lies in understanding itself. Hence, although 
both might involve, say, teaching on environmental education, subjects-based education 
and practices-based education could be different in terms of aim. Secondly, a subjects-
based curriculum and a social practices-based curriculum may involve different teaching 
methods. A social practices-based curriculum may prefer a practice-centred teaching 
method, whereas a subjects-based curriculum may prefer a teacher-centred teaching 
method. Put more concretely, teacher's and pupil's role between the two teaching 
methods may be different. In practice-based teaching, the teacher's and pupil's roles are 
not completely different in what they are doing in that they both together engage in the 
social practices at issue, whereas the teacher's and pupil's roles in teacher-centred 
teaching are clearly distinguished: the teacher's role is transmitting, or even inculcating, 
knowledge that is related to each subject in a more or less well organised way; on the 
contrary, the pupil's role is acquiring knowledge that is transmitted by teachers - in fact, 
in many cases, pupils remain at the rote learning-forgetting repetition level. Furthermore, 
practice-centred teaching may be more flexible and varied than teacher-centred teaching 
in terms of teaching method. 
To consider cross-curricular themes may be helpful for this purpose, because 
most of these themes are crucial topics, which are based on substantive social practices, 
and, eventually, teaching process can show some striking features of a social practices-
based curriculum. To this end, let me pick out two cross-curricular themes: citizenship 
and environment education. 
First of all, think of citizenship education32. How can we bring children up as 
having citizenship so that they contribute to maintaining a flourishing society? In a social 
practices-based curriculum, the teaching process is not limited to transmitting knowledge 
and discussion. Rather, it is more flexible in that teachers (and students) use a wider 
32 My intention here is not to provide philosophical argument for citizenship education, but to show a 
possible teaching process of citizenship education from the perspective of a social practices-based 
curriculum. For philosophical arguments for citizenship education, see P.White(1996) and Callan(1997). 
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range of teaching methods and resources, and that, further, the scope of teaching methods 
is extended to work outside school as well as within school. Perhaps, first-hand 
experience, exploratory activities, audio-visual media, interviews, case collection, 
enquiry projects, participatory approach, group discussions, collaborative teamwork, 
exemplification, role-play, simulations, special events (e.g. citizenship campaign day, 
environment week, etc.), visiting related organisations, etc. may be included. In order to 
appropriately understand the process of citizenship education in terms of social practices, 
therefore, we need to remember that teaching processes for citizenship education may 
take a variety of forms. And, more importantly, what we should bear in mind with regard 
to the teaching process of citizenship education is that this theme is selected because of 
the substantive social practices which are significant for a flourishing society as a whole. 
This implies that teaching process should be linked with real life. (These two points may 
be similarly applied to environment education and other social practices.) In summary, 
one of the distinctive characters of a social practice-based curriculum can be found in a 
variety of teaching method. But the most striking feature of it may lie in its intimate 
connection, and thus relevance, to the current pervasive social practices. 
Then, how can we initiate pupils into citizenship as basic social practices, which 
involves acquiring knowledge, skills, attitudes and values linked together? The process 
might follow these steps: in the first phase, the teachers' task is to initiate pupils into the 
basic social practices. This would include equipping them with basic knowledge, skills, 
attitudes and values in an integrated way. To do this, understanding citizenship as 
interweaving knowledge with activity through practical and productive ways is important. 
It may be possible through ascertaining pupils' needs in relation to citizenship at a 
primitive level, identifYing citizenship in real-life situations such as the family, the school 
and the community life, mapping social practices in the area of citizenship and linking 
the pupils' concerns with society's concerns. In this stage, the following teaching 
activities might be included: for making communication, explaining basic terms, e.g. 
freedom, justice, democracy, citizenship, racism, pluralism, etc.; mapping the category, 
such as multi-cultural, multi-ethnic, muti-faith, multi-lingual issues on citizenship; 
investigation of population of the UK by ethnic group, language, faith, etc.; collecting 
cases of sexual or racial harrassment experience in school aIid society, and so on at their 
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level. 
In the second phase, the teacher's task may be to stimulate pupils to realise the 
significance of citizenship at a personal and social level through participating in practical 
citizenship experiences. Pupils find out what they need to know in order to complete the 
activity and then reflect on and discuss the experience that has taken place. In this stage, 
a day visiting the centre for multicultural education or participating in its activities, a 
half-day attending a debate in Parliament, a half-day auditing the process of judgement 
of a Law Court, individual or small group experience of various organisations, etc. might 
be included. 
This leads to a third phase, in which the teacher's task is to encourage critical 
reflection on citizenship issues. Interactive and proactive activities may give pupils 
opportunities to engage in observing, organising, identifying, discussing and debating. 
Indeed, through participation or experience of various citizenship-related practices, and 
through discussing and sharing others' different experience, pupils may develop their 
own judgement as citizens. Sometimes, role-play, for example, 'bullying in school', 'the 
pain of racism' may be helpful in understanding the importance of citizenship. Through 
these processes, pupils may become equipped with practical reasoning, that is, they may 
acquire wisdom as to how to live as good citizens in a plural society. So pupils may 
recognise that citizenship is significant for living a flourishing life, as well as keeping a 
sane society, and that citizenship as social practices is intimately connected to other social 
practices, such as, environment education, health education, and so on. 
In the last phase, the teacher's task is to encourage pupils not only to use their 
practical reasoning, but also, ultimately, to contribute to promoting citizenship in their 
own way and their places and, further, to promoting a flourishing society as a whole. The 
following activities might be included: participation in decision-making and elections, 
exercising rights, duties and responsibilities, working collaboratively, commending or 
protesting actions of schools, mass-media, local store, borough, and so on. 
Let me now consider the second example, the teaching process of environment 
education. The ways of initiating pupils into environment-related basic practices, 
presumably, are various. One possible way at primary or secondary level may be for 
pupils to recognise the necessity or importance of the preservation of environment 
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through finding and collecting cases of the destruction of the environment and its results. 
The possibilities are various: for instance, air pollution, water, landscape, waste, 
technology, destruction of the ecological balance, deficiency of natural resources. These 
cases can be got through mass-media, such as television, newspapers, magazines, etc.; 
observations, like directly going to a road and seeing the pollution by cars; reading books, 
and so on. Through being in contact with these problems, some pupils may feel that the 
environment is not distant from our life and, furthermore, recognise its importance, at 
least at a surface level. Some pupils might have difficulty in describing these phenomena 
and, furthermore, understanding why these problems are happening. Some people may 
have difficulty in identifying whether a particular case is the case or not. Considering a 
variety of situations, teachers should equip their pupils with a minimum understanding 
of basic terms and skills in order to enable them to communicate and solve their 
problems, such as basic terminology- ' pollution', 'acid rain', 'ozone', 'greenhouse 
effect' according to pupils' level. Sometimes, the teacher needs to categorise the variety 
of environmental matters, such as home, school, workplace, urban, natural, social 
environment. 
In the second stage, the teacher may let pupils participate in environment 
education-related activities, such as participating in the Green Peace movement for a 
week, in a conservation group, and so on. Through practical experience of them rather 
than just through their imagination, they may more clearly recognise the seriousness of 
matters. Then, sharing their experience and discussing. Through these processes, pupils 
may recognise that this issue is not single issue, but is related to other issues, such as 
citizenship, health care, and so on. This may lead to more systematic understanding of 
these issues. 
In the third stage, the teacher tries to give more balanced knowledge, and to 
provide an opportunity for critical examination and deeper understanding of environment 
issues. This may be possible through the following processes: for instance, through 
watching videos on 'destruction of natural habitats', discussing the' impact of technology 
on environment' and providing a variety of knowledge and perspectives that relate 
physical, geographical, biological, sociological, technological, ethical, etc., points of 
View. 
209 
In the last stage, the teacher encourages pupils to make decisions for generating a 
better social environment by considering or prescribing how to participate in 
environmental projects in their situation at a practical level, such as, participation in 
reducing litter and waste; participating in recycling projects by sorting into different types 
of materials, such as metal, plastic, glass, paper, etc.; using recycled paper; protecting 
wildlife; involvement in conservation groups. 
So far I have tried to show the overall teaching process of a social practices-based 
curriculum by taking as examples citizenship and environment education33 . According 
to the above argument, the teaching process of a social practices-based curriculum is 
portrayed as a practice-centred approach which starts with pervasive social practices, but 
also aims at flourishing social practices and a flourishing society, for example, 
participating in resolving or ameliorating environmental problems. However, for 
resolving some questions regarding the teaching process of a social practices-based 
curriculum, the following points need to be added. 
First of all, let me point out two related, but at first glance paradoxical, points. A 
social practices-based teaching process may be not confined to a classroom. It may also 
be extended to family, school and wider communities. 
Secondly, the four phases I suggested are not necessary sequential stages. These 
phases are just the overall order of the teaching process, it does not necessarily follow 
that the first phase is for Key Stage 1, the second phase for Key Stage 2, the third phase 
for Key Stage 3 and the fourth phase for Key Stage 4. In addition, it should also be 
admitted that the distinctions between each phase, that is, between phase 1 and 2, 
between 2 and 3, and between 3 and 4, are not clear-cut, but there may be overlap 
between one phase and another. 
Thirdly, the teaching approach of a social practices-based curriculum might be 
different according to educational institutions, such as school, college, university, but this 
may be a matter of different levels of the same practices. For instance, the university 
curriculum might be composed of wider optional practices and second order practices, 
and the teaching process might proceed in a logical and critical way. In contrast, the 
school level curriculum may mainly be basic social practices and some wider optional 
33For more (concrete) examples on these issues at the primary and secondary level, see Radnor(l994), 
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social practices and the teaching process may be more practical. Nevertheless, we may 
say that the overall teaching process is not much different in that all levels of education 
are strongly connected to the current pervasive social practices and to developing these 
practices for a flourishing society. 
Lastly, social practices themselves can effectively be created and developed by a 
social practices-based teaching process. Some would think that social practices in the 
social practices-based curriculum could not be radically changed, since social practices 
themselves are relying entirely on longstanding traditions. However, in principle, this is 
not necessarily so. We may respond in two ways. One response is that social practices are 
not merely relying on longstanding traditions, but can be changed and developed by the 
process of responding to the wider societies' ceaseless demands. The other response is 
that teachers may not blindly follow current practices, but also take critical traditions 
among ongoing debatable traditions. Indeed, citizenship and environment education show 
this point in that they are relatively new practices, whose importance has been recently 
recognised in school through ongoing debates. Nevertheless, as a matter of fact, we can 
hardly deny that schools as institutions can suffer from inertia and thus can get out of date 
compared with what is going on outside. In order to avoid conservatism, schools need to 
be responsive to what is going on outside. 
chapter 3 and 4. 
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Chapter 8. Towards Education as Social Practices 
What I have argued throughout this thesis can be summarised thus: education can 
be best understood in tenns of social practices and, therefore, education should be seen 
as initiating students into social practices in a prescriptive and substantial sense. This 
view is not only fairly different from that of liberal education both as the pursuit of 
rationality or knowledge and as the promotion of personal autonomy, but also different 
from 'education as initiation into social practices' in a descriptive and fonnal sense. My 
remaining task for this concluding Chapter is to ascertain whether social practices-based 
education provides an alternative to liberal education. Does the social practices view of 
education really overcome some criticisms and challenges about liberal education? 
To this end, in section A, I shall show that social practices-based education can 
have some advantages compared with liberal education in tenns of integrating the 
academic/vocational, theory/practice and individual/society divides. In section B, more 
positively, I shall examine whether social practices-based education can provide an 
alternative to liberal education. In section C, I shall discuss some possible objections to 
'education as initiation into social practices'. In section D, as a conclusion, I shall deal 
with my reflections on this thesis as a text, considering its limitations, contributions it can 
make and further tasks for research. 
A. Why Education as Initiation into Social Practices? 
I have addressed the importance of education as initiation into social practices 
compared with liberal education both as the pursuit of rationality and as the promotion 
of personal autonomy throughout this thesis. In this section, I do not intend to introduce 
any new substantial argument. Rather, I shall summarise, and hopefully elaborate, the 
primacy of education as initiation into social practices over liberal education that has 
been partly argued in the foregoing Chapters in tenns of bridging the 
academic/vocational, theory/practice, and individual/social divides. 
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1. Integration of the AcademicN ocational Divide 
First of all, one of the strong points of social practices-based education, as 
compared with (the rationalistic) liberal education, lies in overcoming a line of similar 
gaps between academic and vocational subjects, between theoretical knowledge and 
practical demands, between intrinsic value and extrinsic value, and between logical logic 
and practical logic. 
Liberal education as the pursuit of rationality or knowledge, as implied in its 
name, tends to address 'initiating pupils into forms of knowledge' under the name of the 
'intrinsic aim of education,34. Namely, according to Peters and Hirst, education is 
conceptually or logically related to knowledge and understanding. This means that 
education is necessarily concerned with the pursuit of knowledge in its intrinsic sense. 
Therefore, however we define education, it must be logically connected to the pursuit of 
knowledge, insofar as we are concerned with, and faithful to, IE. What is more, if this 
logic is correct, the pursuit of knowledge and understanding are inevitably regarded as 
a universal and objective value (and aim) in education, irrespective of individual desires, 
social and temporal contexts. 
However, is this logic valid? Why should (only) the pursuit of knowledge and 
understanding be IE? Why are not other important values, such as vocational preparation, 
justice, citizenship, environment, health, and so on, involved in that? Is there any 
possibility of defining education without excluding important educational values and, at 
the same time, without damaging its own value? Indeed, within Peters' framework, it 
seems impossible to meet this condition. The reason runs something like this: within 
Peters' framework, only IE such as the pursuit of knowledge has essential importance and 
thus other values, such as vocational preparation, justice, citizenship, etc., which are EE, 
are regarded as trivial compared with IE. Seen in this way, IE and EE are always sharply 
distinguished and, thus, educationally significant values are always confined to IE, that 
is, so-called 'theoretical activities'. In contrast, the value of practical activities which are 
essential parts of a good life and society is undermined in education on the ground that 
they are simply not part ofIE from the Peters-Hirstian point of view. Hence, from the 
34Henceforth, I use abbreviations IE and EE instead of 'the intrinsic airn(value) of education' and 'extrinsic 
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Peters-Hirstian perspective, education, in principle, should be defined in terms of the 
conceptual analysis of education itself, which is isolated from the real human life or 
society. Accordingly, social and practical demands for human or social good, vocational 
preparation and justice, etc. are, by definition, excluded or at least overlooked. It is hardly 
surprising thus that, in the Peters-Hirstian liberal education, vocational preparation that 
is seen as an extrinsic aim was undermined. In this respect, in their liberal education, it 
may not be possible to adequately cope with voices demanding vocational preparation. 
On the other hand, to some extent, liberal education as the promotion of personal 
autonomy, unlike the Peters-Hirstian, could meet practical demands that are required in 
the real world. But this version of liberal education may also have limitations III 
satisfying social virtues -for example, social justice- and social demands. 
Social practices-based education, unlike the Peters-Hirstian liberal education (and 
maybe liberal education as the promotion of personal autonomy), emphasises 
participation or engagement in social practices. In other words, from the social practices 
perspective, education is internally related to social practices35, that is, education should 
be understood as an actual engagement in social practices to which one or a society 
belongs rather than intrinsically related to the conception of education, such as the pursuit 
of knowledge and understanding. Both conceptions of education are not different in that 
they both can, to some extent, maintain consistency or coherence of education, whether 
logical or empirical. We, however, should not ignore here some differences between ICE 
in a Peters-Hirstian sense and ISP. Firstly, ICE results from the logical analysis of the 
concept of education and, thus, the relation between education and the pursuit of 
knowledge is conceptual, whereas ISP stresses engaging in (social, educational, practical, 
or whatever) activities and the relation of education to the activities is experiential or 
empirical. Secondly, related to the first point, ICE is linked to understanding of the forms 
of knowledge that is given by logical analysis of education, whereas ISP is anchored in 
the real human lives and practices which are continually constructed by participants who 
engage in them. In this sense, we may say that ICE is related to the real life or world only 
aims(values) of education', respectively. 
35Henceforth, I shall use ISP for 'education internally related to social practices' and ICE for 'education 
intrinsically related to the conception of education'. Indeed, I prefer to use the term 'internal' instead of 
'intrinsic' in expressing the relation between education and social practices in social practices-based 
education. 
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in indirect or abstract ways, whereas ISP is directly connected to it. Hence, regarding 
human life or society, the former is more or less passive and static, whereas the latter is 
active and dynamic. Thirdly, the value of certain activities in ICE is grounded in 
transcendental argument and thus their value is objective and/or universal, whilst the 
significance of certain activities in ISP relies entirely on pervasive or successful social 
practices and thus their value might be different according to temporal and spatial 
contexts, i.e. contexts-bounded. 
When we see education as promoting goods internal to social practices to which 
one or a society belongs(ISP), as seen in the above comparison, there are some 
advantages. Firstly, social practices-based education may reflect vivid forms of human 
lives, which are embedded in society, by engaging in the social practices, not by abstract 
forms of knowledge which rely on conceptual analysis. Following this education, many 
important virtues and activities, which are outcomes of engaging in social practices to 
which one or a society belongs, can be treated as more important than knowledge, 
understanding and cognitive perspective. Furthermore, theoretical knowledge(or subjects) 
and activities may be important, if and only if they are significant in relation to practical 
human life and flourishing human practices. Hence, there is no longer the demarcation 
between theoretical subjects and practical subjects. Rather, a variety of knowledge, skills, 
attitudes, values and virtues are integrated into social practices. Secondly, social 
practices-based education may offer stronger justification than the transcendental 
argument by its justification grounded in social practices and, thus, without claiming 
universal truth, certain social practices can be justified in the light of the significance of 
human life, which is given in ongoing traditions of social practices. 
In what ways is social practices-based education better than liberal education in 
terms of bridging the academic/vocational divide? In the Peters-Hirstian liberal 
education, as I have pointed out, academic subjects and vocational subjects are sharply 
separated and, further, (only) academic subjects which are represented by forms of 
knowledge, are regarded as valuable in education since they are part of IE. Under this 
circumstance, there is no possibility of integrating them. In contrast, a social practices-
based curriculum content rests entirely on ongoing traditions of social practices in which 
people engage. Hence, in principle, vocational preparation in social practices-based 
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education may not be ruled out, if it is internal to social practices or it results from 
engaging in the social practices, even though it is not intrinsic; and, more positively, in 
this education, even theoretical subjects which are typical parts of IE in Peters' sense 
cannot have any significance for themselves without connecting with current pervasive 
social practices. What is more, social practices-based education substitutes 'practice' for 
'academic subjects' or 'academic disciplines'. This has the advantages of forcing us to 
think more broadly about possible curriculum components, and of teaching us the 
intimate connection between studying an activity and engaging in the activity, such as 
studying science subjects and doing science, studying painting and doing painting, 
studying music and doing music, and so on. This leads us to consider the issue of 
integration of theory and practice. 
2. The Integration of Theory into Practice 
Let me now think of the advantage of social practices-based education in terms 
of the integration of the relationship between theory and practice. This is related to the 
integration of the academic/vocational divide. My focus here is the integration between 
theory and practice in relation to educational theory rather than the integration of theory 
and practice as a whole. The debates on the relationship between theory and practice in 
the educational context have so far been distorted in one aspect or another. Perhaps, the 
debate between O'Connor and Hirst is a typical case. As I sketched in Chapter 4, 
O'Connor claims that a typical example of educational theory, ifthere is any, should be 
like a scientific theory. (However, in fact, educational theory neither consists of a 
logically interconnected set of hypotheses nor conforms to the paradigm provided by a 
scientific theory. In this sense, it is no more than a 'courtesy title'). Hirst, on the other 
hand, recognises the practical nature of educational theory; however, at the same time, 
he still claims that it is theory which involves matters of beliefs and values, not 
educational practice. In this respect, we may say that both O'Connor and Hirst see 
educational theory as something separate from educational practice so that they both fail 
to consider practice sufficiently(Langford, 1978, p.90). 
Langford, in contrast to O'Connor and Hirst, sees education as apracticai activity 
216 
which is concerned with bringing about practical results rather than observing how things 
are(1968, p.l6). This view is quite opposite from both Hirst's and 0' Connor's views of 
educational theory in that educational theory is practice rather than theory. But 
Langford's view is not different from both views in that, by seeing practice as being 
separated from theory, he fails to integrate theory and practice. 
In order to close the gap between theory and practice, it is necessary to introduce 
social practices-based educational theory which emphasises the intimate connection 
between theory and practice realised by practitioners who engage in the educational 
activities. This view appears in Hirst's (1983; 1990; 1993), Carr's(1995), and 
Langford's(1985; 1989) more recent views of education. Hirst, Carr and Lanford in their 
recent views agree that educational theory should start from current social practices in 
which practitioners engage and that it is an integral part of educational practices. 
Four models of educational theory that I have briefly outlined can be drawn as 
<Figure 3>. 
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<Figure3> Models of educational theory 
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As we can see in <Figure3>, models of educational theory can largely be divided into two 
categories: theory-oriented and practice-oriented models. O'Connor's and Hirst's old 
models belong to the former in claiming that education should fundamentally rely on 
theory, whether scientific theory or practical theory. By contrast, Langford's and my 
models36 belong to the latter in seeing that educational theories grow out of practices in 
which practitioners engage, regardless of whether each model can integrate theory into 
practice. 
Let us explain these in more detail. Firstly, O'Connor's model can be labelled the 
'scientific theory model' in claiming that educational theory should be based on 
empirically or factually established findings and confirm them. Following his logic, if 
something is theory, it must fit some conditions for a scientific theory. For him, therefore, 
insofar as education is a theory, it should perform scientific functions, such as prediction 
and explanation of educational phenomena, and educational knowledge also should be 
scientific. 
Secondly, according to Hirst's old model, educational theory should not be 
limited to scientific functions but rather should be concerned to determine and guide 
educational practices. Hence, educational theory also should not merely be limited to 
scientific knowledge, but also include various 'forms of knowledge' including non-
scientific knowledge such as moral and religious. In this sense, we might call it the 
'practical theory model'. Hirst's contributions to the models of educational theory might 
be twofold: an extension of the range of educational theory, that is, from science alone 
to morality and religion which are composed mainly of values and beliefs as well as 
science including social science; and defining educational theory as a practical theory, 
which enables us to take the first, albeit small, step towards seeing education as social 
practices. 
However, what is a common limitation for both 'scientific theory' and 'practical 
theory' models may lie in seeing practice as fundamentally derived from theory. In other 
words, practices are seen as an outcome of a theory successfully implemented. Both these 
models, therefore, take for granted the primacy of theory over practice in that theory is 
36 Although I label it 'my model', this model may apply to social practices-based models of educational 
theory as a whole, such as Langford'(new ), Hirst's(new) and Carr's models. 
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a guide for practice(Kemmis, 1995, p.9). Then, their most striking mistake is embedded 
in their common assumption that educational practice is separated from educational 
theory and also educational practitioners from educational theorists. This fatal limitation 
leads us to consider practical models of educational theory. 
Thirdly, Langford's old model has opened up the view of educational theory as 
practice. For him, in short, education is 'a practical activity, the purpose of which is to 
change those being educated in some desirable ways'(Carr and Kemmis, 1986, p.108). 
In this sense, his model can be called the 'practical activity model'. Indeed, for him, all 
activities are something that people do whether performing actions or making 
observations. Particularly, educational activities are practical activities. 
Certainly, the 'practical activity' model has shown that education is best 
understood as a practical activity and thus it is likely to be a practice, although not all 
practical activities are practices. In this model, in a sense, there is no gap between theory 
and practice, since everything is to be seen as an activity which is doing something and, 
accordingly, everything is practice rather than theory. We can ask, then, 'is education or 
educational theory no more than (practical) activity?' Although Langford recognises that 
education is a practice with a social nature, he does not seem to have a strong view of 
social practice, so far as his earlier writings are concerned. What is more, he seems to 
overlook theoretical aspects of educational activity and, thus, he does not succeed in 
reconciling theory and practice in education. 
Lastly, my model of educational theory is not different from Langford's old one 
in that educational theory is basically a practice which arises from engagement in the 
activity itself. But, beyond this, in this model, education involves not only practical 
activities, but also theoretical and technical activities. And these activities are 
fundamentally products of existing and ongoing social traditions of educational activities 
in which teachers and students engage. In this sense, this model may be called the 'social 
practices model' . 
What is stressed on this model are: firstly, education should be regarded as 
comprising various social practices, e.g. theoretical, practical and technical practices, 
rather than belonging to one social practice among them. Secondly, education is 
fundamentally socially constructed and thus in continuous interaction with societies. 
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Lastly, education should address a practitioner's roles both as an agent and as a translator. 
As agents, practitioners initiate pupils into crucial current social practices to which they 
belong. As translators, practitioners integrate educational theory and practice by 
translating theory and practice adequately onto the leamer's level. 
The last characteristic of this model is particularly important in terms of the 
integration of theory and practice in an educational context. As a matter of fact, 
educational theory and practice can be integrated by practitioners who engage in ongoing 
traditions of educational practices and thus know 'how to do it'. Hence, the gap between 
theory and practice might be bridged by seeing the relation between theory and practice 
within educational activities in which teachers are engaged, since 'educational 
phenomena', 'educational problems' and 'educational theories' should be outcomes of 
ongoing traditions of social practices in which practitioners engage rather than separate 
from them(Carr, 1995, p.37). In this respect, this model is better than liberal education 
and other models in integrating theory and practice. On the other hand, liberal educators 
tend to regard the dichotomy between theory and practice as natural and the primacy of 
theory over practice is taken for granted as we can see in O'Connor's and Hirst's models. 
Accordingly, for them, the integration between them is impossible and not necessary. 
3. The Integration of the Relation between the Individual and Society 
The issue of how can we see the relation of the individual to society is very 
complicated. It can be said that the individual and society may be intertwined with each 
other, to borrow P. White's metaphor, like 'two stout strands in a rope'(1989, p. 4). What 
this metaphor shows us in this context is that, whatever way it is, education inevitably 
involves these two aspects of human lives and, thus, education should reflect both aspects 
in some way. The problem is how to see the relation between the individual and society. 
The integration between the individual and society can be understood in two ways: a 
negative and positive way. In a negative sense, society is important only insofar as it 
provides a framework for education. In a positive sense, education should have 
something to do with the flourishing of society37. 
37This can be equated with a descriptive and prescriptive sense of education as initiation into social 
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In this regard, liberal educators tend to undermine the integration between the 
individual and society or, at best, take a negative stance on it. In the case of liberal 
education as the pursuit of rationality or knowledge, the integration between them is not 
a primary concern and thus is often overlooked, because education is seen as more or less 
being detached from society. On the other hand, in the case of liberal education as the 
promotion of personal autonomy, society is important but only in a negative sense. To put 
it another way, liberal educators who emphasise the promotion of personal autonomy 
tend to think society may be valuable, if it 'can provide a framework within which people 
can choose from among other objective values' or that it gives an important context for 
meaningful choice, which is 'an essential element in the realisation of personal 
autonomy'(M. Moore, 1991, p. 677; p. 683). For them, the value of autonomy is justified 
in terms of personal well-being, because they think that it is an essential element for the 
good life. 
Is this enough for defining the relation of the individual to society? It may be not 
enough. Perhaps, the role of society may go beyond that. Rather, it may be safer to say 
that autonomy has a social nature or, more positively, is fundamentally social on two 
grounds: on the one hand, one's desires or preferences are not purely personal, and on the 
other autonomy itself is not innate, but is exercised and developed through society. 
Hence, we cannot see it in isolation from society or society's values. Art, for instance, can 
hardly be seen as merely expressions of personal vision in that the artist's inspiration 
must be learnt from society and from traditions of social practices in art which provide 
ways of seeing and doing(Langford, 1985, pp. 41-2). What is more, according to 
MacIntyre( 1990b), liberals may encourage to a 'privatization of the good' by substituting 
autonomy for the public realm. In other words, they see society as a means of exercising 
autonomy or personal well-being. This may not look at the good of society in a proper 
sense, because we hardly see personal well-being and autonomy as being absolute or 
independent goods. 
From this perspective, social practices-based education may be needed in that this 
view not only provides a positive perspective regarding the role of society, but also it can 
practices, respectively. 
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adequately explain education as social phenomena. Indeed, from the social practices point 
of view, education is fundamentally seen as an active engagement in social practices to 
which one or a society belongs for the purpose of the flourishing of society and social 
practices themselves. The importance of autonomy can adequately be worked out in this 
context. From the social practices perspective, personal autonomy can contribute to 
society in two respects: every practitioner who engages in the social practices 'is granted 
equal respect and concern' and it may be possible for practitioners to 'take a critical 
stance' about ongoing social practices to which they belong(Pendlebury, 1990, pp. 274-
6). To engage in human practices means, in turn, to autonomously participate in ongoing 
traditions of social practices. 
Seen in this way, it might give an adequate perspective on at least extreme liberal 
and communitarian views of education. Liberals tend to assume that autonomy is a 
common feature of human nature and thus valuable in every society, particularly in a 
liberal democratic society. This assumption in the end leads to the conclusion that 
autonomy is of value independently of circumstances of particular societies, and further 
it tends to undermine the value of social practices. By contrast, communitarians tend to 
assume that it is natural that people as social creatures need to be well adjusted or 
accommodated in a given society and, thus, one of the major tasks of education lies in 
enabling people to live as members of the society to which they belong. This assumption 
presupposes that a society or community is regarded as good in itself. (A community or 
society should be directed towards the good, but this does not mean that it is the good 
itself.) In this situation, presumably, individual values may be replaced by the 
community's values on many occasions. Both claims, however, are dubious. Liberals may 
not explicitly realise that social practices are the content of education, by confining it to 
a set oftheoretical anellor propositional knowledge or personal desires, which are, by and 
large, detached either from social contexts or from communal interests. Communitarians' 
claims might not only confuse education with socialising but also undermine agents' 
active role as practitioners. 
Let me now consider whether social practices-based education can have meaning 
in a plural society. Today's society is often labelled 'pluralism' or 'multiculturalism,38. 
38It is worth drawing a series of distinctions between 'plurality' and 'pluralism', between 'plural' and 
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Pluralism can easily be identified in academic fields as well as in ordinary lives. 
However, the issue of how we should understand the phenomena of plurality in an 
educational context is very complicated, since there are many clusters of issues involved, 
such as how we understand different interpretations of plurality, how we can teach 
different values within a society, how we can maintain a proper balance between 
commonality and diversity, and so on (Tamir, 1995; McLaughlin, 1995). However, my 
concern here is not spelling out these issues as a whole, but examining whether social 
practices-based education has any benefit in a pluralist society compared with liberal 
education. 
How should we understand social practices-based education in a pluralist society? 
In what ways is social practices-based education better than liberal education in response 
to pluralistic challenges? Liberal education and educators are often criticised for 
overlooking and ignoring either society as a whole or the special character and needs of 
minority cultures by focusing on rational autonomy or the overall (thus often majority) 
social contexts(Feinberg, 1995, p. 203). Of course, as Feinberg points out, liberal 
doctrines per se do not necessarily prohibit education from teaching different or other 
cultures and thus liberalism itself is 'no enemy to multicultural education' (ibid., p. 203). 
Indeed, liberal educators not only can teach a diversity of cultures and other cultures, but 
also in fact they do teach them. However, their teaching aims at understanding the 
phenomena of cultural plurality in general rather than understanding other cultures as one 
does one's own. Indeed, 'understanding a plurality of cultures' and 'making a pluralist 
society' are different. It is one thing to say that I understand that our society is plural or 
multicultural containing a plurality of values, cultures, ethnic groups and religions. It is 
quite another to say that I (can) contribute to making a pluralist or multicultural society. 
'pluralist', and between 'pluralism' and 'multiculturalism'. Firstly, 'plurality' refers to the phenomena itself, 
i.e. the fact of diversity in values, beliefs, ways of life and so on, while 'pluralism' refers to an official view, 
which is related to modes of asserting and maintaining these phenomena. Secondly, the term 'plural' is used 
to refer to the fact of diversity, whilst the term 'pluralist' includes attitudes about it. For instance, to say that 
'a society is plural' is pointing out 'a matter offact' such as a diversity of values, cultures, etc. but to say 
that 'a society is pluralist' means that it has adopted 'the position that different values, cultures, etc. have 
a right to exist alongside one another without discrimination'(Haydon, 1997, p.116, n.l). Lastly, 'pluralism' 
and 'multiculturalism' have in common that they are connected to the differences and diversities which are 
exhibited in life styles, ways of thinking, religious beliefs, moral views, philosophical positions and cultural 
identities. But pluralism is applicable to all these phenomena, whereas multiculturalism is restricted to the 
cultural ones. In this respect, multiculturalism is rather one aspect of pluralism, i.e. a plurality of culture. 
Nevertheless, due to the broadness of the conception of 'culture' which embraces all that humans create, 
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In this respect, liberal claims are weak39. 
On the other hand, social practices-based education might have some advantages 
in touching on diverse values in a plural society in that not only are the social practices 
which are central to education basically grounded in a particular society and thus come 
from it, but also it provides more positive suggestions on maintaining a pluralist society. 
It should be noted, however, that I do not claim that plurality itself is desirable nor that 
education should be plural-directed. Indeed, this claim can hardly be justified, since 
plurality does not denote desirability and further the fact that our society is plural does 
not imply that it is, or should be, a pluralistic society (Haydon, 1987, pp. 9-10). My 
assertion rather assumes that if we are given a plural society then, since living in that 
society is inescapable, it is necessary to educate for a pluralist society, although a plural 
society is not necessarily desirable. Indeed, it is more or less apparent that we live now 
in pluralities of values and cultures, etc. within and between societies. No matter what 
they are, it is important for people to understand and respect other people's and society's 
values and cultures as well as one's and a society'S own values and cultures. In this 
respect, education is inevitably directed towards a pluralist society such as encouraging 
people to respect other values and cultures, insofar as we are living in a plural society4o. 
If I am right about this, social practices-based education might be more appropriate for 
a pluralist society than liberal education. The reason may be explained thus: liberal 
education relies ultimately on individuals making up their own minds on choices of 
values and ways of life and thus the individuals need understanding of other values and 
cultures only if they are 'real options for the individual concemed'(Haydon, 1997, p. 
140). In contrast, social practices-based education depends entirely on social practices to 
which one or a society belongs and this presupposes understandings and considerations 
of other values and cultures within one's society. Some would argue, however, that the 
emphasis within the social practices view that understandings and values are different 
according to the traditions of the culture to which one or a society belongs, cannot escape 
from relativism. My immediate response would be: what is wrong with the point that 
they can be used interchangeably, especially in the field of education. 
39More strongly, Kekes(l992) maintains that liberalism is not only incompatible with pluralism, but also 
with relativism. 
4°Similar arguments regarding liberal virtues and religious education are found in Haydon(1997), p.lll-
116; pp. 126-129. 
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different societies have different values and cultures, and thus their understandings are 
inevitably grounded in them?41 
B. Social Practices-based Education: An Alternative? 
So far, I have tried to show why social practices-based education is better than 
liberal education, both as the pursuit of rationality or knowledge and as the promotion of 
personal autonomy, in explaining educational phenomena. Should then education as 
initiation into social practices be an alternative to liberal education? This question is very 
difficult to answer straightforwardly, because the answer may be different depending on 
how we understand the term 'alternative', but also on how we conceive of 'liberal 
education' and 'education as initiation into social practices'. If we do not use the term 
'alternative' in a strict sense, if we see 'education as initiation into social practices' in a 
prescriptive and substantial sense, and if I am right about my understanding of 'liberal 
education', I would say that social practices-based education may be an alternative to 
liberal education. Let me try to show this. 
Liberal education as the pursuit of rationality or knowledge emphasises 'initiating 
pupils into forms of knowledge' because of IE. Seen in this way, however we define 
education, it must be logically connected to the pursuit of knowledge and thus the value 
of knowledge and understanding is regarded as universal and objective, regardless of 
individual desires, and social and temporal contexts. However, this view may have some 
weaknesses. Firstly, presumably, it may negate or undermine important values in a 
society, such as vocational preparation, justice, citizenship, environment, health, and so 
on, by stressing IE. Secondly, related, it is isolated from the real human world so that, 
accordingly, it is almost impossible for education to reflect practices and values of a 
particular society. Lastly, also related, there is no way to integrate internal and external 
values and theory and practice because their conceptual differences are sharpened. 
Liberal education as the promotion of personal autonomy tends to emphasise the 
satisfaction of one's desires in the name of the significance of autonomous choice or even 
personal well-being in a liberal democratic society. The promotion of personal autonomy 
41Walzer(l983) also makes a similar point. For further arguments, see Walzer(1983) and section B of this 
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as an educational aim has some limitations. Firstly, on this approach, it may be difficult 
to maintain consistency or coherence within education, because one's desires may be 
changeable from time to time through one's life. Secondly, the satisfaction of personal 
desires may have limitations in realising social or moral desires and values if there is 
conflict between one's personal desires and social desires. Lastly, personal autonomy as 
an educational aim may be limited in that it is valuable within a liberal-democratic 
society, not in all circumstances. 
Social practices-based education, unlike liberal education as the pursuit of 
rationality or knowledge and as the promotion of personal autonomy, addresses 
participation or engagement in social activities or practices. To put it another way, from 
the social practices perspective, education is internally related to social practices, that is, 
education should be understood as part of the outcome of engaging in social practices to 
which one or a society belongs, rather than intrinsically related to the conception of 
education or democratic principle or personal well-being. This may have some benefits. 
Firstly, as I mentioned above, without any metaphysical or logical ground, the social 
practices account can be given a justification by being grounded in substantive human 
practices in which someone or a society participates. In addition, it can ensure a 
consistency among education, participants and social practices. Secondly, it might be 
better in handling diverse values in a plural society in that social practices are basically 
grounded in a particular society. Lastly, it may make it possible not only to bridge the gap 
between theory and practice or theoretical activities and practical activities, but also to 
provide vivid practical education by dealing with the real human practices of human lives 
and societies. 
Chapter. 
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Nature Relation/Justification Ground 
Liberal education Universal Intrinsic Concept 
as Rationality 
Education as Social Internal Practices 
Social practices 
Liberal education Individual Democratic principle/ Desires 
as Autonomy Personal well-being 
<Figure 4> Social practices-based education compared with liberal education 
To sum up, as shown above in <Figure 4>, social practices-based education can 
give an alternative to liberal education on the following grounds. 1) It might avoid the 
two extreme positions of liberal education, that is, universal and individual pictures of 
education, by suggesting a social picture of education. 2) It might overcome the 
weaknesses of the justification of liberal education that relies either on intrinsic 
justification or personal well-being by resting on the social practices to which one or a 
society belongs. 3) It might have a sounder grounding than liberal education in that it 
stands on real human practices rather than personal desires or transcendental logic. My 
argument for social practices-based education is, in the end, overcoming the weaknesses 
of liberal education by taking a middle way between quite different (and in a sense 
extreme) developments of a tradition of liberal education, i.e. liberal education as the 
pursuit of rationality or knowledge and as the promotion of personal autonomy. 
c. Some Possible Objections 
So far I have tried to show in what ways 'education as initiation into social 
practices' can have strong points and thus overcome the limitations of liberal education. 
In this section, I shall consider some possible criticisms about social practices-based 
education. 
The first possible objection might be a fundamental question: is social practices-
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based education really an alternative to liberal education? This question which liberals 
would raise, is certainly a difficult and perplexing one. This objection seems to be 
grounded in my sharp comparisons and arguments. Liberals might criticise my 
understanding of the liberal position as (too) stark and restricted. For example, some 
would think that liberal education as the promotion of personal autonomy has never 
undermined or ignored the importance of society. Some would think that the view of 
liberal education as the pursuit of rationality is not (necessarily) to be equated with the 
view of education as a whole. These points may be right, as I have admitted. 
Nevertheless, we can hardly deny that liberal education as the pursuit of rationality is 
often regarded as a claim about education as a whole, and that personal autonomy-based 
education particularly stressing 'rational autonomy' is more or less detached from society. 
When we see liberal education in this way, I hold that social practices-based education 
may be an alternative to liberal education. However, as far as political liberalism is 
concerned, I do not hold a strong position, since some political liberals tend to maintain 
that education is a social practice. For example, Jonathan(l995; 1997) tries on the one 
hand to overcome 'perennial tensions between individual freedom and social justice in 
a liberal society'(l997, p. 12; cf.1995, p. 106) and on the other to broaden the horizons 
of liberal education, by reinterpreting liberal education in the light of social theory and 
social practices. For her, education is 'a society's most central social practice'(1997, p.1). 
Jonathan's position could be understood, to use my classification, as 'education as 
initiation into social practices' in a descriptive or formal sense rather than in a 
prescriptive or substantial sense. Seen in this way, I would say that this version of liberal 
education might be a complement to (or of) liberal education. But I am not sure whether 
this position can still be called 'liberal education'. 
The second possible objection might be conservatism. This attack can be raised 
in two ways: the nature of social practices, and social practices in school education. 
Firstly, when we see education as an initiation of people into substantive social practices 
to which one or a society belongs, some would think that, to some extent, it may 
inevitably allow conservatism. This may be partly true, because substantive social 
practices are not very frequently changed; however, it is also true that social practices are 
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by no means something fixed and given from outside, as I have stressed several times42. 
Secondly, some would worry about conservatism in the school in that social practices 
within school are relatively less changeable, for example, it took schools a long time to 
catch up with the use of computers in business. We can admit this point, but this is 
derived from the conservatism of institutions, not of social practices themselves. Hence, 
in principle, there is no reason why social practices within schools should not change. 
The third possible objection, as more or less opposite to the second objection, 
might be locality or relativity of social practices. Social practices are basically 'located 
in time and space' because they always exist 'in specific communities and arise[s] out of 
mutual engagement, which is largely dependent on specific places and times'(Wenger, 
1998, pp.130-131). From this point of view, some would raise the criticism that social 
practices-based education is more or less relativistic and its justification is at best local 
justification43 . This claim would be correct in that social practices cannot transcend 
spatial and temporal contexts and their justification also is 'always found within a 
particular set of shared values'(Thigpen and Downing, 1989, pp.542-543). This criticism 
presupposes the claim that education should pursue universal values and its justification 
should be universal. But my response may take two forms: a negative and positive form. 
In a negative response, is universal justification either possible or necessary for the 
justification of values? In a positive response, what is wrong with local justification? In 
a social practices-based education, to some extent, 'weak relativism' may be accepted in 
a pluralist society, although an 'extreme' or 'sceptical relativism' may be rejected44, 
because social practices could be different according to the traditions of society to which 
one or society belongs. Hence, local justification which relies on a particular set of shared 
values is inevitable in a pluralist society. 
The last objection is related to the practical difficulties in educational practices. 
When we practise 'education as initiation into social practices' in school, many practical 
42See section B of Chapter 5 (regarding flexibility of traditions), section B of Chapter 7 (regarding social 
practices of school education) and section D of Chapter 8( cf. a change of my academic life and a 'voyage' 
metaphor ). 
43For details of the locality of social practices, see Wenger(1998), chapter 5. 
44S. Lukes(l995) divides the two kinds of relativism: 'cultural relativism' which holds that 'each culture 
is valid in its own terms, that its norms and principles are only applicable within[it], that to understand 
means not to criticise'; 'the sceptical view' that, 'for epistemological or other reasons, judgements cannot 
be made across cultural boundaries: 'they' cannot be judged by 'our' standards'(p.l78). The former can 
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problems are raised: which social practices are most substantive and thus important? 
Who is to decide them and how? How can we select educationally valuable social 
practices? How can students be initiated into them in a classroom? etc. Although I have 
tried to be clear about lists of questions at a school level and have also suggested that 
ongoing traditions of social practices to which one or a society belongs must be the basis 
for answering them, there are still questions unsettled. Some cases are more or less clear, 
but many cases may not be clear at all, when we perform social practices-based education 
at a specific level. Some would say that this is a matter of sociological, political concerns 
or of pragmatic principle. Even if we follow these principles, we may be faced with 
difficulties in maintaining coherence within social traditions and democratic bodies, 
because we have 'different traditions and practices according to different ethnic and 
cultural backgrounds' and, moreover, 'within a society that shares moral traditions and 
social practices, there may be disagreement about what these traditions and practices 
require'(Tunick, 1998, pp.3-4). Accordingly, teachers as practitioners may have different 
opinions about which social practices students should be initiated into, how to initiate 
them, and so on. In this respect, we should stop thinking that social practices-based 
education can be carried out in accordance with a universal principle, but rather we 
should improve and elaborate it by accumulated trial and error. 
D. Reflections and Conclusion 
This thesis, in fact, has been completed by dealing with the justification of social 
practices-based education and some possible objections. In this section, I shall put 
forward some reflections on my thesis as a text, which include some limitations of it, 
contributions it can make and suggestions for further study. 
Let me begin with reflection on the character of this thesis as a text. My thesis has 
been written against the background of contemporary writings in the philosophy of 
education on the one hand and, on the other, it can be seen as, at least to some extent, a 
reaction against these. In favour of social practices-based education rather than liberal 
education, I have made much of the point that education should be based on current 
be labeled 'weak relativism' and the latter can be called 'strong relativism'. 
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social practices of the real world in which we engage. However, my thesis itself as a text 
might not be directly linked with this point due to the abstractness of the nature of 
academic discourses in general and a philosophical discourse in particular. Indeed, 
academic discourses are in general theoretically-oriented and thus academic writings are 
more or less theory-biased. In this respect, academic discourses and writings, implicitly 
or explicitly, tend to encourage the gap between theory and practice rather than close it. 
In particular, a philosophical discourse is highly theoretical and logically-oriented, and 
thus encourages students to write with these virtues rather than to solve practical 
problems which occur in our society. Without any logical or theoretical tightness, 
philosophical writings are often regarded as lacking in value. 
My thesis is not an exception. The thesis follows the traditions of academic 
writings in philosophy. Put more exactly, my academic writing is still grounded in the 
analytic traditions of philosophy, as far as philosophical methodology is concerned. 
Philosophy as an academic field may belong to a 'second-order' practice rather than 
'basic' practice. Hence, philosophical discourse itself is not directly connected with the 
real world and thus does not directly tackle practical problems which occur in our society, 
although it can show the real world of philosophy as a discipline. This irony or limit 
inescapably appears in my thesis, in so far as I am engaging in philosophical discourse 
or practice. Indeed, my thesis does not directly treat social practices themselves in which 
I live, although I stress both that education should grow out of social practices of the real 
human world and that 'practical logic' is more fundamental than 'logical logic' . 
Given the fundamental limit, nevertheless, my thesis contributes to something 
about social practices. First of all, this text itself shows a social practice both in the field 
of philosophy of education and in my (real) academic life. This text is an outcome of 
engaging in ongoing traditions of philosophy of education. It shows exactly how 
philosophical practices have so far been changed in the field of education. The overall 
argument of this text follows a chronological order, for example,from liberal education 
as the pursuit of rationality and knowledge to liberal education as the promotion of 
personal autonomy, and then to social practices-based education. Furthennore, in general, 
the details of it also show changes in ongoing traditions of philosophy of education- such 
as, regarding educational theory,jrom the scientific theory of education to the practical 
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theory of education, to the practical activity of education, and then to the social practices 
view of education. On the other hand, my thesis also shows a social practice which 
reflects my twenty years-academic life as a student and as a university teacher of 
philosophy of education. I have been educated by the liberal education tradition in terms 
of substance and by the analytic traditions of philosophy in terms of methodology and 
this is extended in my academic career. When I came to the Institute of Education, which 
has the best-established traditions of liberal education, my intention was to more strongly 
justify liberal education by digging into Aquinas's conception ofliberal education, which 
is a missing tradition of liberal education able to bridge the gap between the ancient and 
modem liberal education. To do this, I systematically read and analysed MacIntyre's 
writings for the purpose of glimpsing Aquinas' thought. This work made me interested 
in MacIntyre's idea itself and I found his 'social practice' thesis attractive. My current 
thesis is a kind of expansion and elaboration of his social practice idea in an educational 
context, although it certainly goes beyond MacIntyre's thesis. This break in my academic 
tradition is the result of the ongoing traditions of philosophical practices in which I 
engage. 
Secondly, my thesis as a text can contribute to the understanding and 
improvement of social practices in education by providing theoretical foundations and 
the overall picture of 'education as initiation into social practices'. The relations between 
educational practices and a philosophical argument or practice in education are 
complementary. On the one hand, philosophical argument should not only be based on 
educational practices, but also should unceasingly be modified in the practice of everyday 
life, classroom, education and society. On the other hand, educational practices need to 
be articulated and improved by the practical theory which philosophical practice may 
provide. Social practices are not only improved through trial and error but also articulated 
by academic or philosophical practice. In this respect, teachers engaged in educational 
practices and scholars engaged in academic practice perform different parts of the same 
practices, and thus cooperative and collaborative work between them is desirable in order 
to promote the development of virtuous practices. Furthermore, we should consider 
nonacademic but crucial social practices in which we live along with them. 
My thesis as a philosophical practice in the end should be translated, expanded, 
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articulated and rewritten according to traditions of social practices in which one engages 
or to which one or a society belongs. Korean educational traditions might be different 
from the UK's. So my further research might require my arguments to be reinterpreted 
against a Korean educational background. What can I say about Korean education in 
terms of social practices at a specific level- such as curriculum organisation, teaching 
process, teacher education, and so on? Another task which I have in mind is to 
(re )consider other fields of education, such as moral education 45 and religious education 
from the social practices perspectives. What would social practices-based moral and 
religious education be like in comparison with a traditional approach? It is natural that 
these two tasks are given for me, partly because my life is greatly indebted to two 
backgrounds, i.e. Korean education and Christian education, and partly because I am 
engaged in these practices. 
Let me conclude with a metaphor: 'voyage' and 'sea'. Social practices, like a 
sailor's voyage, are continuously changed and advanced. Although sometimes navigators 
put down the anchor in the harbour and sometimes temporarily cannot navigate because 
of storms or because the engine is out of order, their general duty is characterised as the 
voyage itself. However, social practices are always worked out within certain 
backgrounds, just as a ship's voyage is possible only on the sea. Sometimes, certain 
adventurous navigators want to go on uncharted waters, but they must be navigating on 
the sea. 
45For a partial argument for social practices-based moral education, see Hirst(1999a). 
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APPENDIX I: The Peters-Hirstian Liberal Education 
In this Appendix, I shall deal with how far there IS a difference between 
Peters' and Hirst' views ofliberal education!. 
1. Peters' Liberal Education 
Let us begin by considering Peters' 'liberal education' in relation to 
'education'. Is there any difference between the concept of education and the concept 
of liberal education? To put it another way, is liberal education a form of education or 
the same concept? The answer to this question might be different, depending on what 
we mean by 'education' and 'liberal education'. Ifwe define the concept of education 
broadly, for instance, 'all kinds of teaching and learning activities', liberal education 
might be a form of education. In contrast, if we, like Peters, define the concept of 
education strictly, liberal education would be synonymous with the concept of 
education2. His logic seems to run as follows: the most fundamental question in 
education concerns the very concept of education itself, i.e. 'what is education?' This 
question implies both 'what is an ideal form of education?' and 'what is an original 
form of education?' From this point of view, for Peters, 'what is education?' and 
'what is an ideal form of education?' or 'what is an original form of education?' are 
not quite different questions, and the question 'what is education?' presupposes that 
there is 'the concept of education', or 'the ideal form of education'. The answer to this 
question, according to Peters, is liberal education. 
'It is necessary to analyse their books and papers as a whole in order to understand their ideas of liberal 
education and its limitations. However, my understanding of their liberal education relies mainly on the 
following writings: Peters' Ethics and Education(1966), 'Ambiguities in Liberal Education and the 
Problem of Its Content'(l977), Hirst's 'Liberal Education and the Nature of Knowledge'(1965) and 
Knowledge and Curriculum(l974), even though they have presented their ideas of liberal education in 
a wide variety of papers. The reason why these books and papers were selected is that these are good 
illustrations of their ideas of liberal education, as well as providing an overview of how these ideas 
have developed and changed over time. For more details of the process of Peters' modification of his 
theory, see Hirst(l986), R.K.Elliott(l986) and R. F. Dearden(1986). 
21t needs to be noted, however, that the claim of the equation of education with liberal education is 
considerably weakened by Peters' modification of his view on the concept of 'intrinsic value' in later 
writings. In 'Ambiguities in Liberal Education and the Problem of Its Content'(1977), he has pointed 
out that both practical activities such as cookery and theoretical activities such as science can be 
pursued 'for its own sake'. 
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Let us consider this more fully. Peters' starting point for liberal education is to 
enquire about what the concept of education is. It is clearly shown in his Ethics and 
Education(1966). According to Peters(1966, pp. 25-43), the concept of education has 
to satisfy three criteria: a normative criterion, a cognitive criterion and a procedural 
criterion. These are briefly thus: ' 'education' implies the transmission of what is 
worthwhile to those who become committed to it; 'education' must involve 
knowledge and understanding and some kind of cognitive perspective, which are not 
inert; and 'education' at least rules out some procedures of transmission, on the 
grounds that they lack wittingness and voluntariness on the part of the learner'(p. 45). 
From this point of view, education should be intrinsically rather than extrinsically 
defined, tend towards a broad rather than narrow belief system and understanding, and 
be intelligible to the learner rather than unintelligible in terms of procedures. 
This concept of 'education' is not different from that of liberal education in 
that these criteria of education are exactly the same as the criteria of liberal education. 
He puts it: 
The demand for liberal education might not be for a special kind of education, but for 
the removal of certain restrictions or impediments that might hinder education as 
ordinarily understood. The function of 'liberal' would then be the negative one of 
emphasizing one or other of the three types of criteria of 'education' in a context 
where these were being made difficult to realize(l966, p.43). 
As we can see, from the passage quoted above, for Peters, liberal education is not a 
particular form of education, but rather the very concept of education or an ideal form 
of education in that liberal education is a kind of plea that restrictions or impediments 
in realisation of the concept of education should be removed and thus that what is 
intrinsic to education should be recovered. 
What then are the restrictions or constraints on practising liberal education? 
These constraints, according to Peters, are threefold: firstly, they relate to extrinsic 
ends such as the production of material goods, obtaining a job or manning a 
profession. In other words, the demands for 'liberal education' are protest against 
instrumentalisation of education and an opposition to the restriction of the curriculum 
to what is deemed to be relevant to extrinsic ends. Secondly, they relate to 'training' 
that, as a contrasting concept to 'education', is related to the development of 
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competence in a limited skill or mode of thought. The demand for liberal education is 
in effect a plea that education should not be confined to specialist training. Lastly, 
they relate to methods by which (liberal) education cannot be transmitted in a morally 
acceptable manner. In this sense, we could say that the demand for liberal education is 
a kind of protest against constraining people's beliefs by narrowly conceived or 
dogmatic methods such as indoctrination, conditioning and brainwashing(ibid., pp.43-
45). 
These different ways of conceiving of liberal education appear in some 
ambiguities of the concept of 'liberal'. There are, therefore, bound to be ambiguities 
inherent in the demand for liberal education(Peters, 1977, p. 3). These ambiguities 
appear in the following three forms: as knowledge for its own sake- liberal education 
must be pursued 'for its own sake', not viewed as instrumental to some other end such 
as vocational or utilitarian ends; as general education- liberal education is a plea 
against the mind being confined to one discipline or form of understanding; and as the 
development of the free person- liberal education relates to constrictions on the mind 
imposed by dogmatic methods ofteaching(ibid., pp. 3-20). 
Given the concept of liberal education has ambiguities and vagueness, Peters' 
view of what is central to liberal education can roughly be expressed thus: education 
is fundamentally a matter of worthwhile activities. All worthwhile activities are linked 
with intrinsic goods which are built into the concept of education such as developing 
rational mind-related activities. The core of these goods is the pursuit of knowledge 
and understanding. Therefore, intrinsically worthwhile activities in education can be 
reduced to the pursuit of knowledge and understanding. For Peters, in short, the 
phrase 'liberal education' appears something of a slogan which takes on different 
meanings according to its immediate context. It usually labels a form of education of 
which the author approves, but beyond that its meaning is often entirely negatively 
derived. For instance, liberal education is not a vocational education, not a specialist 
education in any sense, and so on(Hirst, 1965, p.I13). 
2. Hirst's Liberal Education 
Hirst's liberal education is not different from Peters' in addressing knowledge 
and understanding. But the differences between their views are apparent at least in 
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terms of a starting point and the relation of education to liberal education. Unlike 
Peters, Hirst's starting point of liberal education lies in suggesting a stipulative 
definition of it, not education as a whole. Hence, he tried to define the concept of 
liberal education in a positive and logical sense. Indeed, Hirst's 'Liberal Education 
and the Nature of Knowledge '(1965) is an attempt to clarify the concept of liberal 
education in a positive sense. 
Hirst tried to establish the idea of liberal education by examining the Greek 
idea of liberal education3 which was rooted in a number of related philosophical 
doctrines regarding the nature of knowledge, mind, reality and the relationship among 
them. According to Hirst, this logic runs like this: it is the peculiar activity of the 
mind to pursue knowledge; in that the mind, which is related to pursuit of knowledge, 
comes to know the essential nature of things and can apprehend what is ultimately 
real and immutable; and the pursuit of knowledge is the fulfilment of the mind and, 
therefore, an essential element in the good life. From these doctrines there emerged 
the idea of liberal education as a process concerned simply and directly with the 
pursuit ofknowledge(ibid., pp. 113-4). 
A classical argument that the doctrines lend to this conception of education is 
threefold. First, such an education is, or should be, based on what is true (episteme) 
rather than on uncertain opinions and beliefs(doxa). Secondly, since knowledge itself 
is a distinctive human virtue, liberal education has a value for the person as the 
fulfilment of the mind. Thirdly, because of the significance of knowledge in the 
determination of the good life as a whole, liberal education is essential to a person's 
'understanding' of how he or she ought to live, both individually and socially(ibid., 
pp. 114-5). However, these doctrines, in particular the doctrine of 'epistemological 
realism', have become less convincing, since knowledge is no longer seen as the 
apprehension of reality but merely as the understanding of experience. Being deprived 
of its original philosophical grounds, is there still significance in liberal education? If 
so, are there any other grounds for liberal education without resting on metaphysical 
assumptions? If so, on what grounds? 
Having satisfied this demand, Hirst provides us with a revised and plausible 
liberal education which is grounded in 'knowledge itself. His argument runs as 
3He also examined the Harvard Committee Report(1946) and A. D. C. Peterson's idea(I960) of liberal 
education. For the details of this, see Hirst(I965), pp. 116 ff. 
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follows: there is a logical relationship between the concept of 'mind' and that of 
'knowledge', from which it follows that 'the achievement of knowledge is necessarily 
the development of mind in its most fundamental aspect'(ibid., p. 123). To put it more 
fully, a liberal education is 'determined in scope and content by knowledge itself, i.e. 
forms of knowledge and it 'is thereby concerned with development of mind'(ibid., 
p.12S). In other words, liberal education is, fundamentally, aiming at the development 
of mind and what content, to some extent, can be taught relies on knowledge itself. If 
Hirst's assertions that liberal education is aiming at the development of mind and that 
the acquisition of knowledge is logically connected to the development of mind are 
correct, this conclusion presumably follows: the content of liberal education is 
necessarily constituted by forms of knowledge and thus teaching forms of knowledge, 
as it is related to the development of rational mind, is the essential part of education. 
From this point of view, Hirst addressed the following two things: evidence of the 
development of mind that cannot be defined but by acquisition of knowledge; and the 
classification and justification of several forms of knowledge. We can say, therefore, 
that, for Hirst, forms of knowledge lie at the heart of his liberal education. 
What then are forms of knowledge? According to Hirst, the forms of 
knowledge are, in short, 'the basic articulations whereby the whole of experience has 
become intelligible to humans' and thus 'they are fundamental achievements of 
mind'. He puts it more explicitly: 'To acquire knowledge is to become aware of 
experience as structured, organised and made meaningful in some quite specific way, 
and the varieties of human knowledge constitute the highly developed forms in which 
humans have found this possible. To acquire knowledge is to learn to see, to 
experience the world in a way otherwise unknown, and thereby corne to have a mind 
in a fuller sense'(ibid., pp.124-S). Forms of knowledge are, in short, distinct ways in 
which our experience becomes structured, articulated and extended. It is natural to 
say, hence, that different forms of knowledge reflect different understandings of our 
experiences(ibid., p.128). 
What then are the criteria for the distinction between forms of knowledge? 
How can forms of knowledge be classified? He puts forward the distinguishing 
features of forms of knowledge as follows: '1) They each involve certain central 
concepts that are peculiar in character to the form. 2) As a result, the form has a 
distinctive logical structure. 3) The form has expressions or statements that in some 
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way or other are testable against experience. 4) The forms have developed particular 
techniques and skills for exploring experience and testing their distinctive 
expressions'(ibid., 129. My emphasis.). The developed particular techniques and 
skills among other criteria are, as Hirst himself admits in his later papers, merely 
some secondary features that do not directly follow from the logical distinctions of 
forms of knowledge4• We can say therefore that 'the distinctions between the various 
forms of knowledge which will principally govern the scheme of education will be 
based entirely on analyses of their particular conceptual, logical and methodological 
features'(ibid., p. 125). From these criteria, the forms of knowledge can be classified 
as follows: '1) distinct disciplines or forms of knowledge: mathematics, physical 
science, human science, history, religion, literature and fine arts, philosophy5. 2) 
fields of knowledge: theoretical, practical'(ibid., p. 131). 
So far I have explained Hirst's stipulative conception of liberal education. His 
conception of liberal education, unlike Peters', is positively defined by 'knowledge 
itself. Given his conception of liberal education, let me now briefly sketch the 
relationship between education and liberal education. For Hirst, unlike Peters, liberal 
education is not necessarily education as a whole nor should education as a whole be 
equated with liberal education, but rather liberal education is a part of the whole of 
education. As Hirst admitted, liberal education 'cannot be regarded as providing a 
total education' in that there is a danger of ignoring many crucial other concerns such 
as specialist education, physical education and character training(Hirst, 1974, p. 96; 
1965, p. 136). Nonetheless, for him, liberal education is the very heart of the whole of 
education. Hence, we may rightly say that in his earlier education the pursuit of 
knowledge and understanding was addressed in the following logic: education is 
concerned with the whole person who lives the rational good life. The good life is 
obtained and justified by the exercise and pursuit of reason. Having reason or 
justification presupposes having knowledge and understanding. Hence, the pursuit of 
4For this reason, he modifies the criteria and the terms as follows: 'concepts', 'logical structures' and 
'truth criteria'. For the details of it, see Hirst, (1974), pp. 85ff. 
5The question of how many forms of knowledge can be identified is controversial. Indeed, Hirst's 
classification of forms of knowledge has also been slightly modified as follows: in 'The Nature and 
Structure of Curriculum Objectives '(1974), mathematics, the physical sciences, knowledge of persons, 
literature and fine arts, morals, religion and philosophy(p.25); in The Logic of Education(1970), the 
truths of formal logic and mathematics, the truths of physical sciences, our awareness and 
understanding of our own and other people's minds, moral judgements, objective aesthetic experience, 
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rationality in general or knowledge and understanding in particular is the central part 
of education as a whole. This leads us to identify Hirst's liberal education with 
Peters'. 
religious claims, and philosophical understanding. And for a fuller discussion of his position as a whole 
on this, see' The Forms of Knowledge Re-visited'(l974), pp. 84-100. 
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APPENDIX II: An Analysis of the Conception of Autonomy 
The concept of autonomy is ambiguous in that the denotation of it is not clear. 
Indeed, the notion of autonomy has been used in an exceedingly broad fashion. 
According to Dworkin( 1988), it is often used as an equivalent to the following terms: 
liberty, self-rule or sovereignty, freedom of the will, dignity, integrity, individuality, 
independence, responsibility, and self-knowledge, qualities of self-assertion, critical 
reflection, freedom from obligation, the absence external causation, knowledge of 
one's own interests. 'It is even equated by some economists with the impossibility of 
interpersonal comparisons. It is related to actions, to beliefs, to reasons for acting, to 
rules, to the will of other persons, to thoughts, and to principles' (p.6). Indeed, the 
meaning of autonomy varies according to the speakers' intention and social context. 
On the other hand, the concept of autonomy is also vague in that the 
connotation of it cannot be confined. In other words, even if the connotation of 
autonomy is defined, there still might be dispute regarding the meaning of autonomy 
in terms of degree or level of autonomy. What is more, the focus of autonomy, as we 
can see from White, has been changed from time to time: from focusing on the 
intellectual and rational tendency to focusing on the satisfaction of desires, and again 
from focusing on universal human qualities such as rationality and human desires to 
focusing on autonomy within a social and political context. This also makes it 
difficult to understand. In order to understand the status of autonomy in liberal 
education, therefore, it is necessary to follow these transitions. Before I do this, let me 
put forward some preliminary analysis ofthe notion of autonomy. 
What is autonomy? Who can be called an autonomous person? One of the 
easiest ways of clarifying the concept of autonomy might be to compare the notion of 
autonomy with similar concepts such as 'freedom' and 'independence', and with 
contrary concepts such as 'heteronomy'. Is autonomy the same thing as freedom, or 
independence? What is a typical state of heteronomy? And what are the differences 
between autonomy and autarchy, and between autonomy and authenticity? How far 
are these distinctions sound? 
Let us start by contrasting 'autonomy' to 'heteronomy'. The paradigmatic case 
of heteronomy may be easily found in someone who lies under excessive external 
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constraints. According to White, 'autonomous people choose their major ends 
themselves rather than leaving them to tradition, religion or others' domination' (1990, 
p. 74). In other words, autonomous persons tend to choose their ends without relying 
on external authorities, whilst heteronomous persons tend to rest on external factors 
when they choose some particular ends. For heteronomous persons, external 
authorities always constitute some kind of constraints. In this sense, we can say, as the 
simplest way, that autonomy is not a heteronomous state which is determined by 
external constraints. This sense is linked to negative freedom or liberty. It should be 
noted, however, that there is no reason why someone should not act heteronomously 
under internal constraints. One's heteronomous actions may also be influenced by the 
internal constraints, although we admit that they mainly occur under the influence of 
external constraints. This may be linked with a positive freedom or liberty. 
The concept of freedom, in general, is used in two senses: a negative and a 
positive sense. In a negative sense, according to Berlin(1969), freedom is connected 
to the question: 'what is the area within which the subject- a person or group of 
persons- is or should be left to do or be what he[ or she] is able to do or be, without 
interference by others?'. In contrast, a positive sense of freedom is linked with the 
question: 'what, or who, is the source of control or interference that can determine 
someone to do, or to be, this rather than that?'(pp.121-122). That is, negative freedom 
is concerned with the area, in which the subject should be left without interference or 
coercion, whereas positive freedom is concerned with who or what controls. Let us 
begin with considering negative freedom. 
The idea of negative freedom is well encapsulated in Berlin's claims: 'I am 
normally said to be free to the degree to which no man or body of men interfere with 
my activity. Political liberty in this sense is simply the area within which a man can 
act unobstructed by others'(1969, p.122). These claims show us two things: Berlin's 
advocacy of negative freedom; and that the meaning of it can be expressed as an 
absence of or lack( of obstacles to choice) in which nothing obstructs one. For Berlin, 
therefore, his main concern seems to lie in how to remove obstructions to individual 
choice. His claims, of course, must be subjected to some questions6; however, I do not 
60ne obvious question is what counts as interference or constraint when we defme negative freedom as 
the state of the absence of interference or constraint(D. Miller, 1991, p.13). The answer to the question 
may be various, for instance, other people, material resources, laws, etc. For a full discussion of this, 
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want to criticise them here, since my present purpose is to establish the concept of 
autonomy in relation to that of freedom. 
Negative freedom, in short, can be defined as 'the absence of constraints or 
restraints relevant to what we do want or might want to do'(Dearden, 1972, p. 450). It 
may be the case, for instance, that someone voted for or against some issues without 
anybody's, or any institution's, or any party's directions. In this case, we can say that 
he or she was being autonomous in voting. Hence, negative freedom can be a 
necessary condition for exercising autonomy in that without a minimum freedom, to 
exercise autonomy is impossible. However, we should not confuse the exercise of 
autonomy with the development of autonomy7, since exercising autonomy does not 
always guarantee developing autonomy. Furthermore, we can never say that freedom 
is a sufficient condition for both exercising and developing autonomy, since freedom 
itself cannot guarantee the exercise of autonomy, although it is a minimum condition. 
Indeed, for exercising autonomy, other elements are needed such as reason, desire, 
volition for action, and so on. We might conclude, therefore, that the notion of 
negative freedom cannot be equated with that of autonomy, but it is a basic, and 
important, condition we should inevitably assume for exercising autonomy. This leads 
us to consider positive freedom. 
What, then, is the relationship between positive freedom and autonomy? The 
answer to this question seems to be more complicated. According to Berlin, positive 
freedom can be presented thus: 'I wish to be the instrument of my own, not other 
men's, acts of will. I wish to be a subject, not an object...deciding, not being decided 
for, self-directed and not acted upon by external nature or by other men ... that is, of 
conceiving goals and policies of my own and realizing them'(1969, p. 131, emphasis 
added). In positive freedom, as we can see in the passages quoted above, the notions 
of 'my own', 'self-directed', 'subject', etc. are addressed. It seems to me that positive 
freedom emphasises a subject who controls an action, i.e. 'self' in an autonomous 
action, whilst negative freedom emphasises the issue of whether one's state is free or 
not. Negative freedom, in practice, is merely a necessary condition for autonomy, not 
a sufficient condition. That is, being free from the constraints does not guarantee 
see F.A. Hayek(l960), H. Steiner(l974-5) and G. A. Cohen(l979). These seem to show us, in tum, that 
the meaning of freedom cannot be determined satisfactorily by negative freedom(Tayor, 1979). 
7Dearden(1972) draws the distinction between an exercise of autonomy and the development of it. See 
pp.451-2. 
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being autonomous. If my analysis is correct, we might say that positive freedom 
seems to be much closer to autonomy than negative freedom to it. It is noteworthy, 
however, that positive freedom, like negative freedom, cannot always assure an 
autonomous action. For, it is one thing to say that 'I am not prevented from doing 
something' or 'I can choose to do something for my self. It is quite another to say 
that 'I am doing something autonomously'. 
Comparing autonomy with authenticity and autarchy can make the conception 
of autonomy more explicit. Authenticity is often equated with autonomy in that they 
both address individual choice. However, the two conceptions can be distinguished: 
the conception of authenticity stresses the fact that 'everything is ultimately self-
chosen' or 'only self can be the chooser of everything', whilst that of autonomy 
emphasises self as rational chooser. In this sense, authenticity, as it is best illustrated 
in Nietzsche8, may be an extreme form of autonomy. It should be noted, however, that 
authenticity, at least in fact, is neither possible nor desirable, since genuine self-
choosing as a social being, as a matter of fact, is impossible and there is no guarantee 
that everything I choose is always good. 
On the other hand, the conception of autonomy can be distinguished from that 
of autarchy. An agent's being autarchic refers to 'the freedom of action of an agent 
who, while enjoying (over a wide range of actions) that negative freedom which 
covers the absence both of force and of coercion, also exercises unimpaired all the 
normal capacities and powers of a rational chooser by reference to which freedom as 
rational self-direction is defined' (Gray, 1983, p. 74). In this sense, in a tradition-
directed society, to some extent, there is no reason why one cannot be autarchic(l. 
White, 1990, p. 97 ). What then is the difference between autonomy and autarchy? 
According to Gray, an autonomous person has the features of the autarchic person; 
however, in addition to 'exercising capacities for rational reflection and strength of 
will in the objective choice-conditions which are not distorted by the presence of 
force or coercion, an autonomous agent must also have distanced himself in some 
measure from the conventions of social environment and from the influence of the 
persons surrounding him'(Gray, ibid.). In short, whilst the autarchic person stresses 
the self as a rational chooser, the autonomous person should be not merely a rational 
8The best exposition of Nietzsche in terms of philosophy of education may be found in Cooper's 
A uthenticity and Learning: Nietzsche's educational philosophy( 1983). 
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chooser, but a critical reflector9. For the autonomous person, therefore, at least two 
conditions are needed: critical capacities which are required for rational reflection; 
and one's volition which is both to act as he or she wants to act and to follow his or 
her own critical reflection. The former factor seems to be embedded in 'the 
rationalistic model' and the latter element seems to be stressed in 'the desire-
satisfaction model' . 
9In this respect, some would call them a 'weak' sense of autonomy and 'strong' sense of autonomy, 
respectively. It, however, should be noted that this distinction is more or less a product of the legacy of 
Kantian rationality. This tradition can be found in Peters(1977), Dearden(1972) and White(1973). In 
contrast, Cooper would object to the rationalistic notion of autonomy and authenticity, because he sees 
authenticity as embracing cognitive and affective domain in human lives. For details of this, see 
his(1983), pp. 20ff. My concern here does not lie in judging whether this distinction is sound, but in 
exploring and criticising the strong sense of autonomy, which is distinguished from autarchy. 
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